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Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses in all cases. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher for the 10 trials condition than for the 5 trials condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

As a result, the *Journal of Management Studies* is pleased to announce that the *Journal of Management Studies* will be publishing a special issue on the topic of "The Role of the Journal of Management Studies in the Field of Management Studies" in the next issue.



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Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses in all cases. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

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THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE
A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY

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THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE

A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

Citizen Soldiers. Essays towards the Improvement of the Volunteer Force. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1894.

The Brain of an Army. A Popular Account of the German General Staff. Macmillan & Co. 1890.

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR CHARLES DILKE,
BART., AND SPENSER WILKINSON.

Imperial Defence. Macmillan & Co. 1892.

BY MAJOR GAUNE AND SPENSER WILKINSON.

The Order of Field Service of the German Army.
Authorised Translation. Edward Stanford.
1893.

THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE

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A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY

BY

SPENSER WILKINSON



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PREFACE.

IN every country of Europe, in the British Colonies and in India, men are asking one question: Will the British Empire stand or fall? It is at present the issue upon which, more than upon any other, the world's future turns. Those who must settle it are the people of Great Britain, who hitherto have scarcely been aware that there is a doubt upon the subject. In the following pages an attempt is made to bring the question home to them, and to point out that the *articulum stantis aut cadentis imperii* is the nation's will, which cannot be expressed by either of the political parties except with the support or acquiescence, or, if that is refused, the destruction of the other.

S. W.

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INTRODUCTION.

I.

NATIONAL PARALYSIS.

"Budge," says the fiend. "Budge not," says my conscience. "Conscience," say I, "you counsel well." "Fiend," say I, "you counsel well."

—*Launcelot Gobbo.*

ENGLISH policy in relation to the outside world has long alternated between two courses inconsistent with one another. We fought the Boers; and then suddenly, without visible external cause for change, we made a peace. We attacked the Afghans and annexed some of their territory; then we evacuated territory we had just annexed. We invaded Egypt and undertook its administration; but at the same time we protested that it was a mere temporary arrangement: we still administer and still protest. These are symptoms revealing the influence upon our policy of two antagonistic sets of ideas, which, perhaps, in a rough general way, correspond to the two creeds of our two great political parties.

This oscillation between two doctrines in regard to our national conduct paralyses our action. With a great deal of friction we go a certain distance forward, only after a short time with further friction to move

back again ; or, what is perhaps no better, from a consciousness that we are in two minds, we do nothing at all.

Is there not a remedy for this state of things ? Is it not possible to think the matter out and to come to a settled conclusion with regard to our dealings with foreign nations ? I think it can be done, upon one condition,—that we dwell not upon the points which separate Radicals from Conservatives, but upon those points upon which all Englishmen are agreed. It is the fashion for each side to attack the other side at every opportunity ; and the practice has been carried so far that each side denounces the other in language which, if it were seriously meant, would imply a mutual distrust in one another's honesty, integrity, and patriotism. Surely the plain truth is, that there is much to be said on both sides. I cannot help feeling not so much that both sides are wrong, but that both sides are right. Each party presses a particular doctrine against the doctrine of the other. Yet both doctrines are true, and the error is in shutting out one half of the case.

We are all agreed that it is the function of the State to render possible the unhampered exercise of their best powers by as many as may be of its members. Those who have considered this task from the point of view of the inner working of the community, have usually become advocates of liberty, by which they have understood the absence of restraint upon individual

action, except in so far as it is evidently and immediately hurtful to others. Some security against the multiplication of restraints, and some help towards the exercise by all of their highest faculties, is found in the representative institutions of modern times, which are regarded as a means by which the greater number of the citizens can participate in the management of public affairs.

It has been the great merit of the Liberal party to have asserted this conception of freedom with such success that it is now universally accepted among us.

But there is another side to the matter. No doubt, liberty is as indispensable to the health of a community as air to living things; and representative institutions are beneficent in proportion as they accustom men to appreciate, and to exert themselves in promoting, a common purpose involving the well-being of them all. But fresh air and exercise, however necessary for bodily health, are not the whole of life; and liberty and representative institutions, even if perfectly established and working with mechanical precision, will not alone fulfil the object for which a nation exists. The nation is one among many, each of which is imbued with its mission, to be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth. Some nations are possessed at the same time with a higher purpose, and make bold to assert a type of life better than the common, to which they conceive

it fitting that others should conform. The world therefore presents the spectacle of rival peoples contesting among one another for its possession, and aiming each at the prevalence of its own ideals of character, of public and private life, of production, law, and administration. This competition, perpetual and universal, is both material and moral. Though it might be too much to say that the moral forces always have the preponderating influence on the issue, it is clear at least that mankind look back with satisfaction upon the pre-eminence obtained by nations whose success carried with it the spread of a higher and better life. The Roman Empire was established by force, and in its upbuilding there was abundance of cruelty and injustice; but the result was to impose upon the best part of humanity an ordering of life for which the world has been the better; and in modern times the work of the Romans is usually regarded with gratitude and pride.

It seems to me evident that the aspect of the State as the sustainer of the freedom of individuals requires to be supplemented by its aspect as one among a number of rivals engaged in the struggle to keep or enlarge its place in the world, and in the effort to commend to the adoption of others its conception of human work and character.

For the State cannot do its work of securing the freedom of its members unless it succeeds in asserting itself,

or, as many people would prefer to say, in maintaining its rights. In regard to nations, however, the word "rights" is perhaps apt to mislead. An individual has rights in the sense of claims which will be supported by a force outside himself. If any one takes my property, or improperly interferes with my business, the State with all its force will sustain me and repress him. My rights as an individual are claims recognised by the State, which in case of need will enforce them. But the claims of a nation can be enforced only by the nation itself, which has no outside power to which it can appeal. Between the consciences of two individuals the law and the policeman can mediate. But a nation must be its own law and its own policeman. Its mission to exist requires it to have a will of its own and a force with which its will can be backed up. The force is to be found only in the stout hearts and good right arms of its subjects, and the necessity to have such a force is the origin and foundation of those duties of the citizen upon the performance of which depends the possibility of his having rights. That this is the case might seem self-evident; yet there is little sign that either political party is aware that a nation must have a will of its own.

Too many of our politicians seem to live on an island poised in space and detached from the rest of the universe; they concentrate their attention on the development and application of general principles.

General principles are useful because their simplicity and generality are aids to the understanding: but the difficulties of practical life are specific; a general principle seldom helps us to solve them, for it has been reached by the elimination of all those particular features which make each individual case what it is. Accordingly, the attempt to regulate the affairs of a nation by reducing to practice the doctrines of a philosophy—too often conceived of as the dogmas of an infallible creed—is not altogether conducive to healthy national life. I suspect that we have too much doctrine in our politics, and are too much like rival sects quarrelling over dogmas. My idea of government is that it has to manage the affairs of the nation; and this seems to me not so much a matter of doctrine as a matter of what in every-day life we call business. The men who succeed in business have no theorem to prove, no dogma to propagate. They have a thorough knowledge of the goods in which they deal, and of their customers; and they persistently, methodically, study the markets where the one and the other are to be found. They are distinguished by foresight and decision of character. I have always thought of statesmanship, if that is the name for the gifts of a man peculiarly fitted to succeed in government, not as a science and not exactly as an art, but rather as something like the tact which enables a man to manage his own life, his own career. Perhaps this tact in ordinary

life is what we mean by common-sense; and I think statesmanship might be defined as common-sense applied to the management of national affairs.

It is chiefly in the relations of Great Britain to the rest of the world that I miss the signs of this statesmanship. Our Cabinets seem always to be entirely without a plan, and to act on the maxim: "Never do to-day what you can put off till to-morrow". Foreign affairs are habitually neglected, with the result that there is no rational method of dealing with them, and that even public men hardly seem to realise that a rational, well-understood, and generally-accepted method is absolutely necessary.

The dominant theory has indeed in this department produced one tradition which is usually regarded as sound. Few Englishmen at the present day would wish to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. But it may be doubted whether the Liberal party has contributed anything beyond this negative rule towards assisting in the conduct of foreign relations.

Mr. Gladstone, in his third Midlothian speech of 1879, enumerated "the right principles of foreign policy". They were:—

1. To foster the strength of the empire by just legislation and economy at home, and to reserve the expenditure of that strength for great and worthy occasions abroad.

2. The aim of foreign policy ought to be to preserve to the nations of the world the blessings of peace.
3. To strive to maintain what is called the concert of Europe.
4. To avoid needless and entangling engagements.
5. To acknowledge the equal rights of all nations.
This is the principle to which the greatest importance was attached; "because without recognising the equality of nations, there is no such thing as public right; and without public international right, there is no instrument available for settling the transactions of mankind except material force".
6. Subject to all the limitations involved in the first five principles, the foreign policy of England should always be inspired by the love of freedom.

Not one of these principles will bear examination. The first of them contains nothing that is relevant. The value of just legislation and economy is indisputable, but it hardly belongs to the region of foreign affairs. The policy of a nation must of course bear some relation to its strength, which depends upon its resources and the excellence of its administration; but the strength with which a foreign minister is more immediately concerned, is that of the army and navy.

The second so-called principle, to preserve to the

nations the blessings of peace, is the negation of policy. If it means we are to prevent other nations from going to war when they think fit, it is impossible and absurd. If it means we are not to go to war ourselves except when we ought to go to war, it is a truism. I can only suppose the meaning to be that we are never under any circumstances to go to war. Such a course is conceivable ; but it would involve that we should concede every demand made upon us by any other nation ; should give them for nothing any territories they desire ; and compensate them on their own terms for any injury, real or imaginary, with which they may charge us. In this way we should save them the trouble of attacking us in order to gain any object, however disagreeable to our feelings. This policy would enable us, and indeed oblige us, easily and speedily to get rid first of the burdens of empire, next of the duties involved in national independence, and lastly, of the individual liberty which those duties secure. The true purpose of policy is first to assert the independence of the nation as the structure which sustains our personal freedom, and which through the duties which it requires from us is the chief agency in our education ; secondly, to defend the empire, the sphere of our natural activity ; and lastly, to secure its growth in proportion to that activity, and with due regard to the scope required by other communities whose energies and ideas may also in their own way and in their own spheres be beneficial

to mankind. In the pursuit of these aims a well-conducted Government will seek no quarrels; but in a quarrel forced upon it, when its action is upborne by the conscience of its own people, it will embark fearlessly and boldly with all the resources furnished by the enthusiasm, the intelligence, and the industry of a united nation.

The third principle might admit of a limited and cautious application if at any time anything were to be found which could reasonably be called the concert of Europe. For many years past nothing of the kind has existed, and when the powers of Europe have been agreed, except as the result of a war, it has usually been either an agreement to do nothing or an agreement to prevent the execution of some necessary and beneficent work. The most perfect fruits of the concert of Europe were the treaties of 1814 and 1815, by which it was attempted for ever to prevent the union of Germany and the union of Italy. In consequence of this arrangement the efforts of these two nations to unite themselves kept Europe for two generations in a state of disturbance, and brought about most of the wars of the nineteenth century. Another creation of the concert of Europe was the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; a fiction which has been most expensive to Great Britain. A principle of foreign policy ought surely to be something of permanent application. But where now is the concert of Europe?

The fourth principle helps us still less. It is a sound maxim not to promise more than you can perform, and not to bind yourself without sufficient reason. But the difficulty is to determine in each case whether the contemplated engagement is or is not needful, and how far it will entangle us.

The fifth principle is based upon a false and dangerous doctrine: the equality of nations. Nations are not equal, and between nation and nation right is not might. No doubt in the millennium it will be; but in this world there is no method except war of settling a serious international quarrel. Nations agree to arbitration about trivial disputes, but they never accept arbitration upon issues which are or are believed to be of vital importance. A nation that trusts to its rights instead of to its sailors and soldiers is deceiving itself and preparing its own downfall.

I believe absolutely that foreign policy and all other policy must be founded in justice; and I do not think the doors of the Foreign Office could be better adorned than with Bright's well-known motto: "Be just and fear not". But, as I have already suggested, the analogy between the relations of individuals to one another cannot safely be applied to the relations between States. Between nation and nation there is no judge except Time; and even posterity is apt to regard the quarrels of its ancestors according to the way in which they have affected its own interests. The true test, probably

the only test, which a nation can apply to the morality of its policy is to be found in its own self-respect.

The last of the so-called principles, that the policy of England should be inspired by a love of freedom, is so vaguely expressed as to admit of various interpretations. Freedom may be a name for the independence of nations. But the sentence may mean that England ought in some way to help insurrections against existing Governments or Powers when the insurgents command our sympathies either by the doctrines they profess or by the sufferings they have endured. Such a course would be consistent neither with the preservation of peace, with the concert of Europe, with the avoidance of needless entanglements, nor with public international right so far as it exists. The great wars which devastated Europe from 1792 until 1815 had their origin in the proclamation by the French Republic of a doctrine indistinguishable from this sixth principle, and in flat contradiction of the one Liberal principle generally accepted in regard to foreign affairs: the principle of non-intervention in the domestic quarrels of foreign nations.

The six principles altogether ignore the basis and the starting-point of any possible foreign policy at all,—the rights, the interests, or the purposes, whichever is the best word, of the British nation.

I find myself, then, without guidance, at any rate from the Liberal party, as to the method by which Great

Britain is to maintain her position in the world. Lord Rosebery, it is true, speaks of "peace secured not by humiliation but by preponderance"; and thinks we ought "to preserve our empire not for ourselves only but for mankind". This seems to me to strike a true note; but it is only an *obiter dictum*, and is inconsistent with the manner in which, while Lord Rosebery has been in office, peace has been maintained with regard to Siam.

Turning from the theory to the practice, we find British policy for a series of years realising not that self-assertion which within proper limits ought to be its character, but a self-abnegation reminding us of one of the many sects that profess, at the expense of history and common-sense, to be a revival of the "true primitive Christianity". In Egypt we are bound hand and foot by engagements which were probably needless and are certainly entangling. In the Soudan, after interference, invasion, and evacuation, we have adopted the part of the dog in the manger, for we neither govern it ourselves nor allow any other power to govern it. Madagascar, the one country in the world where English missionary enterprise has had substantial results to show in the education of a whole people, we have handed over to a French protectorate which the people detest. We allowed ourselves to be elbowed out of Zanzibar by Germany in order afterwards to make Germany a present of Heligoland in exchange

for Zanzibar and Witu, which Prince Bismarck had annexed upon the report that it was worthless, explaining to the official who made the report, that, though it was of no value to Germany, it would come in useful to exchange with England for something better. We have driven the Newfoundlanders almost to the verge of revolt by enforcing against them the consideration of French claims which the Foreign Office and the law officers of the Crown equally believe to be without a shadow of justification. Lastly, we have allowed the French to create a quarrel with Siam as the pretext for an invasion and an annexation which has no other object than to exclude our trade and our influence from the country. In short, for the last thirteen years our foreign policy has carried out Mr. Gladstone's great principle of aiming at peace, and has obtained it by conceding everything which it was the special duty of the Government to preserve.

These self-denying ordinances have not been exclusively the achievements of the Liberal party; Conservative Governments are responsible for their full share of them. The Conservative party seems to have been overawed by the tremendous defeat of 1880, which was undoubtedly due to a very widespread disapproval of the foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield. But the inference which both parties appear to have drawn from this event, that the nation would have no foreign policy of any kind, appears to me to be entirely mistaken. Lord

Beaconsfield's error and the cause of the popular indignation at that time was not the inauguration of a foreign policy, but the adoption of a policy which did not and could not appeal to the best feelings of Englishmen, and which was presented to the public judgment in a manner utterly unsuited to the temper of the majority of the people. Lord Beaconsfield's leading idea in regard to the Eastern question was to prevent the Russians from planting themselves in or establishing their influence near Constantinople. To this end it was not necessary to espouse the cause of the Turks against their Christian subjects. If Lord Beaconsfield on the occasion of the massacres in Bulgaria had sent the fleet and a landing party to Constantinople, and when in possession of that place had called a Congress of the Powers to settle the future of Turkey, he would have been the most popular man in England, and would have checkmated Russia without giving her even the pretext of a quarrel. However this may be, the Conservative party since 1880 has lost its self-confidence in regard to foreign affairs. Between a Party which thinks it wrong to have a foreign policy and a Party which, whatever its theory, has let "I dare not wait upon I would," our foreign affairs have not been conducted, but have conducted themselves.

Management implies a plan; you must know what you want, and must study and prepare the means by which it can be obtained. There must be a design,

that is, a picture or sketch existing in the mind, of a future state of things regarded as desirable, and serving as a guide by which our conduct may be regulated from time to time as occasion arises. The fact that on every occasion we drift reluctantly by a number of stages into the position which we eventually adopt sufficiently proves that no such design exists. How could it? It could be created only by a man whose one thought was to ascertain the nature of those aims, interests, or rights, about the importance and the necessity of which all Englishmen are agreed. But to identify himself with the aims upon which all Englishmen are agreed is impossible to a leader of either of the worn-out factions which at present under the name of parties contend for votes and for office. The Liberal party is a fiction, a mere survival: the principles of Liberalism are like an exhausted virus; the whole nation has long since been inoculated with them, and they have lost the contagion which was their force. The Conservative party has accepted all that is Liberal of Liberal doctrines, and has at present no other mission than that for which Lord Randolph Churchill invented the inane formula that "the business of an Opposition is to oppose". The great Home Rule controversy itself is no more than a convenient boggy, which serves to distinguish the parties, both of which would be equally delighted to bury it in the first working compromise, if only they were quite sure that they would be able to distin-

guish between one another on their return from the funeral.

II.

THE REMEDY.

All thine shall be the subject main,
And every shore it circles thine.

—*Old Song.*

THE remedy is to be sought by abandoning the method of party, which lays stress upon questions that divide us, and seeking instead the interests that unite us. This brings us at once to the thought of England—of the nation—and to a cause we can all serve. So long as we are possessed by party, our first thought is of the other party; but as soon as England is the ideal, we remember that England is in Europe and Europe in the world. That is the forgotten fact which calls for consideration. Our political parties have worked on the assumption that Europe might as well be in another hemisphere or on another planet; yet as soon as we think of the nation, of England, and of Europe, we know our own mind. We remember the greatness of the past, we realise the weakness of the present, we half divine the future. What is the greatness of England? Her maritime power, the empire that rests upon it, and the national character that has made and been made by it. But England's maritime power is the result of her relations with Europe. It was in resistance to the

naval power of Spain that the English navy rose to importance. Resistance to Spain would hardly have been successful if Spain had not had other enemies—the Turks, the French, and the Dutch. In the long struggle which followed for supremacy at sea, England at first took advantage of the rivalry between other Powers. The French helped her against the Dutch, until Holland ceased to be formidable; and then the Dutch helped her against the French. The effort of France to make herself supreme in the world by military and political predominance in Europe and on the sea was opposed by a common effort of the European nations. England was but one of the adversaries of France. She co-operated by her share in the maritime struggle with the continental Powers that furnished the armies with which the armies of France were resisted. England's independence is incompatible with the supremacy at sea of any other nation; and she was thus forced to make the cause of Europe, summed up in the words "the balance of power," her own. Her peculiar position both compelled and enabled her to be the incarnation of that European idea. For two centuries she has literally held the balance of Europe; she has been the fly-wheel on the European machine. The reward of this function faithfully performed was that magnificent position with which England emerged from the wars against the French Empire. She was not merely superior at sea to any other Power, there was

no other naval Power. All the other navies had been destroyed in the conflict, and the sea was all her own.

So tremendous was this result that for the greater part of the nineteenth century England has been able to do as she pleased at sea. She has held Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Islands of the Pacific, in the hollow of her hand. The position has been too great for us, and we have forgotten the duties out of the fulfilment of which it sprung. Meanwhile, during the years of our indifference, Europe has been transformed. Germany and Italy have shaken off the dominion of Austria and the tutelage of France, and have become nations. They too have built fleets, they too have discovered that the ocean is the great highway, and they will not be shut off from it. France, in the effort to renew her strength, has been obliged to recreate her naval power, and even Russia has prepared to assert herself on the sea. All these Powers find England at their gates. Most of them have chafed at her monopoly of the sea. There have been significant warnings that it will be challenged, and that one of three things must happen: either England must create a navy superior to those of the rest of the world combined, and must so use it in the service of the world as to satisfy the intelligence and the conscience of mankind; or, she must enter into partnership with that half of Europe whose aims most nearly agree with her own against the other half which rejects

those aims; or, if neither of these courses is possible, she must submit to naval defeat, and disappear from the list of great Powers and from the future pages of history.

The key to the situation is not the navy, but the policy of which it is the instrument. The world will never tolerate a predominance of any kind which is not to its advantage. If, therefore, England is to retain the dominion of the sea it must be justified by its usefulness to other nations as well as asserted by an unparalleled development of naval force. If she is to take the lead among one half of the Powers of Europe in opposition to the other half, those Powers which co-operate with her must be convinced that her purposes are their own, or at least that their own ends will be promoted by the assertion of them.

For these reasons the safety of Great Britain and of the British Empire is to be sought primarily not in a calculation of numbers of iron-clads nor in a forecast of plans of campaign; but in an examination of the hopes, the necessities, and the purposes of the civilised nations, in the first instance of the nations of Europe, in which at present the work and the progress of mankind are mainly concentrated.

I.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

THE Eastern Question is the problem which the world has to solve in consequence of the decay of Islam. It may be analysed into three elements, of which the first is the nature of Mahommedanism as a religious system incompatible with social or political development; the second, the peculiar organisation which created the Turkish Empire; and the third, the character of Europe, which, though it is a community of States in perpetual conflict one with another, is yet a unity, exerting upon the world outside it a continuous influence, like that of the resultant of a series of forces operating from various directions upon a single point.

The rise and progress of that strange system of society which takes its name from Mahomet is not more remarkable than the swiftness and completeness of its decline. The dogma of the oneness of God appealed with irresistible force to the races to whom it was first preached; and within a century from the death of Mahomet, his religion had carried its conquests in the East to the Indus and the Oxus, and in the West to the shores of the Atlantic. The whole region which

extends from the west coast of Northern Africa to the upper waters of the Ganges, and from the Indian Ocean to the Caspian and the Jaxartes, appears to have been permanently won for Islam. It is throughout a rainless region, barren, except where some river brings water from a more favoured clime, and separated from Europe either by the sea or by vast tracts of land difficult of passage. The first effect of the Arab conquests seems to have been a great intellectual impulse, which produced under the early caliphs a civilisation at that time nowhere surpassed. To the mass of believers, however, the fundamental truth appeared to be, not that there is no god except Allah, but that Mahomet is his prophet. Mahommedan orthodoxy gradually took the shape of acceptance of the Koran as the one absolute and final revelation to which the mind of the believer must passively submit, as the corpse to the hands of him that prepares it for burial. The triumph of this rigid orthodoxy brought with it intellectual torpor and the political and social degeneracy which are its inevitable consequences. Whatever civilising impulse was possessed by the Arabs expired after the Crusades; and since the fourteenth century the general history of Islam is that of local despotisms, rising and passing away again without leaving any legacy of benefit to the world, and exhausting, by taxation, oppression, and war, the countries in which they have held sway.

The Mahommedan system is without that appeal to the conscience, that stimulus to inner or spiritual growth, which has made Christianity the fountain of progress. Its religion is without pity and without sympathy. While it appeals to fanaticism as the motive of bravery, it justifies that self-indulgence which is the usual accompaniment of cruelty. Its social system is based upon slavery, the degradation of man, and upon polygamy, the degradation of woman. Thus in the higher qualities of humanity Mussulman orthodoxy has been as barren as the sands in the midst of which it was propagated, and as hard as the rocks that overshadow them. The history of Islam, except where some enlightened despot like Akbar has been able to emancipate himself from its spiritual fetters, is one of constant and increasing decay, political, social, and material. The faculty of government has everywhere gone from it. Yet government, the first necessity of all communities, is especially necessary where even the tillage of the soil is impossible without the supervision of an authority at once intelligent and just.

The inner collapse of Islam has been accompanied by the development and spread of European civilisation, so that in our own day no Government worth the name, no social or political system capable of promoting the welfare of a population, is conceivable except as an emanation from the European system. But Europe is divided against itself. A united Europe would have

long ago taken the whole of Islam under its control, and restored its deserts to cultivation, its people to order, industry, and progress. In the dissensions of Europe this has been impossible. The sea Powers, it is true, have little by little yielded to the attraction exercised upon them by communities in need of government, but incapable of creating it for themselves. In the eighteenth century the East India Company, in conflict with the French, gradually inserted itself in the place of the Mogul; and in the first half of the nineteenth century the French conquered and annexed the countries previously ruled by the Dey of Algiers. But these are countries on the outside fringe of Islam. The further encroachment of civilisation on the Mahommedan world has been delayed by the jealousies of the European Powers. Their contrary purposes counterbalance one another, and produce an equilibrium which it is dangerous to disturb. This has been the preservation of anarchy in the greater part of the area covered by Islam. For to govern is usually thought of as synonymous with to possess, and the Mahommedan countries which are still nominally independent are grudged by each Power to every other Power. Meanwhile these countries are saturated with European influence, so that the Mahommedan State, where it still exists, has lost the confidence in itself which alone could nerve its resistance to that Western world whose might has long overshadowed it.

At the close of the fourteenth century, the Mahomme-

dan world seemed to have reached its normal level of stagnation. The great age of Arabian culture lay in the far past. A mere relic of it lingered on in Spain. The Crusades were at an end.

This was the moment of the rise of the Ottoman Power, which was destined to absorb in itself the most powerful forces of Islam, and which planted itself at the first in the rich districts where Europe and Asia meet, so different in their geographical character from the rest of the countries under Mahommedan dominion.

The Turkish system owed its strength, not to any new religious influence, but to fresh blood and to its peculiar military organisation.

The House of Othman divided all the lands which it conquered into small fiefs, held for life upon condition of personal military service. Every holding had to produce its horseman, and none but a soldier or a soldier's son could receive lands. There was no hereditary tenure, and no hereditary rank; the son of the greatest warrior or of the greatest official received, not the lands that had been his father's, but the ordinary portion of a common soldier. These feudal horsemen formed a cavalry that never met its equal.

The early Ottoman conquests were made at the expense of the Eastern Empire, where there was a Christian population. The extermination of the Christians was not intended: they received indeed no rights, they formed no part of the State; but they were the

workers by the produce of whose labours the Turks, whose profession was not production, but destruction, were sustained. The Christians paid tribute for the permission—it was not a right—to exist. Their religion was not interfered with; they had their priests and bishops—who also paid tribute. But the Ottomans exacted a tax peculiar to themselves. Every five years the pick of the Christian boys were confiscated as slaves. They were brought up in the barracks, and most of them trained as soldiers; the more promising became officers of the Sultan's household, and in consequence very frequently rose to the great offices of the State. Some of them were formed into standing corps of cavalry, distinct from the feudal cavalry, which required to be called out by special orders. The bulk of them formed the standing army of infantry. Brought up without family ties, in the absolute obedience of the Moslem, inured to every kind of hardship, the Janisseries, as this corps of slaves was called, were for three centuries the most perfect infantry in the world.

At the head of this great military society was the Sultan, the only person in the empire who derived rank from his birth; with a power limited only by the Koran, as interpreted by the religious and legal teachers—the Ulemas.

The force thus constituted, so long as it preserved its character, was irresistible. In three centuries the Ottomans destroyed the Eastern Empire, conquered

Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and pushed their way far into the interior of Europe. In the sixteenth century Soliman the Magnificent held the better part of Hungary, and a great province in Poland; Moldavia and Wallachia were tributary States; the Black Sea was a Turkish lake, and the Tartar tribes, who inhabited its northern shores, paid tribute at the Porte. The Ottomans had a considerable maritime power, and even before they conquered Egypt had driven the fleets of the Christian nations from the Levant. It is probable that this is the only service which the Turks have rendered to mankind; for the closure of the Levant compelled the European maritime nations in search of another route to India to navigate the ocean and explore the world.

The sixteenth century is at once the noonday of the Turkish power and the beginning of its decline. For the conquests, upon the continuance of which the effective working of the whole system depended, came to an end. The institutions upon which it rested began to degenerate. First of all the Sultans, upon whose personal qualities everything depended. Soliman himself had the best of his sons put to death to make way for the son of a slave woman. From that day there has never been a Sultan with the qualities of a ruler. The successors of Soliman stayed at home at Constantinople, a prey to the intrigues of the harem, and dependent upon the advice of their creatures.

Soliman permitted the Janissaries to marry; and in the next generation they extorted by mutiny the right to enrol their sons in the corps. In the same way the Janissaries acquired commercial privileges. The tribute of Christian children ceased as the corps became a hereditary corporation. The Spartan discipline, the military spirit which knows of no domestic tie, the simple hardihood of poverty and obedience, disappeared. The Janissaries became as other mercenaries. Then, too, the fiefs, which in better days had been reserved for soldiers, were obtained by bribing a vizier, or through the influence of women and slaves. In this way the feudal cavalry, already half destroyed in wars with the Persians, entirely lost its character; the military tenure became a fiction; the horsemen were no longer maintained.

In other countries when institutions fail there is the nation to fall back upon, which can create new institutions, inspired by the old force. In Turkey there was no nation. There were two classes divided by an impassable gulf: the Turks, and the Christians; the Moslem, and the "herd" (*rayah*), as the Christians were called. So long as the Turks pursued their career of conquest the Christians had to endure; they were neglected, and therefore there was a limit to their oppression. But with the cessation of conquest, with the decay of the military system and of the administration which depended upon it, the demands upon them

increased. That the bulk of them did not become Moslems was due only to the fact that with the decline of the Turkish power the Christians saw hope from outside.

After the destruction of the Eastern Empire and the partial conquest of Hungary by the Turks, the task of defending Europe against the Turkish power fell upon the Emperors, the nominal heads of Western Christendom; and since, in the loose constitution of the Empire, the Emperors had to rely mainly upon the resources of their hereditary dominions, as Dukes of Austria and Kings of Bohemia, and later as claimants to the crown of Hungary, one of the results of this long conflict was the growth of an Austrian State, distinct from Germany, with its face to the East rather than to the West. It was the pressure of the Turks upon the Empire which gave France the opportunity for that interference in Germany upon which her own predominance in Europe was principally based.

In the seventeenth century the decay of Turkey had so far proceeded that Austria, though in perpetual conflict with France, could pass on her eastern frontier from defence to attack. By the peace of Carlowitz in 1699 the Turks restored to Austria almost the whole of Hungary, and condescended for the first time to treat with the infidels upon equal terms. After the close of the war of the Spanish Succession Prince Eugene was once more at liberty to drive back the Turks, and the

Peace of Passarowitz in 1718 took the Austrian border beyond Belgrade. With Prince Eugene the Austrian conquests end. From 1718 until to-day Austria has never taken the initiative against Turkey, and her aim has been, not to conquer the Turkish Empire for herself, but to prevent its conquest by Russia.

The Slavonic people of Eastern Europe were divided by the origin of their conversion to Christianity. The Poles received their religion from the Western Empire and the Roman Church; but to the kingdoms founded in the ninth century by Norsemen in the plains of the Volga and of the Dnieper, Christianity came from Byzantium. Thus Russia at her birth received that trait of dissidence from Western Europe which marks all her history, and which finds its expression to-day in the Pan-Slavist idea of a mission to renovate Europe by freeing it from the burden of Western culture.

The second impulse implanted in the growing nation was that of hostility to Islam. From the early part of the thirteenth to the close of the fifteenth century, Russia was under Tartar dominion. The princes of Moscow grew powerful in subservience to the Tartar khans, upon whose overthrow they acquired the headship of Russia and an authority still identical in its despotic character with that of their Tartar prototypes. They were early allied with the Eastern Church. In the fourteenth century a Grand Duke of Moscow became protector of the Church in

Russia. In the sixteenth, a Tsar obtained from the Patriarch of Constantinople the appointment of the Bishop of Moscow as Patriarch of all the northern countries. Peter the Great, the founder of the modern Russian monarchy, refused to nominate a Patriarch, and thereby prevented the Church from having any other head but himself.

It is no wonder that the traditional policy of the Tsars should be one of conflict with Turks, and of encouragement to the rayah to revolt. This course was marked out for them long before the time of Peter the Great. In 1576 the Venetian envoy at the Porte wrote to the Senate at Venice: "The Sultan fears the Muscovite, because the Grand Duke belongs to the Greek religion, as do the peoples of Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, the Morea, and Greece, who are in the highest degree devoted to him, and who will always be ready to take arms and to revolt in order to escape from the yoke of the Turks".

Just a hundred years after this was written began the first war between Russia and Turkey, ended by a truce, in which the Turks granted to Russians permission to make pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and agreed that the Russians should retain possession of Kief.

The greatness of Peter the Great was his grasp of the value of sea power; and he aimed not only at the Baltic but at the Black Sea, the straight road to Constantinople. In 1695, when the Turks were occupied

in their great struggle with Austria, he took Azov and built a fleet there. In 1711 he set out to invade Turkey, making the most of the case for the rayah. Before leaving Moscow the guards received a flag bearing a cross and the motto, "In hoc signo vinces," and on crossing the Dniester, then the Russian frontier, Peter issued a manifesto of which the point lay in a declaration that "Greeks, Wallachians, Bulgarians and Serbs groan under the yoke of the barbarians". The Hospodar (prince tributary to Turkey) of Moldavia was to help the Russians with a rising in the principalities; and made a treaty, by which in case of success Moldavia would practically have become a Russian province. The Turks, however, being at peace with Austria, had their hands free against Peter, who was ignominiously beaten, escaped capture only by bribery, and had to sign the Treaty of the Pruth, by which Azov was restored to the Turks.

The general scope of the policy in relation to Turkey, indicated by the origin, the situation, and the history of the Russian monarchy, thus received from Peter the Great a definite aim and a distinct form. The purpose was the conquest of Turkey, with the assistance of her Christian subjects. The ultimate goal was the possession of Constantinople. Peter the Great died without having accomplished any part of this purpose. The frontier of Russia as he left it ran from Riga by Smolensk to Kief, and thence, keeping at a distance

from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, to the Caspian. The district enclosed in the bend of the Dnieper was Russian, and the Bug was here the border between Russian and Turkish territory.

The successors of Peter the Great have pursued his policy with a persistence which is perhaps the principal title of Russia to greatness. They have reached the Black Sea, and have wrested from Turkey more than half of its shores. But a great part of the programme has either been unfulfilled, or has resulted in consequences not foreseen by Peter the Great. Constantinople remains in the possession of the Turks, and the countries taken from the Turks on the west of the Black Sea have not become Russian. The interest of Russia has been confronted by a greater interest, that of Europe, which it has been unable to overcome. But while the interest of Russia is entrusted to a single hand, and passes on from generation to generation by dynastic succession, the interest of Europe is in charge of a number of Powers engaged in a perpetual rivalry among one another. The wonder is, not that Russia has acquired so much, but that Europe amid its divisions has been able to prevent her from acquiring more. The explanation both of Russia's success and of its limitations lies in the nature of the action of Europe. It is only where great and palpable common interests are assailed that the Powers will suspend their differences. Changes which do not greatly or directly

threaten them will fail to arouse them to joint action. Thus all the outlying districts of Turkey have been acquired by Russia; but beyond the Danube she has never been able to gain a permanent footing. The reaction of Europe against her Eastern policy has had a twofold effect upon Russia. It has driven her energies into Asia, where she has acquired a vast empire, and has accentuated that antagonism to Western life and to Western ideas which took its rise with the beginnings of Russian Christianity.

In the first half of the eighteenth century the Emperor at Vienna still regarded Turkey as a much more dangerous enemy than Russia. More than one treaty bound him to co-operate with Russia in any war against Turkey. The Russian Court was eager to efface the humiliation of 1711; and pretexts were not wanting. In 1736 a body of Turkish troops sent from the Crimea against Persia marched through Russian territory near the Caspian. The Russians thereupon marched a force into the Turkish territory of the Crimea. The Turks declared war, and the Russians called upon the Emperor for his stipulated assistance. Before the outbreak of hostilities a conference of the three Powers was held, at which terms were proposed by Russia clearly embodying her policy. They were: the abrogation of all previous treaties, that is, of course, of the Treaty of the Pruth; the cession to Russia of the Turkish suzerainty over the Tartars, in other words the cession of the north

coast of the Black Sea; the recognition of Moldavia and Wallachia as independent principalities under a Russian protectorate; freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Hellespont, and the Mediterranean. The Turks refused these terms, the conference broke up (November, 1736), and the war began. The Russians gained considerable successes; they took Azov, invaded the Crimea and captured Oczakow and Choczim; but the Austrians were disastrously beaten by the Turks, and in 1739 concluded, through French mediation, the Peace of Belgrade, by which that fortress and Orsowa were restored to Turkey. Russia, exhausted by her efforts, was unable to continue the war alone, and accepted a peace by which the Black Sea was declared a Turkish lake, and its navigation forbidden to Russian ships of any kind. All the Russian conquests from Turkey were abandoned, except only Azov, of which the fortifications were to be razed.

This is the last war in which the fate of Turkey has depended on her own exertions. Ever since 1739, though the success or failure of the Turkish arms has been reflected in the treaties that mark the stages of Russian advance, these treaties are the result not so much of the military operations as of the relations between the Powers of Europe.

During the next hundred years there were four great wars between Russia and Turkey, in each of which the Russian arms were victorious; but in every case the

territorial acquisitions of Russia bore no proportion to the conquests which she had actually made. This is the essential fact which has to be explained, and to understand it we must consider the circumstances of each war and the conditions out of which the treaty concluding it arose.

In 1768 Catharine's quarrel with the Poles involved her in a conflict with Turkey, in the course of which her troops occupied the Danubian principalities and the Crimea. The Austrian Government, believing that a Russian annexation of the principalities would be a danger to Austria, made overtures to Frederick the Great, till then regarded as Austria's chief enemy, and induced him to become the mediator between Russia, Turkey, and Austria. The result was the partition, not of Turkey, but of Poland.

Catharine abandoned all her Turkish conquests except the ports on the Sea of Azov; but she obtained from the Turks the protectorate over the Tartars of the Crimea and of the coast between the Crimea and the Caucasus, the right of free navigation in the Black Sea and the Straits, and the right of making representations through her ambassador at the Porte in regard to a particular church in a particular street at Galata. These are the chief stipulations of the famous Treaty of Kainardji of 1774. Their most important immediate result was the rise of a considerable trade between the ports of the Black Sea and the coasts of Greece. It was mainly in

the hands of Greeks ; and Odessa became a prosperous commercial city, with a large Greek population, recalling the Greek colonies of an earlier age.

Austria rewarded herself for her good offices to Turkey by occupying, and persuading the Porte to cede to her, the province of Bukowina, forming the north-western portion of Moldavia.

In 1779 the policy of Austria changed ; the old hostility to Prussia was again accentuated, and the Emperor Joseph II. sought an understanding with Catharine of Russia. This astute princess took the opportunity to secure the co-operation of Austria for her own Eastern policy. The plan discussed and agreed upon was that the Turks should be expelled from Europe by a joint effort of the two empires ; that the frontier of Austria should be extended to the south of the Danube and along the coast of the Adriatic, while an independent Greek kingdom, of which Catharine intended that her grandson Constantine should be the sovereign, was to be established at Constantinople, and a Dacian kingdom, also under a prince of the Orthodox Church, and also independent, was to be made up of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia. This understanding produced no immediate result ; but a year or two later, Catharine, being now assured of the diplomatic support of Austria, marched her troops into the Crimea and took definitive possession both of that country and the coast lying to the east of it.

This action provoked the Turks, who in 1787 declared war upon Russia. The Austro-Russian alliance then took effect, and the Emperor Joseph declared war upon Turkey. The Turks directed their main effort against the Austrians, whom they defeated. The Emperor Joseph was confronted with a sea of troubles. The Austrian Netherlands were in revolt; Hungary was disaffected; Prussia hostile; and behind Prussia were England and Holland, both of which were interested in the future of Turkey. In the middle of the crisis Joseph died; his brother and successor Leopold prudently decided to make terms with his enemies before it was too late, especially as the progress of the French Revolution occasioned new and grave anxieties. By the Convention of Reichenbach, concluded with Prussia in July, 1790, to prevent a Prussian invasion of Austria, Leopold agreed to make peace with Turkey on the basis of the *status quo*. Russia was thus left alone against the Turks; and while the Austrian peace, signed at Sistowa at the end of 1791, left the Turkish dominions intact, the Russian treaty, signed at Jassy in January, 1792, gave Russia the territory between the Dnieper and the Dniester, but no more.

The next Russo-Turkish war began in 1806, and lasted until 1812. It arose out of Russian rights, granted in previous treaties, to interfere on behalf of the Christians of the Danubian principalities, which countries during the whole six years of the war were occupied.

by Russian troops. In 1812 the prospect of the French invasion of Russia caused the Tsar to patch up a peace with Turkey, by which he obtained, not the whole of the principalities, which had been his object, but merely the province of Bessarabia lying between the Dniester and the Pruth. This treaty, signed at Bucharest, renewed the provisions of previous treaties with regard to the principalities, and further stipulated that complete amnesty and administrative independence should be granted to the Serbians, who had risen in 1804, and since then had attempted with varying success to emancipate themselves from the Turkish yoke.

The Treaty of Kainardji had rendered possible the rise of Greek commerce. This was followed by an awakening of Greek intelligence and a remarkable revival of Greek national feeling. The protectorate exercised by Russia over the principalities and the stipulations of the Treaty of Bucharest in favour of the Serbians led the Greeks to look to the Tsar as the future helper in their struggle for freedom. The Greek rising was precipitated by the indiscreet action of the Greek ministers and officers at the Court of Alexander I. It began with an abortive movement in the principalities, which was easily crushed by the Turkish troops. The revolt then broke out simultaneously in the Morea, in the mainland of Greece, and in the islands.

The European Powers were embarrassed by the outbreak. Alexander, though in his heart he sympathised

with the Greeks, was deeply committed, in conjunction with Austria and Prussia, to resistance to all revolution. The Western Powers were afraid that the emancipation of the Greeks would be the dismemberment of Turkey, and the prelude to its conquest by Russia. Thus the Greeks were cold-shouldered by all the Powers, and had to rely upon their own scanty resources and upon such help as could be got from the subscriptions collected in Europe and from European volunteers, whose zeal was too often better than either their judgment or their practice.

It was impossible that the rising should not have the character of a religious conflict; and it was therefore natural that its first result was the murder by the Turks of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople, and a multitude of similar acts of fierce reprisal. The Tsar replied to this by an ultimatum (June 28, 1821), in which he protested against the barbarous persecutions of Christians; and said that in these circumstances "the further co-existence" of Turkey side by side with the other European Powers depended upon whether the Porte should continue to attack the Christian religion, and to attempt the destruction of a whole people. It was the phrase "the co-existence of Turkey" in this document which rendered the Western Powers too suspicious of the Tsar to be willing to help the Greeks. Diplomacy prolonged its discussions and the agonies of the patriots for many years.

The death of Alexander I. and the accession of Nicholas made it probable that Russia would actively interfere between the Greeks and the Turks; and Canning, who was now Foreign Secretary, thought that Russian designs of aggrandisement would be better counteracted by co-operation than by direct opposition. Accordingly, in 1826, the two Powers agreed to a protocol, which provided that they should mediate between the Porte and the insurgents with a view to the creation of a Greek state tributary to the Porte, but having the full management of its own internal affairs. Both Powers declared that they would not seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce for their subjects which should not be equally obtainable by all other nations. Shortly afterwards the Tsar sent an ultimatum to the Porte formulating those grievances in regard to the principalities, and to other matters unconnected with Greece, which had been unsettled since 1821. The Sultan, at this time, had just effected that suppression and destruction of the Janissaries which, though it was undoubtedly necessary for the establishment of his authority, and for the improvement of the Turkish military system, left his empire for the time without adequate defence. Accordingly, he accepted the terms of the ultimatum, and they were embodied in the Convention of Ackerman (October, 1826). By this act the provisions of the

Treaty of Bucharest concerning the principalities and Serbia were affirmed and extended.

In July, 1827, the French Government acceded to the Anglo-Russian agreement concerning Greece, which was embodied in a treaty between the three Powers, who bound themselves to propose an armistice both to Turks and to Greeks, and to enforce it in case of refusal by either party. The armistice was refused by the Turks; and the consequence was the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino by the fleets of the allies. Before this took place Canning died, and the English Ministry relapsed into its former policy of non-intervention. The Tsar might possibly also have hesitated; but he was committed to action by a manifesto of the Sultan, who called upon his subjects to arm for resistance to the interference of the Christian Powers, and expressly declared that he had signed the Convention of Ackerman in order to gain time, and without the intention of fulfilling it. Thereupon the Tsar declared war (April, 1828), announcing, at the same time, as by the self-denying clause of the protocol he was bound to do, that he had no purpose of aggrandisement.

The campaign of 1828, though favourable to the Russian arms, led to no decisive results; but in 1829 the Russian army crossed the Balkans and advanced as far as Adrianople, which was not defended. This was, however, only the remnant of the force with which the Russians had opened the campaign, and disease

was rapidly destroying it. Probably, if the Turks had remained obstinate, the Russian enterprise would have ended in a great catastrophe ; but, under the influence of the ambassadors of the Western Powers, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed by the Turks before they or their Western friends had realised the helplessness of the conquerors. By this treaty the *Porte* agreed that the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be appointed for life, and that Mahommedans should not be allowed to reside in either province. The navigation of the Danube was to be free ; merchant ships, whether Russian or not, were to be allowed to pass the Dardanelles ; and the terms of the Treaty of London as regards Greece were accepted. In spite of the self-denying declaration of the Tsar, Russia annexed the islands at the mouth of the Danube and a considerable tract of territory in Asia Minor, where the Russian arms had been successful. The *Porte* for the first time definitely recognised the administrative independence of Serbia, though Turkish garrisons were still maintained in its fortresses.

The conditions of Greek independence were as yet far from settled ; they continued for some years to be the subject of negotiation between England, France and Russia ; and the creation of the Greek kingdom, as well as the subsequent enlargement of its boundaries, are the results of the mediation of the Powers between the Greeks and the *Porte*.

For the suppression of the Greek rising the Sultan in 1824 had called for the assistance of Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, who possessed an army disciplined after the European fashion and an excellent fleet. Mehemet sent his stepson Ibrahim Pasha, who first of all landed in Crete, and desolated that island, of which he received the governorship as his reward, and then transferred his army to the Morea, which it was his purpose to depopulate and make desert. The fleet destroyed at Navarino was composed mainly of Egyptian vessels; but even the loss of his fleet did not induce Ibrahim to stay his destroying hand. Accordingly in 1828 the French Government, with the sanction of the allies, sent a force under General Maison to the Morea, in presence of which Ibrahim withdrew his troops.

Mehemet Ali had risen to power in Egypt under the protection and with the assistance of the French. It was his design, of which his protectors highly approved, to make for himself an independent kingdom in Egypt and Syria. He perceived that his growing power was obnoxious to Sultan Mahmoud, and he determined to anticipate the blow by which he expected that the Sultan would try to depose him. In December, 1831, he picked a quarrel with the Turkish Governor of Acre, and sent Ibrahim Pasha with an army into Syria. Ibrahim defeated the Turkish forces, passed the Taurus range into Asia Minor, and utterly

defeated the Turkish army at Iconium (December, 1832).

Sultan Mahmoud, having destroyed the Janissaries, and exhausted the military resources of his empire in the wars against Greece and Russia, could raise no second army for the defence of Constantinople. He turned for help first of all to England. But the English Ministry had no sufficient force available, and were already involved, in relation to Portugal, Spain, Holland and Belgium, in enterprises which required them to keep what force they had, ready for events in Western Europe. It was useless to ask for French aid against Mehemet Ali, the French *protégé*; so the Sultan in despair appealed to the Tsar, who promptly sent a fleet from Sebastopol to the Bosphorus, and followed it up by landing an army of 12,000 men at Scutari. Thus balked of his prey, Mehemet Ali, under French advice, accepted the Sultan's offer to recognise him as Governor, not only of Egypt and Crete, but of Syria up to the Taurus range.

Before the Tsar withdrew his fleet and his army, he obtained a recompense for his services in the shape of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July, 1833), by which Russia engaged, in case the Sultan should again ask for help, to furnish as many forces by land and sea as might be necessary; and the Sultan in return engaged, upon the Tsar's request, to close the Dardanelles against the ships of war of all foreign Powers.

Thus in 1833, while Russia had temporarily attained by the protection of Turkey that control of the Straits which is one of the chief aims of her policy, France seems to have succeeded in that creation of an Egyptian state under French influence in which the far-seeing eye of Bonaparte had perceived the most telling blow against England. The English Government, unready, and without a plan, had been doubly discomfited; but the failure was concealed under the phrase "the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," which, though untrue and impossible in both its parts, served instead of a design for British policy during the next fifty years.

Mahmoud never mastered his resentment against Mehemet Ali, and in 1839 he thought the time had come to recover Syria. His army advanced from Armenia along the line of the Euphrates, but it was completely defeated by Ibrahim at Nisib (June, 1839). A few days afterwards the Turkish admiral deserted to the side of Mehemet Ali, and took the whole Turkish fleet into Alexandria. The English Ministry were at this time under the spell of belief in the French alliance; and the English and French fleets appeared in the Dardanelles to prevent any Russian action upon the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Tsar Nicholas saw that the treaty was of little avail so long as England and France were united to oppose his policy. It was more important for him to separate the two maritime

Powers, than to attempt for the present to enforce his claims in regard to the Straits. So long as Turkey remained weak, the question of the Straits might be postponed; but a strong Egypt, reaching up to the Taurus range and to the borders of Armenia, might in the future be inconvenient. France obstinately supported her *protégé* Mehemet Ali, in spite of the objections of the English to his claims, objections rooted in the recollection of the causes of the French interference in Egypt in 1798. This difference and the readiness of the Tsar to meet the wishes of England in regard to the Straits led the English Government to abandon the French alliance. After a year's negotiation, England and Russia concluded a treaty, in which Prussia and Austria joined, pledging themselves to compel Mehemet Ali to retire from Syria, and to content himself with a hereditary monarchy in Egypt under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Russia at the same time accepted, in lieu of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, a new one, by which the five Powers and the Sultan confirmed the ancient rule, according to which the passage of the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus is always to be closed to foreign ships of war so long as the Porte is at peace. By these proceedings France was isolated. Thiers, the minister who had insisted on supporting Mehemet Ali, and proposed to arm for the purpose, resigned; and the French looked on in passive indignation, while British and Austrian forces drove the Egyptian troops out of Syria.

The Crimean War arose out of the claim set up by the Tsar to a special right to be the protector of the Christian subjects of Turkey, over and above the undoubted protectorate which the treaties conferred upon him of the Danubian principalities, and over and above the right which the Porte had conceded in the Treaty of Kainardji, to make representations on the subject of a particular Greek church, in a particular street at Galata. By way of enforcing this unfounded general claim, Nicholas marched an army into the Danubian principalities. The other four great Powers protested. After much negotiation France and England prepared for a joint attack on Russia, while Austria mobilised an army, and required the Tsar to withdraw his troops from the principalities. This he did, but the two Western Powers were not satisfied. They demanded that the Black Sea should be declared neutral, and that Russia should be prohibited from keeping a naval force in it. To obtain this prohibition, they landed a force in the Crimea, and after a long struggle destroyed the fortress of Sebastopol, which had been created as a base of operations for the Russian fleet. In the end the Russian Government accepted the terms offered, which were recorded in the Treaty of Paris of 1856. One of the conditions of the peace was a promise given in the form of a voluntary undertaking by the Sultan to ameliorate the condition of the rayahs, and in particular to treat them as having equal rights with

their Mahommedan fellow-subjects. This promise was from the beginning regarded as illusory by all who were acquainted with Mahommedan life and with Turkey; for the fundamental conception of Islam is that the unbeliever is an inferior being.

The neutrality of the Black Sea was a humiliation to which no great Power could be expected to submit indefinitely. A Power may be weakened by the annexation of some of its territory to another Power. This can be undone only by a victory over the other Power. The object which the allies had in view would have been attained if it had been possible to take from Russia the Crimea, Bessarabia, and the intervening coast, and to transfer them to a Power capable of defending them. But the prohibition to keep a fleet in a sea in which there is no superior naval force can be kept up only if there is suspended over the recalcitrant state a perpetual threat of conquest. In this case there was no certainty that the Anglo-French alliance would last, or that it would be able at any time to repeat the adventure of the Crimean War.

The measure was the wrong one. The true way to prevent the exit of a Russian fleet from the Black Sea was to have set up at Constantinople a Power strong enough to be able to close the Straits and to hold its own against Russian attack. The true way to protect the rayah was to have created a series of autonomous principalities, corresponding as nearly as might be with

the several nationalities. Both objects would have been effected at once if it had been possible to establish a federation of such principalities, with its capital at Constantinople, under the protection or the suzerainty of Austria. Such an Eastern Empire would have had to be carried into Asia Minor, probably to the eastern border of Armenia.

I have attempted to review the history of the Eastern question because it so remarkably reveals the nature of the European community.

It does not appear to be the mission of any Power to assert interests or rights other than its own. But where the purpose of one Power conflicts with those of most of the others, and where this opposition continues through many changes in the relations of the opposing Powers to each other, the policy of the one Power which is thus steadily opposed by combinations between the others may fairly be regarded as contrary to a general interest of Europe, revealed in the concurrence of the individual aims of those others.

The purpose of Russia to acquire a paramount or exclusive influence upon the Bosphorus and upon the western shores of the Black Sea, pursued with great persistence for more than a century, met with a not less persistent resistance from other Powers. This resistance has seldom, or never, been that of all the other Powers, it has hardly ever been that of any one Power alone. In 1770 it was due to an understanding

between Austria and Prussia, at that time otherwise hostile to one another. In 1787 Austria, in order to prevent Russia's preponderance, is her ally; but the combination is defeated partly by the military success of the Turks against Austria, partly by the counter-combination of Prussia, England, and Holland, aided by the general turn of events. From 1807 till 1812 Turkey, threatened by the alliance of France and Russia, is supported, not very effectually, by England. In 1828-29 the sympathy everywhere felt for the Greeks prevents the Powers from armed resistance to the Russian attack upon Turkey; but Russia in the self-denying protocol recognises a general European interest, forbidding her to acquire for herself any portion of European Turkey. This protocol becomes a precedent. But in 1854 the Russian claim to a general protectorate over the Christian population of Turkey calls forth a protest from all the Powers; the Russian invasion of the principalities brings on to the scene an Austrian army, in presence of which the Russians withdraw without fighting. The maritime Powers require Russia to renounce her naval ambition in the Black Sea, and by the expedition to the Crimea enforce her temporary acquiescence in this, perhaps, extreme demand.

The concurrent action of a number of Powers in antagonism to the design of some one Power must not be confounded with the concert of Europe, a term which has been applied to the agreement between all the

great Powers such as is recorded in each of the principal European treaties. The action of Europe is usually not agreement, but discord; it is a tremendous conflict of forces. The antagonism frequently works itself out in war. When war is avoided it is usually because the combination on one side has an undoubted preponderance, so that the other side abandons purposes which it is evident cannot be realised. The settlement takes the form of a European treaty, which records an agreement, not in the sense of the expression of the unanimous wishes of all the parties, but rather in the sense of the acceptance by some of them of the purpose asserted against them by the others.

When, however, a definite purpose has been continuously asserted during many generations by successive combinations of Powers amid all the changing conditions of the European world, and has been embodied in a series of European treaties, this purpose may fairly be said to cover a European interest. Among such interests must be placed the limitation of Russian influence by the Danube and the Pruth, the exclusion of a Russian control over the Bosphorus, and the prevention of a Russian acquisition of Constantinople.

II.

THE UNION OF GERMANY.

IN 1848 the first German Parliament met at Frankfort. It had a specific mission,—to make Germany free and united. The Germans of those days might have called themselves Liberal Unionists. They were Liberals because they had been overdosed with divine right, and Unionists because they wanted to be a nation. There were between thirty and forty divine rights in the country, each of them endued with authority, or, as it was called, sovereignty, over a region large or small, the largest being the kingdom of Prussia, and the others of various sizes down to little duchies like Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. These many crowned heads had ambassadors, who sat at Frankfort in a sort of committee called the Diet, and discussed the affairs of Germany. Matters of no importance were decided by the majority. Serious business required a unanimous vote; but as the multitude of sovereigns were never all agreed, except to put down revolution, or, in other words, to keep their thrones, no serious business was ever done, except that now and then an obnoxious constitution, granted by some prince in a moment of weakness, was revised or rescinded, and

that a censorship was kept up to exclude the dangerous theories that the best government is by representative institutions, and that Germany ought to be a nation having one head instead of thirty or forty.

This *régime* had lasted thirty-three years, and the Germans were tired of it. They thought that a German Empire would do better for them than a multitude of home rulers, and that a national Parliament was the proper organ for managing German affairs. In February, 1848, the King of the French was upset. The German kings and princes were terrified, for they thought that their turn was come. They lost their heads; and when a caucus at Frankfort summoned a national Parliament to make a constitution for the whole country, the princes and the Diet agreed. The Diet in particular declared its functions at an end. The Parliament, which met in May, went to work in the methodical fashion of the German professors of those days, many of whom sat in it. A Liberal constitution was drafted, making the supreme power a Parliament, to be elected by universal suffrage, putting the princes into an upper house with less powers than the House of Lords, and setting up as the honorary president a hereditary Emperor. This draft took nearly a year to make.

The great difficulty was to settle the limits of the new United Germany, the thorny point being its relations with Austria. Hungary, Croatia, Lombardy and Venetia were not German; and no one wanted them in Germany.

But to take in the German part of Austria, and to leave these provinces out, would be to cut the Austrian monarchy in two. To this the Austrian Government objected, announcing that its consent would never be given to such an arrangement, nor to any plan which did not leave the Austrian Emperor head of Germany. After long and acrimonious discussion the Parliament decided to leave Austria altogether out of its Union. This point being settled, early in 1849 the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., was elected Emperor, and a deputation went to Berlin to offer him the crown.

A good deal had happened between May, 1848, and April, 1849. There had been revolutions in Austria; and at this time Hungary, which had declared itself independent, was victorious. The Danes, who in their own way were as Liberal and as Unionist as the Germans, had announced a sort of Act of Union by which Schleswig-Holstein, an independent state, three parts German, half in and half out of the German Confederation, and united to Denmark only by the purely personal tie of a common sovereign, was to be incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark. The Schleswig-Holsteiners replied by setting up a provisional government of their own, and raising an army. Thereupon the Danes invaded Schleswig-Holstein. All Germany was full of sympathy with the Schleswig-Holsteiners, and the King of Prussia sent troops to their aid. But the Tsar Nicholas took the Danish view. He gave the King of Prussia

to understand that a continuance of the war with Denmark would mean war with Russia too. The Prussian troops were recalled, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners left to their fate. They lost Schleswig, but the Danes failed to conquer Holstein.

The Tsar would not hear of the new German Empire. It was made quite clear at Berlin that the acceptance of the offer from Frankfort would lead to a war in which Prussia would have to face both Austria and Russia, and in which the princes, about to be reduced to mere peers, would not help Prussia. Such a war would be too much for Prussia, and there was nothing to be had by it except a sovereignty reduced to a shadow by an almighty Parliament. The king refused the proffered dignity, and the Parliament soon after came to an unhappy end.

There could, however, be no longer any doubt about what the German people aimed at. It was union, and the strength that flows from union. Divided they had to look on and see a German province overrun by the hated Danes.

The King of Prussia next tried to make a union to his own mind by treaties with the leading German states. But Austria would have none of it, and set on foot again the Diet at Frankfort which had abolished itself in 1848. Austria had by this time recovered from the shock of revolutions, and had, with Russian help, completely crushed the revolt of Hungary, which

was her greatest internal danger. She was then supported by Russia in giving peremptory orders to Prussia to dissolve its inchoate union, to recognise, and send ambassadors to, the restored Diet, and to join in compelling Holstein to submit to its Danish masters. The king had called out his army. But at the last moment, when the Russian and Austrian forces were on the move, he yielded. The agreement by which he submitted, signed at Olmütz on the 29th November, 1850, was regarded in Prussia as an abject surrender.

The old Diet resumed its tedious discussions, Austria, which had the perpetual presidency, using every occasion to thwart Prussia. The Austrians now tried to unite Germany under Austria by attempting to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Diet, and to empower a majority of its members to decide all questions. The majority of the monarchs (the Diet represented not the people but the sovereigns) were always on the Austrian side, so that the adoption of this system would have abolished Prussia. Therefore Prussia vetoed it, and it could not be made legal.

The Prussian ambassador at the restored Diet was Bismarck, in 1850 a man of thirty-five, full of the high Toryism in which he had been brought up. He went to Frankfort to represent Prussia, and very soon forgot party and party doctrine for his attention to his country's business. He saw that the Diet was an organised anarchy, a no-government, and left Germany

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impotent, and that Germany could never be a power so long as two great states were quarrelling in her council chamber. She would be stronger if one could turn out the other and rule. Prussia was entirely in Germany, had no non-German interests, and was regarded by the people as the representative German state. Austria had most of her lands, most of her population, and consequently most of her interests outside Germany. But it was evident that neither Power could be expelled, except by force, from its position of influence on German affairs.

The greatness of Bismarck consists first in his perfect grasp of the true aims of Prussia, which raised him out of and above parties, and secondly in that he saw the world as it was, and distinguished between what was attainable and what was impracticable. Prussia was bound to unite Germany under her own leadership. There was no other solution of the necessities either of Prussia or of Germany. For this purpose it was indispensable to eject Austria, and this could be accomplished only by a war. In 1850, as we have seen, the Tsar was on the Austrian side, while the traditional policy of France was absolutely opposed to any unity of Germany.

Events came to Prussia's assistance. In 1853 arose the dispute between Russia and Turkey, in which the other Powers took so deep an interest. Prussia joined with Austria, France, and England, in the protest

against the Russian occupation of the principalities. But while Austria, in 1854, by placing an army upon her frontier, compelled the withdrawal of the Russian forces, Prussia, after the first protest, maintained through all stages of the conflict a neutrality benevolent to Russia. The Tsar was as much gratified by the friendly attitude of Prussia, whose German policy Russia had opposed, as he was indignant at the resistance of Austria, which Russia had so recently saved in Hungary and supported in Germany. Accordingly, the events of 1853-4 put an end to the accord between Austria and Russia, and cemented the friendship between the royal houses of Prussia and Russia, thus rendering improbable any further Russian interferences hostile to Prussia in German affairs.

In 1857 a new monarch, William I., took up the government of Prussia, first as representative of his sick brother, then as regent, and on his brother's death in 1860 as king. He had never forgotten the bitter humiliation of Olmütz, and his firm resolve was to make Prussia too strong for a repetition of such a fall. Accordingly, his first act was to re-organise the army, that is to improve the conditions of service, and to create forty-nine new regiments, thus doubling the available fighting force. The Prussian Parliament, a creation of 1850, refused supplies for the purpose, and opposed King William's policy at all points, under the quite erroneous belief that it was reactionary, and

negligent of German national aims. To carry out his policy in face of this opposition, and without violation of the constitution, the king in 1862 made Bismarck chief minister. The work carried out by the king with Bismarck's help during the next five-and-twenty years is a brilliant example of statesmanship, that is of the pursuit of a great end, representing the true needs of a nation and of its attainment, not by the acceptance of a party creed, but by knowledge of the world and resolute action.

The first step was to confer a new obligation upon Russia. The Polish insurrection of 1863 was a danger to Prussia as well as to Russia; and, while the Western Powers and Austria sympathised with it, and sent sharp remonstrances to the Tsar, Prussia concluded a convention with Russia to facilitate its suppression. At the same time the case of Schleswig-Holstein again attracted the attention of Europe. The Danes in 1863 proclaimed their Act of Union. All Germany was unanimous that it should be annulled, and the two duchies freed from the Danes. Austria could not, without loss of her influence in Germany, evade the task of co-operating against Denmark; and Prussia with great skill induced her to join in a course which, while diplomatically correct, so that there was no handle for the interference of other Powers, led to a joint war with Denmark, to the conquest of Schleswig and Holstein, and to their acquisition by Prussia and Austria

as partners. This partnership, adroitly managed by Prussia, brought the conflict for the lead in Germany to a head.

The great danger for Prussia was that of French interference. In order to understand this, it is necessary to consider briefly the traditional aims of France as they have been set forth by French writers of unquestioned authority. M. Sorel, in his work on *Europe and the French Revolution*, has traced with infinite pains the history of French policy, and has shown how the policy of the new France sprung from the Revolution is identical in its purposes and in the nature of its means with that of the *ancien régime*. The great design of France has always been to exercise dominion over Europe. This is the object of Henry IV., of Richelieu, and of Mazarin. It reappears in Louis XIV., and is revived at the Revolution in the project of Sieyès, which sums up its aims and method. "France, surrounded by vassal states, was to dominate Europe by her alliances, to direct it by her policy, to impose peace upon the states, and to propagate the doctrines of the Revolution among the peoples." The monument of this policy had been the Treaty of Westphalia, "which bases the supremacy of France upon the vassalage of the middle states".

"That which must be considered in Germany," writes M. Sorel, in explaining the views of French statesmen a century ago, "is not the Empire, which is

decrepit, nor its institutions, which are in decay, but the states of which it is composed. Germany is nothing so long as they remain divided; she becomes formidable if they should unite; . . . the fundamental object of the Treaties of Westphalia is to render their union impossible." In the same way, as M. Sorel shows, the object of France in Italy was never the creation of an Italian nation, but of a loose confederation of states which by their weakness and division would be subject to French influence. Napoleon III. hoped by his campaign of 1859 not to unite Italy, but to weaken Austria and to form an enlarged kingdom of Sardinia in return for Savoy and Nice. The subsequent events which brought Tuscany, the Emilia, Naples and Sicily into the kingdom of Victor Emanuel, took Napoleon by surprise, and were distasteful to all parties in France. But his declarations of 1859 bound Napoleon to help Italy to recover Venetia, or at least not to oppose her attempts for that purpose; and he was deeply committed in opposition to Austria, the stronghold of legitimism.

The purpose of Prussia to unite Germany required that France should not interfere in the German conflict, or at least not in such a way as to render impossible the fulfilment of the Prussian design. This was one chief object of the alliance concluded in April, 1866, between Prussia and Italy. Napoleon could hardly support one of the allies against Austria, while helping

Austria against the other. Moreover, he hoped by acquiescing in a limited aggrandisement of Prussia, that is, in her conquest of North but not of South Germany, to secure her consent to the acquisition by France of provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.

The Prussian minister, while avoiding any admission or promise, carefully guarded his language on this point so as not to rouse in the Emperor's mind the conviction that in order to annex German territory it would be necessary first to conquer Germany.

The neutrality of Russia being secured, and the neutrality of France up to a certain point having been rendered probable by the attitude and policy as well as by the assurances of Napoleon, the German conflict was allowed to come to a head. The kings and most of the princes whose independent sovereignty, the curse of Germany, was threatened by Prussia, took the Austrian side. The war began on the 15th of June. On the 29th the Hanoverian army, beaten and surrounded, surrendered at discretion. On the 2nd of July the Austrian and Saxon armies were crushed in the great battle of Königgrätz, and by the 20th the Prussian army was in sight of Vienna. The Bavarian army had by this time also been defeated. The French Emperor was offering his mediation to both sides, and sent word to Prussia that he should consent to her demands for North Germany, but should expect compensation on the Rhine. But the Prussians came to a

direct understanding with Austria. By the preliminaries of peace, signed at Nicolsburg on the 26th of July, Austria agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation and to cede Venetia to Italy, although Italy had been defeated both on land and sea. The definitive treaties were concluded in August.

Prussia took no territory from Austria. She annexed Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and the electorate of Hesse, and formed a North German Confederation, of which the King of Prussia was president and military commander-in-chief. The confederation was absolutely unlike the previous German Confederation in that it was not a federation of independent states, but a single federal state with one army and navy, and a single federal administration, the states forming it retaining only their local administrative powers. The Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Würtemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden signed secret treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, by which the command of their armies in case of war was given to the King of Prussia. Thus in a few weeks the great aim of Prussia and of Germany was substantially realised. Unity had been secured, though not completed.

The South German states retained their independent sovereignty because to have brought them into the confederation might have provoked the forcible interference of France.

Italy had secured Venetia; but the possession of Rome was still wanting to complete her national unity. French troops held Rome, so that France appeared as the hinderer of Italy's dearest wish.

The French view of these events has never been more accurately expressed than by M. Thiers, who was, at any rate in the latter half of his life, the best representative of France. In 1865 M. Thiers expounded, by way of comment on the policy of Napoleon III., of which he disapproved, the feelings with which most Frenchmen regarded the unification of Italy. He denounced the policy which seeks in foreign affairs the realisation of doctrines or principles, and affirmed that the only true guide in foreign affairs is the welfare of your own nation. The interests of France were opposed to the unity of Italy. "The unity of Italy was not desirable for France. I seek in vain in history for the example of a Power helping to raise up on its frontier, at its very doors, a Power almost its equal, with which it must sooner or later come into conflict. I shall of course be told that Italy will be our devoted ally. I do not believe it. To-day when Italy needs us, and cannot exist without us, yes, she will be faithful to us; but her faith will last just as long as her weakness. When she has grown strong she will wish to be independent, and she will be right. . . . One of my chief grievances against the unity of Italy is that it will one day be the mother of German unity." This

was in April, 1865, and M. Thiers painted in glowing colours the danger to France of German unity. In May, 1866, just before the outbreak of the war in Germany, he delivered a memorable speech on the same subject, of which it is worth while to quote the most important passages.

“The Germans have been a prey for a good many years to certain pre-occupations which are natural, and which if kept within certain limits can offend neither their neighbours nor Europe.

“These pre-occupations are as follows. The Germans are displeased that what they call the German Fatherland, that is to say the entirety of all the states of German origin, is represented by a meeting of diplomats, professional gentlemen, of great learning, but little accessible to popular ideas. They are displeased, too, that the Diet is constituted in a certain manner, which, according to them, renders its action neither prompt enough nor vigorous enough. They would wish to have more unity in its constitution, and they think that with unity their country would play a more considerable part in the world.

“This double wish, kept within certain limits, I am for my part far from blaming, and I understand Europe remaining an attentive but tranquil spectator of what is passing in Germany, so long as Germany keeps itself within the limits I have just traced; but I beg the Germans to consider well that in the pursuit of these

two aims much prudence is required; for we are upon the borders of very great rights, very important rights—the rights of all the other Powers.

“What is the political principle to which in all ages Europe has been particularly attached? On this point I beg you to be good enough to hear me with attention, for I am touching the most delicate point in European policy. I beg the Germans to consider that the greatest principle of European policy is that Germany should be composed of independent states, bound one to another by a simple federative tie. That principle was proclaimed to all Europe at the Congress of Westphalia. It was again the principle adopted when Frederick the Great signed, on the occasion of the Bavarian succession, the Peace of Teschen, to which all the European Powers adhered, always with the essential condition that Germany should be composed of independent states.

“In 1814, after the long wars with France were ended, the allies left Paris without any other conditions having been settled than those relating to the outline of our frontiers; but it was not possible to quit Paris and go to Vienna without leaving behind some guarantee to a Power that had been so great, and which, in spite of its defeats, as the future has since proved, still remained the greatest of all.

“What guarantee was left to France upon the return to Vienna after the signature of the Treaty of Paris? I

have before me the terms, and here is the most important of these guarantees: 'Germany shall be composed of independent states, united by a federal tie'. There was renewed that great European principle that Germany must be composed of independent states. Afterwards when the Federal Act and when the final Act were drawn up, there no doubt appeared certain provisions which would have brought down the German princes to the condition of mere civil administrators of their states, to the condition so to speak of prefects, with neither the right to command their armies nor to be represented by their ministers to foreign Powers. The Congress of Vienna did not accept these provisions, but maintained the old European principle that Germany should be composed of independent states. I repeat, I beg the Germans not to forget, that this is one of the great principles of the public law of Europe. They desire that the Diet should be composed of members more accessible to the ideas of the time. Very good; I have no objection. They desire that it should be constituted with more unity; again I have no objection. But let them not forget that they would be lacking in regard for Europe, and in respect for the great principles of the European equilibrium, if they wished to constitute Germany into a single whole which should absorb all the particular states and leave them no distinct and independent existence.

“That is the right, the true right in which the whole world is interested. There is, as you know, one Power which makes use of the ideas at present reigning in Germany, and which wishes to make use of them to reach a very different result. That Power is Prussia. She wishes to use the German ideas to attain a result that is easy to see, that is known, that is published everywhere, and in a hundred ways. If the coming war should be fortunate for her she would wish to seize—not fifty millions of Germans; oh, no! she has fourteen millions, and to start from fourteen and arrive at fifty—however eager you may be—the journey must be divided into stages. What is quite certain is, that if the war is fortunate for Prussia, she will seize some of the states of North Germany, and those which she will not seize she will place in a Diet which will be under her influence. She will then have one portion of the Germans under her direct authority, and the other under her indirect authority; and then Austria will be admitted into this new order of things as a *protégée*. Then, allow me to say to you, will be realised a great phenomenon, towards which we have been tending for more than a century. We shall see recreated a new German Empire, that Empire of Charles V., which in former times was seated at Vienna, which would now be seated at Berlin, and would be very close to our frontier, would press upon it, would squeeze it; and, to complete the analogy, this Empire of Charles V.,

instead of leaning, like that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, upon Spain, would lean upon Italy."

The opinions which were thus clearly expressed before the Austro-Prussian War were repeated with equal force in 1867, and the point directed against Italy was sharpened. "We were told, 'Italy will be your ally'. But you have seen, gentlemen, this pretended ally; you have seen her last year, when it was a question of joining Prussia, and thus of striking against us a blow of which she could not but perceive the seriousness; you have seen how quickly she made up her mind, without troubling herself about the blow she was about to deal us."

These speeches of M. Thiers expressed the feelings of the French nation. They translated themselves in the public mind into the cries, "Revenge for Sadowa," and "The Rhine frontier for France," and the passions thus excited were more than Napoleon could control. He was driven to find an occasion of quarrel with Prussia.

In Germany there was an equally widespread feeling with respect to the relation between France and a united Germany. The Germans had had two centuries to reflect on the meaning of the Peace of Westphalia. They well remembered how, in 1681, Strasburg had been seized by Louis XIV. in time of peace, how Lorraine had been given to France by Austria in exchange for Tuscany, and had thus in 1766 become a French province. They remembered that in 1792 the occasion

of the war against the revolution was the abolition by the French of the rights of German princes in Alsace. Above all they remembered that it was Austria in conjunction with France and England, and in opposition to Prussia, that had in 1814 restored to beaten France the German-speaking provinces so recently acquired by the French.

In 1841 by way of reply to an utterance of M. Thiers, who even then suggested that France should acquire the Rhine frontier, a German magazine had published an essay on "The Western Frontier" in which the writer said: "If at any time France ceases to recognise the treaties of 1814 and 1815, the only legal title that secures her the fruits of her former robbery from Germany, treaties which we have honestly recognised, though they are disadvantageous to us—if France breaks these treaties and begins a war, we ought to unite ourselves in the firm resolve, that if God wills and grants victory to our just cause, we will never make those treaties the basis of a new peace, never put the sword back into its sheath, until we have secured all our rights, and France has paid in full the debt she owes us". This essay, written by Moltke, afterwards so famous, expressed the feelings of all Germans.

It is no wonder, then, that when in 1870 Napoleon raised and pressed the insignificant question of the Spanish candidature, the glove thrown down was taken

up. In the war then begun, France was fighting for the Rhine frontier as the symbol of her secular primacy on the European continent. Germany was fighting for her national union, that is for her national existence, and saw in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine the symbol of its complete attainment.

Prussia deserved the position at the head of Germany which she won in 1866, and maintained in 1870. It had been her peculiar distinction that in the days of her misfortunes, when she was conquered and all but annexed by Napoleon, her patriots sought and found the right path of national regeneration. They thought that the way to make Germany a great nation was to create in the Germans the qualities that produce national greatness. True hearts and clear heads were the great requisite, and the question was how to supply them in sufficient quantity to fit out a whole people, or at least enough of its members to give the tone.

The means were found. An army under the command of genuine leaders is a good school of duty; and in the hands of Scharnhorst and his companions the Prussian army taught one generation of Germans to obey, to endure, and to die. Stein and Hardenberg reshaped a number of institutions with a view to bind rich and poor together in the bonds of a common welfare. Fichte, W. Humboldt, Niebuhr, and their fellows, strengthened the foundations of that part of education

which is given by the school and the university. The aim was not to give every man the whole of knowledge, but to give each man the particular knowledge necessary to enable him to do his particular life's work, as well as the general knowledge required to make a good citizen.

From this ideal resulted a public school system which, in spite of faults, made the Prussians the people among whom the general knowledge conveyed by primary and secondary instruction was most widely spread and most fully developed. One of its elements was a better general view of history and of geography than is imparted by any other system of national instruction. Upon the basis laid by the schools was built up a university system in which knowledge was classified into compartments, and the student encouraged to choose a compartment and to master its contents as perfectly as he could. The system aimed at quality, not quantity. Each student was trained to spontaneous effort and taught a method, and he became himself an active searcher, seeking to enlarge the bounds of knowledge in the particular region which he had entered. Thus for every career in which knowledge is an element of success there were Prussians better equipped than most of their competitors in other countries. In the army and all branches of the public service thorough professional knowledge gradually came to be the indispensable condition of advancement. The universities became genuine fountains of knowledge, corporations

organised to acquire and to spread a deeper insight into nature and human life than had existed before. A generation of German teachers became the teachers of their class all over the world. Until a few years ago, university professors outside Germany were little more than the channels through which the teaching of the German masters found its way more or less diluted to the pupils.

Stein, Fichte, and Scharnhorst had sowed the seed of which the fruit was to be reaped in the third generation, when the strong hearts and clear heads were found in high places, and led the nation to unity and victory.

III.

THE PARTITION OF TURKEY, AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

THE relations between France and her two neighbours, Germany and Italy, have long formed one of two poles round which the policies of the continental Powers revolve. The other pole is the relation between Russia and those Powers, among which Austria stands first, that are opposed to her designs upon the outlet of the Black Sea. The connection between these two oppositions is the clue to the last five-and-twenty years of European history.

Before reviewing the latest phases of the Eastern question it may be useful for a moment to abandon the European point of view, and to place ourselves successively in the position of each of the Powers concerned. It is natural to begin with Turkey.

We are at once confronted by a difficulty. What is the cause represented by Turkey? It cannot be that of Islam, which, at any rate within the sphere of European influence, is a lost cause. It cannot be the Turkish institutions, for they have failed. It must be that of the population of the country, which, at least in

European Turkey, is for the most part Christian. The first purpose of any population is to control its own destinies and to seek a common welfare. To this end it becomes a nation and asserts its independence. But the independence of the Ottoman Empire, which long seemed to Western statesmen to be the ideal for Turkey, was a very different thing; for it meant the negation of independence to each of the nations of which the population was composed. When the Roumanians, Serbs, and Greeks had acquired with the help of Russia a limited independence, a new conception of Turkey arose in the minds of those Europeans who best knew the country. It was perceived that if the Christian population were grouped into a number of states, federated under the suzerainty of the Sultan, it might in this way become possible to employ Christian armies for the defence of the Porte, and to create an empire of which the independence would be not merely a convenience to Europe but the condition of prosperity for its own people.

It is the doom of the Ottoman Empire that such a creation is incompatible with Mahommedan orthodoxy; and it is the condemnation of English policy in that stage of the Eastern question which followed the Crimean War, that it was not based upon a clear understanding of these conditions.

The Austrian Empire is the realisation of the conception towards which the recent history of Turkey

tends;—of a number of nations united to form a great Power. This is the secret alike of Austria's weakness and of her strength. The policy of Austria has been condemned as dynastic; but this quality is perhaps its merit rather than its reproach. Where the State is identical with a nation, a distinction between the interest of the nation and that of the ruling house would undoubtedly be disastrous; but the house of Austria represents the common purposes of several nations. Austria is a sort of Europe in little; and the policy of its Government, like that of Europe, is the resultant of counteracting forces. For this reason Austria has little expansive capacity, and the success of her Government has lain, not in a development of great military strength, but in judiciously making the best of the ever-changing European situation. The paramount aim of Austrian statesmen must be the preservation of the Empire, which carries with it the only independence possible for the nations that compose it.

This essentially conservative character of Austrian policy was emphasised by the events of 1866, which put an end to the traditional designs for acquiring or maintaining a dominant influence in Germany and in Italy. The Austrian statesmen found it difficult at first to acquiesce in these limitations; and if in 1870 the campaign had been opened by a series of French successes, Austria would, no doubt, have appeared in the field to recover what she had lost four years before.

But the defeat of France carried conviction at Vienna, where since 1872 it has been well understood that the sphere of Austrian influence lies to the East and not to the West. Austrian statesmen see in the decay of Turkey the legitimate occasion of the extension of the power or influence of the Austrian monarchy. A Government which represented the combined forces of the Austrian Empire, of the states of the Balkan Peninsula, and of Roumania, and which held Constantinople, would be strong enough in itself to maintain its independence against Russia.

The Russian Empire is the only one of its kind, it has no analogy in history. The extent of the territory and the numbers of the population which may fairly be described as Russian, without extending the term to districts and races merely under Russian administration, far exceed those of any European state. This vast population is marked out as a nation to itself by every characteristic of language, race, religion, and political tradition. But it differs in one essential respect from every one of those communities with which in the present or in the past we usually associate the idea of greatness.

A nation invariably presents a specific type of character. The greatness of a nation consists in the excellence of this type, which makes it in some respect a model for mankind. Moreover, a great nation or a great state has always by its work conferred some

benefit upon the world. Even after it has passed away it is remembered for the services it has performed and for the ideals it has left behind. In the case of Russia such an ideal has yet to be created, and the services which she has rendered to mankind have arisen rather from the defeat than from the realisation of her aspirations. Her absolute despotism, her undeveloped institutions, her peculiar form of Christianity, appear to be useful in the absence of anything better, just as Mahommedanism in its wildest form is a boon to the fetish-worshipping blacks of the Soudan.

Hitherto Russia has been in relation to European civilisation an outsider. She has been not a creator, but a receiver, and to some extent a transmitter. Her function has been to spread a preliminary varnish of discipline over the wide tracts of Eastern Europe and Western Asia which are cut off from the sea, the true pathway of civilisation.

Russian policy in regard to Turkey has been one of conquest, supported by a real religious sympathy with the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, a sympathy which has been used both as a diplomatic pretext and as a means of acquiring the assistance derived from an insurrection in the enemy's country. The purpose of aggrandisement has been fully realised in regard to the Northern and Eastern shores of the Black Sea, but in regard to the European provinces of Turkey it has resulted, through the action of the other

Powers, in the emancipation of the Christian nations once subject to Turkey. In this emancipation Russia has been the active force; and though the result has been the opposite of that which she intended, the exertions by which she has produced it constitute almost her only claim to the recognition of mankind.

The mass of her population and the size of her armies make Russia appear to her neighbours as an immense weight perpetually pressing upon them. This pressure is most felt by the weakest, that is, by Turkey and the small states which have grown up upon what was once Turkish soil. The Russian design in regard to the Black Sea and its shores has all the strength and persistence of a mass of water pent up by a dam. Wherever and whenever the resistance of Europe leaves an opening Russia moves through it.

Such an opening was created by the Franco-German War, which rendered for the time impossible that combined action between France and England in regard to the Eastern question which had produced the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Prussia in her contest with France absolutely required the neutrality of Russia, and the condition made for its observance was the consent of Prussia to the modification of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris in regard to the Black Sea. Accordingly, in October, 1870, the Tsar announced that he could no longer hold himself bound by those stipulations. The British Government protested, but as no Power was

ready to fight for the treaty, negotiations took place ending in the Treaty of London (March, 1871), by which the neutralisation of the Black Sea and the prohibition to establish arsenals upon its coasts were abrogated. The Sultan, who by the Treaty of Paris had been bound to exclude foreign ships of war from the Straits, was empowered to admit them in peace, under conditions of which he was to be the judge. A convention of the same date between Russia and Turkey abrogated the limitation of the Treaty of Paris upon the size and number of the ships of war which either Power might maintain in the Black Sea.

The Treaty and Convention of London are still in force. They do not modify that freedom of the navigation both of the Straits and of the Black Sea for merchant ships which, though it was denied by the Turks in the days of their power, has been exercised by all nations for more than a century. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles have never been subject to the ordinary rules of international law applying to narrow straits commanded from their banks and included in the territorial waters of the Power possessing their shores. The difficulties in regard to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles appear to arise not from questions of navigation, but from the fear of the Powers, springing out of the whole course of Russian policy, that Russia may one day make use of the Straits for the purpose of

taking Constantinople by a combined naval and military expedition.

This is the kernel of the whole Eastern question. What are the interests and what ought to be the resolves of the several Powers in regard to Constantinople? A change in the ownership of Constantinople can hardly be discussed on the basis of right; for the Turks, having been in possession for four hundred years, have a title that cannot be questioned. Yet what is left of the Turkish power may at any time collapse, and would certainly collapse immediately either if Europe were so divided as to leave Turkey face to face with a single adversary, or if Europe were so united as to agree in appointing a successor to the Turk. The question thus becomes, not who is entitled to Constantinople, but how are the interests of Europe affected by the different ways in which its ownership might be disposed of? What, then, would be the effect upon Europe of a Russian conquest of Constantinople and the Straits?

The situation of Constantinople is such that any vigorous power in possession of the city must very shortly have the maritime command of the Black Sea, and the military command of the two peninsulas which are separated by the Straits. In the hands of a civilised Power, Constantinople is necessarily the capital of an empire embracing Asia Minor and the Balkan countries. To give this position to Russia would be to make her unassailable. The Black Sea would immediately become

for military purposes a Russian lake, even though the commercial navigation of its waters were unimpeded. The independence of Roumania and Bulgaria would be impossible; they would at once become Russian provinces. The greater part of Asia Minor would share the same fate. The power of closing the Straits would secure Russia against attack by the maritime states. Austria, at present no match for her powerful neighbour, would be at her mercy, even though she were compensated by the annexation of Serbia and of the country to the south of it as far as Salonica and the northern border of Greece. The Mediterranean states would be confronted by a new rival, endowed with the peculiar advantage of the possession of an inaccessible inland sea as a refuge for her fleet in case of need. Such a Power would perpetually overshadow the independence of Italy. Its existence would compel Great Britain, unless she is to abandon her command of the sea, to increase indefinitely her naval forces and in particular her Mediterranean fleet. Russia, secure on her southern frontier in Europe, would be at liberty to pursue at her leisure a programme of aggression in Asia.

There is, in short, no Power that can contemplate with satisfaction the possibility of Russia at Constantinople; and the history of the Eastern question abundantly proves that however much the temporary needs of one Power or another may be served by temporary abstention from resistance to the Russian design, the

policy of every great Power, and still more of every small Power, is in the long run opposed to it. That this is the case has been explicitly recognised by the Russian Government.¹

In August, 1875, disturbances broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They arose from changes consequent upon the break-down of the old Turkish system. The Turkish holders of fiefs had by degrees transformed themselves, usually by mere force, into actual possessors of the land. The Christian peasants, who had formerly lived in small communities holding the land and tilling the soil subject to the payment of the various dues to the fief-holders and to the Turkish authorities, were thus deprived of their subsistence; and as they were unarmed and without recognised rights their situation was intolerable. Many of them took refuge in the neighbouring provinces of Austria, or in Serbia or Montenegro, where the people were of their own race and speech. Those that remained procured arms from across the borders, and carried on such warfare as they could against their oppressors. The sympathy of the

¹ Extract from despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador in London, relating to British and Russian interests in the East. St. Petersburg, 18/30 May, 1877. The Imperial Cabinet "recognised that, in any case, the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers".

population of Serbia, of Montenegro, and of the border provinces of Austria, was entirely with the insurgents ; and it was evident that if the fighting continued the Austrian Government would be compelled to repress by force its own Serb population, and that Serbia and Montenegro could not remain tranquil.

The Austrian Government, having in 1872 frankly accepted its exclusion from Germany and Italy, had entered into very friendly relations with that of Germany. There was in consequence an excellent understanding between the Cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. The Austrian Government brought to the notice of its allies the difficulty in which it was placed, and the three Cabinets came to an agreement upon proposals for the pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the close of the year were submitted to the other Powers in a document known as the Andrassy Note. They proposed to urge upon the Porte certain reforms, without which the condition of the provinces must continue intolerable for the Christian population, and that these reforms should be superintended by a commission composed of an equal number of Mussulmans and Christians. This Note received the general assent of all the great Powers. It was communicated to the Porte in January, 1876 ; and in February the Sultan replied that he was resolved to carry out in all their integrity the reforms proposed. He offered an amnesty to such of the insurgents as

would lay down their arms and make their submission. The insurgents, however, declared that past experience forbade them to trust the promises of the Turkish Government, and refused to lay down their arms without a positive material guarantee from Europe for the execution of the reforms.

In May there was a great outburst of Mahommedan fanaticism in Turkey. The French and German consuls at Salonica were murdered by a Turkish mob. The Governments of the three Empires then agreed to a Circular (the Berlin Memorandum) in which they proposed to insist upon an armistice of two months, during which they would endeavour to negotiate between the insurgents and the Porte. They further proposed that the Porte should assist the refugees to rebuild their houses and churches; that relief should be given to them by a mixed commission; that the Turkish troops should be concentrated at points to be agreed upon; that Christians as well as Mussulmans should retain their arms; and that the consuls or delegates of the Powers should keep a watch over the application of the reforms. The three Courts also expressed their opinion that in case the armistice and the proposed negotiations should fail of their purpose, they ought in concert to arrange for further measures. The French and Italian Governments accepted the Berlin Memorandum.

The British Government, however, declined to be a party to it, alleging that "they would not be justified

in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without knowing whether the military situation admitted of it being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government"; they expressed a "doubt whether the Porte has the means of providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents, or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees"; they thought that "the distribution of relief by such a commission as is contemplated would be little better than a system of indiscriminate almsgiving"; "that the concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms"; and that "the consular supervision would reduce the authority of the Sultan to a nullity, and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible". They held that "even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents upon the basis proposed, it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further". At the same time the British Government declared that it could not permit territorial changes to be made in the East without its own consent, and ordered the Mediterranean fleet to Besika Bay, close to the entrance to the Dardanelles.

The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum was a turning-point in British policy. Was the Government which took this step inspired by a true sense of the interests of Great Britain, and was their action consistent with a correct appreciation of the actual conditions? I think not. Their purpose was to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The phrase was an old one, and had often been used before to cover an interest of Great Britain; but it was inexact. The British interest was to prevent the too great aggrandisement of Russia, and in particular to prevent her acquisition of Constantinople. Since 1829, at the latest, the independence of the Ottoman Empire has been a fiction; for a state which exists by the toleration or by the jealousies of its neighbours is independent only in name. There was in 1876 abundant evidence that the Ottoman Empire could be preserved only by measures which should transform the Christian population into its loyal subjects and defenders, that is, precisely by such measures as were suggested on a modest scale by the Andrassy Note. There was not the slightest doubt that no such measures would ever be executed by the Porte of its own free will. But the Berlin Memorandum was rejected because it proposed, though in the most considerate way, to interfere with the free will of the Porte. The British Government, in short, entirely ignored the nature of Turkey, which was the essential fact in the situation with which they had

to deal. If their action at that time represented no British interest, still less could it be alleged to cover a European interest, for all the great Powers except England concurred in the Berlin Memorandum.

A policy founded in ignorance cannot succeed; and the British policy of 1876, instead of preserving the Ottoman Empire by preventing its compulsory acceptance of reforms, led to the realisation on an incomparably larger scale of all the reforms proposed in the Berlin Memorandum.

At the close of May, 1876, the Sultan, who was suspected of a too conciliatory attitude towards Europe, was deposed, to be murdered a few days later. Shortly afterwards reports reached Europe that an insurrectionary movement, which had broken out in May near Philippopolis in Bulgaria, had been suppressed by the indiscriminate massacre of the Christian population of the district. This news, which created a painful impression in Western Europe, produced an intense excitement in all the countries in which the orthodox Greek Church prevails. Its first result was that Serbia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey. A second result was to rouse the traditional interest of Russia in the fate of her co-religionists under Turkish rule.

In July the Emperors of Austria and Russia, meeting at Reichstadt in Bohemia, came to an understanding in regard to their policy. It was agreed, of course secretly, that in case Russia should invade Turkey for

the emancipation of Bulgaria, Austria should be at liberty to take possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the close of October the Serbians, in spite of the assistance of numerous volunteers from Russia, had been completely defeated. During the continuance of the campaign negotiations had taken place between the Powers and Turkey for the conclusion of an armistice.

The British Government had proposed as the conditions of a peace that the *status quo* should be preserved as regards Serbia and Montenegro; that the Porte should undertake to grant to Bosnia and Herzegovina a system of local autonomy, giving the population some control over their own local affairs, without the creation of a tributary state, and that similar guarantees should be provided against maladministration in Bulgaria. These conditions, supported by Russia and the other Powers, were declined by the Porte in September; and the Russian Government then proposed that Bosnia should be occupied by an Austrian and Bulgaria by a Russian force, and the united fleets of the Powers should enter the Bosphorus; expressing at the same time its readiness to abandon the proposal of occupation if the naval demonstration was considered sufficient by the British Cabinet. The British Cabinet, however, refused to concur in these measures, and made further suggestions for an armistice, to be followed by a conference.

All these negotiations led to nothing; and on the 31st of October a Russian ultimatum induced the Porte to agree to an armistice for two months.

On the 2nd of November the Tsar informed the British ambassador that the state of things in Turkey was intolerable, and that unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy he should be obliged to act alone. He deprecated England's suspicion of Russian policy, and repudiated any desire of conquest or aggrandisement. In particular he repudiated any desire to acquire Constantinople, and thought that his proposal for a naval demonstration ought to be sufficient proof that he had no intention of occupying that capital. He could not see why there should not be a perfect understanding between England and Russia by which the peace might be preserved. He wished for the immediate meeting of a conference, to agree upon the introduction of such reforms as would safeguard the interests of the Christian populations in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and that the Porte should give effective guarantees for the execution of these reforms.

In December a preliminary conference of representatives of the great Powers met at Constantinople, and agreed to proposals for the administrative autonomy of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, each province to be under a Christian governor, selected with the approval of the Powers, the execution of the reforms to be

superintended by an international commission supported by a force of Swiss or Belgian troops. At the close of December these proposals were submitted to a conference, in which Turkey as well as the Powers was represented. The Turkish representative refused to accept them, and announced that the Sultan had rendered them unnecessary by the promulgation of a new constitution for the whole Empire. At the close of March the six Powers signed the protocol of London, in which they took note of the conclusion of peace between Serbia and Turkey (which had been signed in February) and of the various promises of the Porte to introduce necessary reforms. They declared that they would watch carefully the manner in which these promises should be carried into effect; and that if their hopes should be once more disappointed, and if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of the complications which periodically disturbed the peace of the East, such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. The Russian Government made a separate declaration, that "if peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a special envoy to treat of disarmament, to which

his Majesty the Emperor would also on his part consent ”.

The Porte protested against the London protocol, and declared that Turkey as an independent state could not submit to be placed under any surveillance, whether collective or not. This reply was dated the 9th of April, 1877. A week later a convention was concluded between Roumania and Russia, by which the Russian army was guaranteed a free passage through Roumanian territory, and before the close of the month the Russian forces invaded Turkey.

Before the close of January, 1878, the Turkish armies in Asia and Europe had all been completely defeated, and the Russian advanced guard had reached the Sea of Marmora. On the 31st of January the Turks agreed to an armistice and to preliminaries of peace, of which the substance was the independence of Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the creation of an autonomous tributary principality of Bulgaria, with a national Christian government, and an autonomous administration for Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were the bases of the treaty between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano on the 3rd of March, which defined the limits of the new principality of Bulgaria so as to include not only all the country now known as Bulgaria, but the whole of Macedonia.

During the earlier stages of the war the British Government remained neutral; but when the Russian

forces had passed Adrianople the British Cabinet made ostentatious preparations for war, and negotiations took place between them and the Russian Government, in which both parties agreed to abstain from occupying by their forces either the shores of the Bosphorus or the shores of the Dardanelles.¹

It had been from the beginning understood that the Russian Government would submit to the consideration of the Powers those portions of its treaty which affected European interests. The British Cabinet, while continuing its hostile preparations, asserted its view that the consideration of the Powers should extend to all the terms of the treaty. The most important of the English demands were that Macedonia should be restored to the direct authority of the Sultan, that the new Bulgaria should be cut in two along the line of the Balkans, of which the Sultan should retain the right to garrison the passes, and that the Powers should be consulted in regard to the institutions to be created in the new province. The British Government gave it to be understood that if these terms were rejected they would go to

¹ The precise nature of these communications has been disputed. It was at the time alleged on behalf of the Cabinet that by the despatch of the British fleet through the Dardanelles the Russians had been compelled to keep clear of Constantinople. It has since been alleged, with at least equal plausibility, that the British fleet was kept at a distance from Constantinople by a Russian declaration that if it approached nearer the Russian troops would occupy the city.

war with Russia. At the close of May the Russian Government accepted them, in an agreement which was kept secret; and about the same time the British Cabinet concluded a treaty, also secret, with Turkey, engaging for the future to defend Asia Minor against Russian attack, in return for permission to occupy at a specified rent the Island of Cyprus. In the middle of June a European Congress met at Berlin, by which the Treaty of San Stefano was revised in accordance with the English proposals and with the wishes of Austria, which obtained, under the name of a right of occupation, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹

The British policy which led to the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano is not open to the same objections as the earlier policy in which England had separated herself from Europe. The object of diminishing the importance of the new Bulgarian state was to limit a province which it was anticipated would become an outpost of Russian influence. This limitation accorded with British and European interests. It seems probable that the Russian Government distinctly intended that the new Bulgaria should be subservient to Russian purposes. Except on

¹ The action of Great Britain in opposing the Russian policy in 1877-8 produced a reaction in Asia. A special military mission was sent from Russian Turkestan to the Court of Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, out of which arose the British invasion of that country in 1878.

this hypothesis, Russia would hardly have agreed in advance, in 1876, to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia; and although, at the fifth sitting of the Berlin Congress, Count Shouvaloff affirmed that it was not intended that Bulgaria should become a Russian *annexe*, Prince Bismarck, in 1889, said that it had been beyond question the belief at the Congress that Russia was to have a paramount influence in Bulgaria. Subsequent events, as we shall shortly see, prove that this was, and still is, the Russian intention; and these facts are the justification of the British policy of 1878.

The Treaty of Berlin was regarded in Russia as a diminution of Russian success, due not only to British and Austrian opposition, but to the unfriendliness or insufficient support of Germany. The consequence was a complete change in the relations between Germany and Russia. The Russian Government looked to Germany for active help in the furtherance of the Russian policy, and required that in the commission for the delimitation of the new frontiers in South-western Europe the German delegate should invariably vote in support of his Russian colleague. The Tsar, in a letter to the Emperor, declared that this demand must be acceded to if the peace between Germany and Russia was to be preserved. Under the influence of this ultimatum, the German Government concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria. It was a purely defensive alliance; if either Power were attacked by Russia the

other was to assist it with all its forces. Further, if either Power were attacked by a Power not Russia, and if during such war Russia should in any way, even by a mere demonstration, assist the attacker, the Power attacked was to receive the full assistance of its ally.¹ It will be seen that this did not in any way commit Germany to give active assistance to Austria in any policy of advance into, or interference in, the Balkan Peninsula. There can be no doubt that this aspect of the treaty was very fully considered by both Powers, for the question whether a similar treaty bound Germany to Austria, in case Austria should take the offensive in

¹ The following is the text of the binding clauses of the Austro-German Treaty of 7th October, 1879 :—

I. If, contrary to the hopes and against the honest wish of the two high contractors, either of the two empires should be attacked by Russia, the high contractors are pledged to help one another with the whole fighting force of their empires, and accordingly to make peace only together and in agreement.

II. Should one of the high contracting parties be attacked by another Power, the other high contractor hereby pledges himself not only not to help the attacker against his high ally, but to maintain at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards his high ally.

III. But if in such a case the attacking Power should be supported by Russia, whether in the form of an active co-operation or by military measures threatening the side attacked, then the engagement stipulated in Article I. of this treaty for mutual help with the whole fighting strength at once comes into force, and the two high contractors will then carry on the war in common until the conclusion of a peace together in common.


the Balkan country, had been discussed and settled in the sense here indicated at the time of the Crimean War. The effect of Germany's action was a restraint upon both Russia and Austria. Neither of them could count upon Germany's help in an advance towards the Straits, and for that eventuality Germany reserved herself a free hand. But the alliance showed a unity of purpose in defence between Austria and Germany that must make the Tsar pause before interfering in regions where his action might prejudice interests presumed to be vital to Austria.

The effects of this alliance, in holding the balance between Russia and Austria, were seen a few years later. The Russian Government had nominated Prince Alexander of Battenberg as candidate for the Bulgarian throne, to which he had been elected by a popular vote. He was assisted in the first organisation of his principality by Russian ministers, Russian officials, and Russian officers. These Russian assistants, or at least those of them whose functions were political, made themselves exceedingly unpopular in the country. Prince Alexander had, at first, great difficulty in maintaining his authority, in face of the very democratic constitution which had been framed by Russia with the consent of the Powers. It became necessary to obtain a popular vote, which conferred upon him, for a limited time, a sort of dictatorship. In the long run, he found himself obliged to take the side of his Bulgarian sub-

jects, against a number of utterly unreasonable and unjustified projects of his Russian advisers. The result was the resignation of the Russian ministers and the appointment of Bulgarians as their successors. The Russians during their tenure of office had set on foot a movement in the nature partly of a conspiracy, and partly of a popular agitation for the abolition of that part of the Treaty of Berlin which divided Bulgaria into two provinces. This movement was now carried on by the Bulgarians themselves, so that its character changed; and instead of being an act of Russian policy to extend a sphere of Russian influence, it became an effort of Bulgarian patriotism, to enlarge a country which was to be independent, and to require neither Russian nor any other tutelage.

In the autumn of 1885, the intriguers carried their plan into execution. A popular rising at Philippopolis arrested, deposed, and expelled from the country the Turkish Governor of Eastern Roumelia, and proclaimed the union of that province with Bulgaria. Prince Alexander, at that time superintending the annual manœuvres of his army, at once went to Philippopolis, and accepted the position offered him of Prince of United Bulgaria.

In the circumstances, the act of union thus effected was an act of emancipation from Russia. It was bitterly resented by the Tsar. The Turkish Government, which was entitled to assert its suzerainty over



Eastern Roumelia, took no decided action; but King Milan of Serbia mobilised the greater part of his army, and after a little delay invaded Bulgaria on the pretext that if Bulgaria was entitled to enlarge itself, Serbia was entitled to similar enlargement by way of compensation. The great Powers looked on. The influence of Germany was used to prevent a war from breaking out between Austria and Russia. Austria, accordingly, refrained from interference, until Prince Alexander had utterly defeated the Serbian army, and was about to march upon Belgrade, when he was stopped by an Austrian ambassador, who seems to have declared that any further pursuit of victory would bring Austria into the field against the Bulgarians.

The history of Bulgaria since 1885 is one of the assertion of national independence against pressure exercised by Russia, both diplomatic and undiplomatic, carried to any extent short of war. The hostility of the Tsar, thus strongly manifested towards Bulgaria, has had the result of bringing about very friendly relations between that principality under its present ruler, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, and the Austrian Government. And these relations have reacted upon the minds of Serbian patriots; so that, in spite of the service rendered by Austria in 1885, when her intervention saved Serbia from conquest and annexation to Bulgaria, the Serbs have become bitterly hostile to Austria.

The more carefully the action of Russia from 1876 to 1886, or indeed to 1894, is considered, the more clearly does it appear that the purpose of her Eastern policy is unchanged. The declarations made by and on behalf of Alexander II. in 1876-7 do indeed express a renunciation of all intentions of aggrandisement, but at the best they reflect no more than the personal character of Alexander himself and his own views at the time. Russia wanted nothing for herself, and did not aim at Constantinople. But events since 1885 prove beyond all doubt that Russia wanted Bulgaria for herself, not indeed as a portion of Russian territory, but as an instrument of her policy. The history of Roumania shows clearly a Russian design to acquire the country if possible, but if not, to be able to use it as an open gate for the invasion of Turkey. Bulgaria was to serve a similar purpose. And that this was the substance of the Russian design in "liberating" the Bulgarians is proved by the desperate measures to which recourse was had to put an end to the independence asserted in 1885. There does not appear to be any crime for which the Russian Government has not made itself responsible in the effort to overthrow the liberties of a nation of which at one time it posed as the protector.¹

¹ The present Tsar, by his whole conduct at the time, gave at least his *ex post facto* approval to the conspiracy against Prince Alexander of Bulgaria. He was, to say the least, an accessory

The Russian conception of the meaning of assurances is illustrated by the case of Batoum. By the sixty-ninth article of the Treaty of Berlin the Emperor of Russia declared his intention to constitute Batoum a free port, essentially commercial; and this arrangement was the condition upon which the British Government agreed to the cession of the port to Russia. In July, 1886, the Russian ambassador informed Lord Rosebery that the Tsar had decided to terminate the arrangement, on the ground that circumstances had changed. It is evident that a declaration made by one Tsar that he did not want Constantinople at a time when the European situation made it impossible for him to obtain that place, will not be considered to bind another Tsar at a time when European "circumstances have changed".

The events of 1885 appear to have modified not so much the purpose of Russian policy as the means by which its attainment is sought. It is hazardous to march an army from Russia through Roumania into Bulgaria so long as Austria is hostile. Accordingly, the advocates in Russia of the advance towards Constantinople have long declared that the way to Constantinople lies through Vienna; in other words, that if after the event. It is needless to recall the subsequent mission of General Kaulbars. Perhaps the best illustration of the methods of Russian policy is to be found in the official documents lately published by the Bulgarian Government, of which a sufficient account was given in the *Fortnightly Review* for July, 1893.

Russia is to obtain possession of the Straits she must first overcome the resistance of Austria. The treaty of 1879 makes it impracticable to overcome Austria without also defeating Germany. The advisers of the Tsar have in recent years developed a different plan. It consists in preparation to seize Constantinople from the sea by the despatch from Russian Black Sea ports of a combined naval and military force which may be able by landing a considerable body of troops to reduce the defences of the Bosphorus before any other Power can bring help to the Turks either on sea or land. In the opinion of experts well acquainted with the Straits, this operation can now be effected by Russia at any time. The danger to her would be that upon her seizing Constantinople she might be attacked by a combination of other Powers. If she were once in possession of the Straits she would have nothing to fear from naval force; the only serious attack would be that of Austria and Germany combined. To meet this Russia has since 1885 gradually moved the whole of her army to her Western frontier, where it would be ready at any time to resist such forces as might be brought against it.

The second clause of the Austro-German Treaty of October, 1879, not only covered Germany against a Russian attack during an unprovoked war with France, but it protected Austria against Russia during an unprovoked war with Italy.

Italy had completed her unity in its present shape by the acquisition of Rome in 1870. To the ardent nationalists something was still wanting, and the term "Unredeemed Italy" was the watchword of a large party that sought to extend the frontiers so as to include all the Italian-speaking population, and perhaps all the territories that might be conceived to be geographically parts of Italy. It is difficult to say exactly where this doctrine would draw the line. It would certainly include Trieste and the Trentino; probably Nice; possibly Savoy, Corsica, Malta, and part of Dalmatia. But a Government in the actual exercise of its functions could not fail to see that such schemes were impracticable. None of the annexations could be effected without a war; and each of the wars which would be required, either with Austria, with France, or with England, was altogether beyond the powers of Italy to carry to a successful issue. To begin any of these quarrels would be to stake all that Italy had gained. "Italia Irredenta" was therefore doomed to be the cry of idealists irreconcilable with the realities of life.

Far other were the needs that confronted the men engaged in the practical conduct of Italian affairs. Surrounded by the sea and the Alps, Italy has in all ages depended for her prosperity mainly upon her maritime enterprise. In respect of her commercial marine she is the fifth nation in Europe, being surpassed on the continent only by Germany, Norway,

and France, and by France not in the number of her sailing ships but only in that of steamers. Genoa and Venice for the north, Leghorn and Naples for the west, Tarentum, Brindisi, and Ancona for the south and east, are the gates of Italy. To close the sea to Italian ships would be to suffocate her. But that is not the full measure of her dependence on navigation. Sicily and Sardinia are hostages given to a hostile Power in command of the sea.

Thus so soon as Italy became a nation her great aim was marked out for her. She must trust to the sea for her hopes of expansion, for her trade, for the preservation of her unity and her independence. A maritime war in which she should be defeated would be her ruin. But though by her peninsular situation and her union with Sicily and Sardinia Italy is hardly less dependent on the sea than Great Britain, she has also a land frontier to consider. To the north-east Austria, and to the north-west France, are her neighbours, each of them stronger than she is in respect of area, population, and the configuration of the border-line.

The Italians could not forget that in the long struggle for unity they had, whenever they fought alone, lost all their battles. The first work of the new nation was therefore to create an army and a navy, tasks which were pursued with characteristic tenacity of purpose. The army in particular was regarded as a school of national duty, a discipline sorely needed after genera-

tions of division. But the experience that counselled the acquisition of armed strength suggested also the imprudence of isolation, the utility of co-operation with another Power or Powers.

For the first ten years of her national existence Italy waited. The prevalent sentiment was not friendly to Austria, so recently mistress of Venetia and still possessing Trieste and the Trentino. Nor was Italian feeling strongly drawn towards France. The services rendered by Napoleon III. in 1859 had been very fully repaid by the cession of Savoy and Nice. The sympathy shown by Napoleon had not been shared by the French nation; and it was the French who had delayed, so long as they could, the acquisition of Rome. M. Thiers in 1865 had clearly seen the direction in which the interests of a united Italy would tend. "When the question of maritime interests arises," he had said, "Italy will hold the political pendulum between France and England; and as the ports of Trieste" (M. Thiers thought Trieste would go to Italy), "of Naples, and of Genoa will be jealous not of Liverpool but of Marseilles, the side that Italy will take is almost marked out in advance."

The Austro-German Treaty of 1879 had only to be communicated to the Italian Government to make clear the hopelessness of an anti-Austrian policy.

To determine the course of Italian statesmen nothing more was needed than to convince them of the incom-

patibility of French aims with their own. This demonstration was given in Tunis.

In 1878, at the time of the Berlin Congress, Lord Salisbury had said to M. Waddington: "Do at Tunis what you think proper; England will offer no opposition, and will respect your decisions". This statement of British intentions was confirmed in 1880 by Lord Granville. The French Government thereupon proceeded to make its plans for the acquisition of Tunis. The difficulty was that Italy had a prior claim, founded in the fact that 30,000 Italians were settled in the country, while the total number of residents of all other European nations taken together, including the French, did not exceed 15,000.

It was evident that to annex Tunis over the heads of the Italian population would be an act of hostility to Italy, and Italy might resist the operation. To avoid the possible resistance of Italy the plan adopted—deliberately adopted, according to the statement of M. Jules Ferry in 1893, twelve years afterwards—was to find a form of words which would appear to deny the real purpose of acquisition, while yet consistent with it.

In April, 1881, the British ambassador at Paris was informed that the French Government proposed to chastise certain Kroumirs on the Tunisian border of Algeria. The Bey of Tunis would be reminded of his responsibility as sovereign of the country whence the

incursions of the Kroumirs had proceeded. France was entitled to a predominant influence in Tunis, and was not disposed to allow any other Power to make Tunis the fulcrum of a lever with which to disturb the French possessions in Africa. The assurance was repeatedly given to Lord Granville, and by him conveyed to the Italian Government, that the French had no intention of annexing Tunis. Thereupon a French army invaded and conquered the country, and dictated to the Bey a treaty by which the country was to be temporarily occupied by French troops, until such time as "the local administration was capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of order". Thus there was to be no annexation, merely a protectorate. But, as M. Ferry, its author, last year took pains to make clear, the protectorate was only a more convenient form of "acquisition".

The immediate consequence was, that in the spring of 1882 the Italian ambassador at Vienna signed a treaty by which the Austro-German Alliance of 1879 was converted into the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy.

The French by seizing Tunis had materially changed the situation in the Mediterranean. "The Lake of Biserta," say the geographical notes of the Prussian staff for 1880, "might, in possession of a European Power, become one of the best harbours and most important strategical points in the Mediterranean." The French Government in 1881 declared that it was not contem-

plating the fortification of Biserta. But in 1894 work is in progress to make Biserta what the Prussian staff reported in 1880 that it might one day become.

French naval supremacy in the Mediterranean would be fatal to Italy and disagreeable to Austria. The existence in the Mediterranean of a Russian fleet based upon Constantinople would be dangerous both to Austria and to Italy. There was therefore ample reason for a defensive alliance between these two Powers. The hostility of France to Italy, manifested in the seizure of Tunis, is the more dangerous because of the great difficulty of defending Piedmont against a French attack and the great numerical superiority of the French army. It is probable that the alliance involved assistance to Italy by Germany in case of a French attack. However that may be, the Italian Government thought it necessary to increase its own army and to take additional measures for the protection of its Alpine frontier. It is interesting to note that while the French press has persistently denounced the entry of Italy into the Triple Alliance, as though it were an act of spontaneous hostility towards France, M. Ferry shortly before his death justified this step as "a political calculation, the result of mature deliberation, founded upon the analogy of situations and the attraction of interests".

IV.

THE USE OF ARMIES.

THE function of every government is to promote, not as is sometimes vaguely imagined, the welfare of mankind, but exclusively that of its own subjects. A good government indirectly contributes to the well-being of humanity, partly by the benefits which it confers upon the nation which it leads and represents, and partly by the force of example. There would be something abnormal in the condition of a nation whose prosperity should be detrimental to the general interests of the race; and no government could, without a kind of moral suicide, admit itself to be the representative of such a community. No government therefore can without a violation of its trust recognise an ideal of humanity at variance with the national purpose of which it is itself the embodiment. The highest good which a nation can confer upon mankind is the perfection of its own life, which involves at once the elevation of its character and the fulfilment of its task or mission.

Two nations may be at cross purposes. Each of them may conceive itself to have a mission the fulfilment of which appears inconsistent with that of the other. If the inconsistency is real, the nation to which

the disputed task is indispensable must assert itself at any cost, and may not evade its duty on any plea of humanity. It is the business of a statesman to distinguish between those necessary aims which his nation cannot under any circumstances abandon, and those which are secondary, auxiliary, or accidental. He must therefore study the purpose and policy of the other nations, in order to appreciate the possibilities of conflict, and to distinguish between what is attainable and what is not. He must understand the nature of the process by which, in case of need, his own purposes can be asserted.

There are many methods and degrees of national self-assertion, but in the last resort a nation is obliged to have recourse to force. Even in the employment of force there are many degrees, and the word "war" which is applied to most of them is in one way misleading. It covers operations very different in their character and intensity. The bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, though an act of force, was denied by the government which ordered it to have the character of war; while the action by which a small body of soldiers destroys the village of some robber clan outside the Indian border is undoubtedly correctly called by that name. Neither of these operations can be compared with a great struggle between two civilised Powers, such as that which began in the United States in 1861, or in Germany in 1866.

Most of the books in which the nature of war is explained are written either by soldiers for soldiers, or by sailors for sailors. They are in each case the hand-books of a special trade, their purpose being to enable the admiral, the general, or the captain better to understand his own particular function in the working of the naval or military organism. But the true conductor of a war is the statesman at the head of the government. He employs for the fulfilment of the national purpose means which vary with the situation with which he has to deal. Among his instruments war is the most potent. It would seem, therefore, that the statesman as well as the military commander requires to understand the nature of war, though the point of view from which he will regard it is different. War is to him the employment of force for the assertion of a purpose which cannot be made good in any other way. His business is to appreciate beforehand the true character of conflicts in which his nation may become involved, so that for those which are foreseen to be inevitable suitable preparation may be made. In a maritime state it will be necessary for him to grasp the relative importance and the distinctive character of warfare by sea and by land.

A prudent statesman will not undertake a war without clearly knowing what his object is and in what way victory will conduce to it. The first question therefore is: How can a government, a state, or a nation be

coerced? How can material force be made to affect the will? The answer is, that you cannot directly affect the will; but you can destroy the government that has it, you can abolish the state, and suppress the nation. The will may be undaunted, the resistance heroic; but if you can crush and conquer the nation you can assert your purpose without hindrance.

This extreme case, of one nation conquering another, annexing its territory, and absorbing it in itself, is possible only where there is great inequality between the resources of the two powers, and necessary only where the existence of the one state is incompatible with the welfare of the other. Both these conditions existed in the conflict between the Federal and Confederate States of North America, which ended with the annihilation of the Confederate government. As a rule the possibility of such a result prevents the weaker state from pushing its resistance to the last extremity. But the type of war, the perfection of success in it, is absolute conquest; and in every war, whatever its cause, the victorious side pushes on towards this result, whether the intention is permanent conquest or not, until resistance ceases and the terms offered are accepted. The first step is the destruction, by defeat or capture, of the enemy's army; then, if the terms offered are not accepted, follows the occupation of territory and probably of the hostile capital. If the force available is sufficient this process will be extended without interrup-

tion until the entire territory is in the hands of the victor.

It may seem unreasonable that where one side has gained a decided superiority the beaten enemy should continue his resistance. As a rule, he hopes that the victorious side will be exhausted, that he himself may raise fresh forces, or that some other power may interfere in such a manner as to revive his chances. He submits the moment he is convinced that further resistance will certainly leave him in worse case than submission. But the beaten side can seldom put an end to the war simply by accepting the will of the victor in regard to the point originally in dispute. The demands of the victor increase with victory, and every additional exertion imposed upon him is apt to lead to a new demand. Moreover, a state of war puts an end to all treaties previously subsisting between the belligerents. Either party is likely in the event of success to rake up old matters of dispute, and to revive forgotten or long-suspended claims. Therefore a nation which once enters upon a war, against a power strong enough to have any chance of overcoming it, stakes in the conflict not merely its interests in the particular subject of the dispute, but its whole existence.

It often happens that a nation has outstanding questions with a number of different powers. They may be for the most part insignificant and very unlikely to

become in themselves occasions of war. But any of these other powers may see, in a war begun, the opportunity for successfully asserting claims which otherwise it could not hope to realise. A belligerent power must therefore exercise the utmost caution in so regulating the occasion and the time of its action as to deprive its enemy of the possible assistance which might be gained from the interference of other nations, and to secure if possible such help for itself.

The cause of a war must be carefully distinguished from its pretext. A great part of the energy with which a nation fights springs from the conviction of a good cause; and the attitude of other nations towards belligerents depends partly, though less than is commonly supposed, upon the appearance of right and wrong. It is a crime to undertake a war without just and sufficient cause; but it is a folly, when you have a substantial cause for war, to allow your own people or other nations to imagine that your motive is some trifle. If your real motive cannot be avowed your case is probably a bad one. A war, however, is sometimes seen to be inevitable, and a prudent statesman will begin it at the time most convenient for his own side and most disadvantageous for the enemy. In such a case he should so choose the occasion that the rights and wrongs are clear and palpable to all the world.

I have hitherto spoken of the state as taking the initiative, as voluntarily resorting to force for the attain-

ment of its own ends. At first sight this is inconsistent with defence, with the attitude of resistance rendered necessary by the action of another power. The difference is not altogether what it seems. Attack and defence are merely two different modes of employing force. Attack involves the greater effort, and is more exhausting. As a rule, therefore, at the beginning of a war the weaker side adopts the defensive, in the hope that the exhaustion of the enemy by attack may diminish the difference of strength. If that should happen there may later on be an exchange of parts.

The question who is responsible for the war is altogether different from that of attack or defence. War springs from a conflict of aims. Each nation is responsible for its own purposes; that is to say, its purposes are a part of itself, and its fate is bound up with them. It is easy to say after the event, when defeat and failure have come, that they were wrong. But success is not everything even for nations, and a spirited nation will not tamely abandon ideals which it has long cherished. Thus a war which afterwards seems to have been needless, is sometimes begun with little regard to the real probability of success, because self-respect or pride, whichever we choose to call it, prevents the nation from admitting without a struggle that times are changed, and that claims once justified are justified no longer.

The greatest analyst of war has explained why its extreme form, which in the abstract it would always assume, is not always realised. War is a part of the life of the nation that wages it, and it will therefore be carried on in accordance with the national character. This character is known to the rest of the world, and is never perfect or ideal. Accordingly, the enemy contents himself with less than perfect or ideal counter-preparations. Moreover, war is not a single instantaneous act. It lasts a certain time, so that each side hopes to make up at a later stage for any shortcomings at the beginning. Even the end of the war is not the end of history. A nation hopes, if defeated this time, to win in the next war. The confidence in luck and in pluck is a fruitful cause of inadequate preparation. Again, the amount of effort for which preparation is made depends upon the value attached to the object of dispute, and upon the estimate of exertions which the enemy is expected to make. Thus wars may be of all shades of intensity. The most important act of judgment exercised by the statesman is the correct appreciation of the character and intensity which motives and circumstances will give to the war. It is here that mistakes are most serious, and yet, strange to say, most frequent. In 1859, in 1870, and in the more recent war between Servia and Bulgaria, the chief cause of defeat was that war was begun with forces utterly inadequate to those which

the enemy was known to possess and actually employed.

The intensity of war, or, in other words, the amount of effort which a state will make for the assertion of a purpose which is disputed, has enormously increased in recent times. The energy of Napoleon's warfare astounded his contemporaries, so that his exploits appeared almost miraculous, and were attributed to a transcendental agency under the name of genius. But Napoleon had resources unknown to his predecessors. The Revolution to which he owed his greatness was the first symptom of that keen and active interest in public affairs which under the different aspects of democracy and nationality is the distinguishing mark of the modern age. The first effect of this movement was to identify the nation with the state ; and as this fusion first took place in France, the French commanders were supplied with forces utterly disproportionate to anything that the old dynastic states could produce. Between the Seven Years' War and the Revolution, the continent of Europe had been covered with paved roads, the creation of which is the explanation of the great rapidity of Napoleon's movements in comparison with those of earlier wars. Since the Revolution, the intensity of public life has constantly increased. The growth of population, the immeasurable increase of trade, the substitution of the railway for the high road, of the ocean steamer for the sailing clipper, and of the steam

printing-press for the hand-press, have multiplied a thousandfold the energy and the activity of all communities. It is impossible that these changes should not manifest themselves in the conflict of nations. Some measure of the force which a nation can exert may be gathered from the American Civil War. During that conflict the Government of the United States employed two and a half million soldiers, of whom 300,000 were buried in the national cemeteries. There was in this case a great waste of force, because no preparation existed; indeed, in the circumstances, no preparation could have been made beforehand. In the Franco-German War, the German Government, which was well prepared, and used its forces with almost perfect economy, moved altogether 1,146,355 men across the French border, and of these 41,122 never returned home; while 88,488 others were wounded. These figures, however, give little idea of the vast preparations which the great Powers of Europe during the last twenty years have completed with a view to possible conflicts.

The cost of a modern war is difficult to estimate. It comes under three heads: there is, first, the actual money bill, of which some idea may be formed from the payment made by France to Germany—£250,000,000; then there is the loss by destruction; and lastly, there is the loss caused by the dislocation, and as a rule the entire cessation, of all productive industry.

The tendency in all war is towards concentration of effort. You try to find out the point at which a blow will produce the greatest effect; there you endeavour to collect the largest possible amount of force, and to employ it simultaneously. It is a great advantage to get the upper hand at the beginning. But no state can keep millions of men permanently under arms and assembled. Accordingly, a land war begins by the formation of the army, that is the withdrawal from their industrial occupations of those who are to fight, and their equipment and distribution among the commanders. The various bodies are then moved across the country to assemble at a point from which the projected blow can conveniently be delivered.

The first act of war upon land is to cross a frontier, for the land itself is the territory of one or the other nation. In the enemy's territory his army will be met. The object is to destroy it,—not necessarily in the sense of killing the men who compose it, but of putting an end to its existence as a fighting force. Your purpose is to induce the enemy to do what you wish, and as the first sign of this acquiescence to cease his opposition. You begin by killing and wounding some of his men, in the hope of convincing the others that unless they change their plans it will soon be their turn to be killed. When this conviction has been produced in their minds they are usually ready to move away to another place. If they can do so, they will as soon as convenient renew

their resistance, and in that case your work has to be done over again. You have won a victory, but it requires another victory to complete it. If you can in the first instance so arrange that the enemy, though ready to leave, cannot do so without inconvenience equal to or greater than that which confronts him where he is, he will no doubt make a despairing effort; but, if that fails, he must do as you wish, that is, take no further part in the war.

When the enemy's army has been defeated (either driven back or captured), you advance into his country. This is a very gradual process. An army cannot go faster than men can walk, its pace under very favourable circumstances being about fifteen miles a day. It has to be constantly supplied with a number of requisites which cannot be found in the enemy's country. These must be brought to it from home; and the roads behind it, as well as the railways so soon as they can be put in order, are covered with a perpetual stream of traffic passing to and fro. These roads are the arteries upon whose unimpeded circulation the health and strength of the army depend. They must, therefore, be protected from all assaults of the enemy. An invading army then is not free to move where it likes. It is tied by a vital cord to the sources of its strength. It is like the head of a serpent that enters a garden through a small chink in the wall; its fangs are in its head, but the head must so move as to

protect against its foe the whole length of its body as far back as the wall. The army, indeed, is not quite so defenceless as the snake, for it protects its flanks by detaching parts of itself, but each of these detachments weakens its force for a blow. Thus an army as it advances drags behind it an ever-lengthening chain which is also a vulnerable part of itself.

In 1870 the German army was called out on the 16th of July. Its most advanced portion crossed the French frontier on the 4th of August. On the 18th of August the greater portion of the French army was defeated and driven into Metz, where on the 29th of October it capitulated. On the 1st of September the remainder of the French army was defeated and surrounded at Sedan, and surrendered the next day. On the 17th of September the first German troops reached Paris, which within the next few days was invested. At this time the German army had to defend against an attack from either side a band of country stretching from Paris to the German frontier. The greater part of France was untouched by the invasion, and its resources were at the disposal of the French Government. Between the outbreak of the war and the beginning of the siege of Paris, France had six weeks during which to strengthen its forces. The siege of Paris lasted four months. During all this time prodigious efforts were made by the French, who created several large armies and assailed all those points at which they thought the German army was vulnerable.

These improvised troops, however, had neither discipline, training, nor organisation, and their efforts invariably ended in failure. With Paris fallen, with the newly raised armies all defeated, with the trained professional army all captive, it was impracticable for France to continue the struggle. The defeat was complete.

Volumes have been written by soldiers and by military critics to explain this failure and the German success. But the true explanation will never be found in an examination of the military events alone. The German success was the result of sound policy, of which due military preparation was only a part. The French failure was due above all to unsound policy. The French Government had conducted its affairs according to opinions and sentiment, and had failed to observe what was actually going on in other countries.

There are two military lessons which the events of 1870 do not directly teach. The first is, the enormous risks which attend success. Had the German army before Paris suffered a serious reverse, and had its communication with Germany been interrupted at the same time, the result would have been so disastrous as to outweigh all the advantages which had been gained. The terrible nature of such a reaction in the midst of victory is illustrated by the fate of Napoleon's army in Russia in 1812, and its momentous consequences. The second lesson is, the relation of the sea to warfare on land. I shall examine this subject in the next chapter;

and it will suffice to say here that in all probability if the Germans, instead of being at sea the weaker power, had possessed a navy superior to that of France, the French resistance, such as it was, would have been deprived of more than half its force.

V.

THE SECRET OF THE SEA.

I HAVE already said that the statesman's view of war is not altogether identical with that of the general or the admiral. The military commander is concerned with the means by which victory may be obtained. Of these the statesman requires a general knowledge, but he is more particularly concerned with the interpretation and the use of victory. It will, I think, be found that victory at sea is very different in its quality and in its consequences from victory on land. To understand it we must consider first the nature of the sea.

The sea is the universal carrier, the highway of mankind, the communication between the nations scattered over the surface of the globe. The carrier on land fights against the gravitation of the earth, and against perpetual friction. With infinite pains he clears a road and smooths it by macadamisation or by laying down rails. But every incline, however slight, compels him to lift at least a part of the weight which he moves. The builder of the first hollow ship enlisted the attraction of gravitation in his service, for he had discovered that the sea is compelled to carry on its surface any vessel

weighing with its cargo less than the quantity of water which it displaces. The water will carry his load, and the wind will move it. Wherever the sea reaches, his ship can sail, and the sea covers with its continuous surface three-quarters of the globe.

But the sea has dangers of its own. If the ship is fractured or loses its balance, crew and cargo are destroyed. The wind, helpful to-day, may to-morrow be a raging enemy. The watery surface has no marks, no tracks to guide the traveller. Thus from the seaman's life the element of danger is never absent. Danger, however, is not altogether an evil ; for a seafaring people is educated and disciplined by its conflict with the wind and the waves. A race of seamen is always resourceful, bold, and hardy.

What gives the sea its historical significance is its continuous extent. Though it has different names in different parts, it is one single uninterrupted surface without breaks or obstacles ; and, the art of navigation once acquired, the whole sea from the frozen North to the frozen South is open to every ship that is launched on any shore. This is the secret of the sea. It is of infinite purport, for it implies some kind of community between all mankind. My purpose in this chapter is to trace the meaning of the oneness of the sea so far as it affects the policy of England.

The knowledge and the use of the sea have been of very gradual growth. They involved first of all the acquisition

of seamanship, the art of managing the sail. Then it was necessary to learn navigation, the art of finding the way without tracks. Navigation was impossible without the mariner's compass, and uncertain before the perfection of astronomy and of the chronometer. Lastly, a considerable development of industry is indispensable for the construction of ships of sufficient size to make long voyages convenient.

The mariners of the sixteenth century sailed round the globe, explored the oceans, and thus established the unity of the sea. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the maritime nations of Europe by degrees transported armies and colonists across the ocean, and set up according to the climate of the countries which they visited, and to the civilised, half-civilised, or uncivilised state of the inhabitants, trading stations, empires, or new nations. An American writer, Captain Mahan, in a series of volumes which have been little less than a revelation even to those who had specially devoted themselves to the study of maritime affairs, has shown how vast has been the influence of sea traffic and of the power which it brings upon the prosperity of the nations of Europe. His story traces the rise of the maritime energies of England up to the battle of Trafalgar, which left her in undisputed predominance upon all the waters of the globe. During the nineteenth century the primacy of England on the sea has never been challenged—a fact which ought to open our

eyes to the prodigious effect of naval victory; but there has taken place gradually and peacefully a change of which it seems hardly possible to over-rate the significance. The importance of sea carriage to the world has been more than tenfold multiplied. In 1820, soon after the close of the great war, the carrying power of all the ships in the world slightly exceeded 3,000,000 tons. In 1830 there had been no increase; but soon afterwards the introduction of the steam engine produced an effect, and a rapid expansion of carrying power began. This increase has since then constantly accelerated, as the steam engine has improved, and as iron and steel have been employed for the construction of larger vessels. In 1881 the estimated total tonnage of all the ships in the world was 20,000,000 tons; but as a steamer, owing to the greater speed, certainty, and regularity of its course, can make more voyages in a given time than a sailing vessel, the carrying capacity of the world's ships in 1881 was to their carrying capacity in 1830 not as 20,000,000 to 3,000,000, but as 43,000,000 to 3,000,000. The share of Great Britain in the ownership of this gigantic fleet is equal to those of all the other countries of the world together.

Sea transport at the present day is everywhere necessary to national prosperity. To Great Britain it is the indispensable condition of the very existence of her people. The food we eat and the materials which we manufacture come to us from beyond the sea. If the sea

were closed, we should starve twice over, first because the British Islands do not grow food enough for the population; and secondly, because without the raw materials it would be impossible to manufacture the goods in return for which the food is at present received. Thus sea transport is vital for Great Britain as it is for no other nation; for no other nation is to the same extent dependent upon foreign produce, and no other great nation is without avenues of approach by land.

What, then, are the conditions and consequences of the employment of force upon the watery element which is so potent a factor in human welfare?

The weapons of land warfare are prepared for the destruction of men, or as a subsidiary object for the destruction of such shelter as they may have made for themselves. At sea the prime object is the destruction of the ship, from which the destruction of its crew results. Accordingly, in all ages special vessels have been constructed for sea fighting. They are always stronger, and the attempt has always been made to have them swifter, than merchant ships. The merchant ship therefore is never a match for a ship of war, which moreover has always a numerous crew of fighting men able to overpower the handful of sailors that suffice for the needs of mere navigation. The merchant ship, unless it has a great superiority of speed, is absolutely at the mercy of the ship of war. It may, then, be laid down as an axiom that for the

purposes of battle, only specially constructed ships are available. The merchant ship may be useful as a scout and as a tender, but generally speaking it cannot fight against a ship of war. The construction of a ship is always a matter of some time, and a modern ironclad takes not less than two years for its completion. It is evident, therefore, that the fighting force of any nation on the sea at the outbreak of a war is limited by the number of fighting ships which it possesses, and that any sudden addition to this number is out of the question.

Even more important than the special quality of the ship is the special quality of its crew. They must, to begin with, be seamen; that is, they must have that familiarity with life at sea which is acquired by long experience of the use of helm and sails in the struggle against wind and wave. The true seaman is at home on the sea, which has become as it were his native element. It was the glory of the British navy in the days of Hawke and of Nelson that its officers and sailors were the finest seamen in the world. But seamen are only the raw material out of which the crew of a fighting ship must be formed. They require two further qualities, obtainable only from the special training afforded by a combatant navy: of these the first is discipline; the second is skill in the management of the peculiar weapons of naval war. Both these qualities take years to acquire; and in our day an ironclad,

both in its own structure, in the means of its propulsion, and in all the various engines for destruction and protection which it contains, is one of the most complicated, intricate, and subtle pieces of machinery known to the mechanical world. Accordingly, the naval force of any state has a limit even more imperious than that imposed by the difficulties of ship-building. The number of men available in any event is limited by that of the native seafaring population, and the number of these actually available at any time is just the number that has been trained and served upon ships of war. The British navy at the present moment¹ undoubtedly falls short, in the number of its fighting ships, of the standard which, in the opinion of some naval officers, is the minimum requisite for safety, and in the opinion of all of them is eminently desirable. But a far more serious lack is that of trained seamen. There are not enough at present to man the ships which the country possesses, and there appears to be no system in operation for the purpose of making good this startling deficiency.

Broadly speaking, the sea has no local features. Here and there a rock endangers or a shoal impedes navigation, and according to the state of wind and weather the neighbourhood of a coast affects the movement of ships; but the general quality of the sea is everywhere alike. On land the undulations of the ground, the

¹ December, 1893.

differences in its quality, and of the growths and build-ings which cover it, profoundly affect the operations of war; for the features of the ground afford obstacles to movement, and shelter against attack. They offer to the weak, under skilful guidance, a means of delay and of resistance by which he may to some extent counter-balance the superior strength of his adversary. The sea has no counterpart to this. Each side at sea has to rely only upon its own force and skill. The weak finds nothing to compensate for his weakness, the strong nothing to counterbalance his strength. A battle between very unequal forces offers a greater probability of success to the stronger force than would be the case between equally disproportionate numbers upon land; and it would seem that in a naval battle, when the balance of force has once been decidedly upset, the defeated side is in imminent danger of destruction.

The rule of the concentration of force is more imperious on sea than on land. In every maritime war there must be sooner or later, unless one side loses the game from the beginning by the dispersion of his forces, a battle between two fleets representing substantially the available naval force of the two sides. When in this battle one side has obtained a preponderance, it will be asserted in the endeavour to destroy the enemy's fleet. The enemy, if he still resists, almost courts destruction; if he retires he will be pursued

until he leaves the sea, that is takes shelter in a fortified harbour. The victor then will watch that harbour with a superior force as long as the beaten fleet remains there, and the moment it comes out will attack it again. Thus the course of naval war is inevitably marked out. It leads with certainty to the preponderance of one side, and this is followed ultimately by the disappearance from the sea of the combatant forces of the other side. When this has taken place the naval victory is complete, and the victor has acquired what has been technically called the command of the sea.

The command of the sea differs from the power exerted by an invading army over the territory in its occupation. The power of the army is limited to the area within which it could deliver a blow, and this is restricted by the slowness of its march. It is restricted also by the possible resistance of a hostile population, and it is in any case confined to the territory of the hostile state. The sea has no population which can rise in resistance. It is no man's territory, and there are therefore no frontiers upon it to make bounds for a successful commander. A fleet moves twenty times as fast as an army. The victorious navy uses its power to drive from the sea the merchant ships of the enemy, while, as the enemy's forces are paralysed, the whole sea is open to the merchant ships of the victor, subject of course to whatever attacks may be made upon them by such ships or squadrons of the beaten side as may

evade the vigilance of the winners. Thus, for a nation defeated in naval war, the sea is no longer a highroad but an impenetrable wall. This is the first meaning of victory at sea.

The sea may be closed to an enemy's commerce by sending out armed vessels to patrol the sea, and to capture or destroy his merchant ships. In the old wars governments used to grant licences to private persons authorising them to fit out armed ships, called privateers, for this purpose. By the Declaration of Paris of 1856 privateering was abolished ; but the rights of governments to use cruisers of their own in substantially the same way remains. It will, therefore, always be necessary, even for the victorious side, to protect its traders by the use of armed vessels, both to convoy them and to patrol the sea with a view to find and destroy the enemy's cruisers.

A second method of damaging maritime commerce is blockade. An enemy's port or a section of his coast may be declared in a state of blockade, and if the power making the declaration is actually able to prevent the unchallenged exit and entrance of ships, the neutral powers are bound to recognise the blockade, that is to permit their own ships, if they attempt to break through it, to be captured.

A third method is concerned with neutral ships. A state of war at sea affects only the ships belonging to the belligerent powers, or employed on their account.

In every naval war the power which, as against the other side, has had the command of the sea, has always claimed the right to forbid the enemy from trading by sea with powers not parties to the quarrel. These claims in their full extent have by no means always been admitted by the neutrals. Until 1856, however, it was the recognised right of either belligerent to confiscate the goods of his enemy when found in a neutral ship. This right is necessary to the full exercise of the results of naval victory; for it avails little as a rule to have closed the sea to the enemy's merchant ships, if he can still ship and receive goods in neutral vessels. The Declaration of Paris, which was signed by all the great powers of Europe, but not by the United States, lays down that an enemy's goods in a neutral ship shall be exempt from capture unless they are contraband of war. By contraband of war is meant arms and ammunition, and all other supplies which can be used by the enemy for warlike purposes; and there is no doubt that a belligerent is entitled to confiscate these, even when found in a neutral ship. But, unfortunately, the definition of the term is a matter of dispute. Great Britain in past wars has more than once acted on the principle that supplies of food were contraband; and the same principle was enunciated by the French a few years ago during the course of their hostilities against China.

It is assuredly much to be regretted that Great Britain was a party to the Declaration of Paris. Under

the old rule, as under the new one, the merchant ships of either belligerent are liable to destruction and capture. Under the old rule the merchant ship of a neutral was liable to search, and any goods belonging to a subject of a belligerent power were liable if found in the neutral ship to confiscation. Under the new rule these goods are perfectly safe in a neutral ship. It is evident that during the continuance of a war the merchant ships of a belligerent will be used by no one but himself; but whereas under the old rule the trader of a belligerent state had no inducement to use any other ships than those of his own nation, under the new rule he has the strongest of all reasons for avoiding the ships of his own nation and employing those of the neutral states. Therefore on the outbreak of a war the shipowners of both belligerents will, if possible, sell their ships to neutral owners; or, if that is impossible, lay them up in their own or in neutral ports, while the shippers will exclusively employ neutral ships. In a war between two continental states the net result would be merely to diminish the effectiveness of that result of victory which consists in depriving the enemy of the use of the sea. But, in a war between England and any other power whatever, the new rule must have an altogether one-sided effect; for while the enemy will lose the use of shipping to the extent of from one to two millions of tons, England will be deprived of the use of nine millions of tons of her own shipping. The British

Colonies possess shipping to the extent of one and a half million tons—equal to that of any power except the United States. The Colonies will be greatly tempted to secure for this shipping the newly created advantages of neutrality. In other words, the new rule operates as an inducement to them to secede from the British Empire. The only advantage that can be claimed for this new rule is that it would facilitate the import of food into Great Britain during war. This is, however, illusory; for there is abundant precedent to show that the enemy, if he felt strong enough, would treat food as contraband of war, and thus render it liable to capture under the neutral flag.

It appears that the immunity of the neutral flag is regarded as a concession to humanity. It is nothing of the kind. No question of the mitigation of pain or of personal suffering is involved. It is a question of diminishing the effect of naval victory. That the continental powers in 1856, when the balance of naval force was so strongly in favour of England that none of them could hope to upset it, should have wished to diminish its possible effects was natural enough. But it seems incredible that any English Ministry should have tamely agreed to so serious a diminution of the effectiveness of the particular force upon which depend the Empire, the greatness, and the very independence of Great Britain.

The object of war is to coerce the enemy; to compel him to accept your will. How does naval victory or the command of the sea conduce to this purpose? We have seen that the first effect of naval victory is to close the sea to the enemy. It is evident that the result of this process would not be the same for all countries. For a continental country this would no doubt be in the highest degree inconvenient; but as import and export would still be possible across its land frontiers, the effect of closing the sea would hardly of itself be decisive. But for an island which was not self-supporting the closing of the sea would be fatal. This is the case with Great Britain.

The victor in naval war retains for himself the use of the sea; for the enemy has ceased to be able to interfere with any maritime movement which he chooses to undertake. He is, therefore, at liberty to move an army across the sea, supposing, of course, that he possesses an army and ships enough to carry it. Moreover, he can always land the army at any suitable point that he chooses which is not fortified. The reason of this is, that ships of war carry the heaviest guns, to which only similar guns can make an effective reply. But the transport of heavy guns upon land is exceedingly difficult, and possible at all only by elaborate preparation. The rapid movements of a fleet cannot possibly be met by corresponding movements of heavy artillery on shore. If, therefore, a great military power,

having large armies at its disposal, should ever obtain the command of the sea, it will be in a position to apply to any hostile country not merely the indirect coercion resulting from the closing of the sea, but the direct and decisive compulsion of invasion by military force.

It remains to consider the relation to naval victory of the unity of the sea and of its continuous extent over three-quarters of the surface of the globe. The enemy's forces having been defeated and paralysed, and the victorious power having forces available over and above what is necessary to ensure the maintenance of this paralysis, how far does the striking power of this superabundant force extend? The answer is, to the utmost limit of a voyage; that is, of the distance to which the ship can go without being compelled by its own needs to return home. The ship requires to be well supplied with provisions, ammunition, and coal, and it may at any time be in need of repair. The modern ship of war consumes an enormous quantity of coal, while the amount which it can carry is limited; but if at various points on its journey it is assured of a fresh supply of coal and of the execution of necessary repairs it can prolong its voyage to any extent. Upon these conditions—the security of coal supply and the possibility of repairs at suitable points—the results of victory extend to the whole sea, and the command of the sea acquired by one nation as against another

thus becomes universal in its extent. It carries with it the power of landing troops on any shore. Thus the victorious nation can exercise its constraint against every colony possessed by its adversary. They will all be beyond the hope of relief from the mother country, shut in by an impassable sea, and their conquest therefore becomes merely a matter of time and of the military force that may be needed to reduce their garrisons.

So much, then, for that command of the sea which consists in naval victory pushed to its natural consequences over a hostile maritime power. It may perhaps be distinguished from that maritime pre-eminence which is no doubt at once its cause and its consequence, and which England has so long enjoyed. The fact that English shipping, measured by tonnage, is five times that of the United States, which is the second maritime nation, and ten times that of France, which is the fourth, gives Great Britain an incomparable influence upon every shore. It has enabled her during peace, when the command of the sea has not been in question, to establish her trade in every part of the world, to create new nations by colonisation, and to exert for many years over all the uncivilised coast tribes of the world an influence so powerful that it could at any time without difficulty have been converted into government.

The possession of a great mercantile marine is by no means always inseparable from that of a strong fighting

navy. Norway, for example, has more merchant ships than any other nation except Great Britain and the United States; while France, though her fighting navy is almost equal to that of Great Britain, has a much smaller mercantile marine than either Norway or Germany. For this reason I have distinguished between England's maritime pre-eminence and her fighting power at sea. It might be well to reserve the term command of the sea for the state of things existing during the continuance of a war, after naval victory had been fully asserted. For the possession of a powerful fleet, which may in the event of war be able to obtain naval victory with all its consequences, is at the best only a potential or latent command of the sea. This difference, however, must not obscure one of the peculiar characters of a navy.

As there is no territory at sea, a fleet never crosses a frontier, and therefore the movements of a fleet are not acts of war. Accordingly, fleets are not kept at home like armies, to be called out and got ready when an emergency arrives. They must be always ready, and, to a certain extent, they must always be within reach of the point at which, when war comes, they will have to deliver their blow. The principal part of every plan of campaign, the chief question to be decided by a commander in war, is the distribution of his forces. He has to determine the direction of his principal effort, to the execution of which everything else is subordi-

nate, and for which he will concentrate the maximum force at his disposal. There are, however, also subsidiary efforts which cannot always be dispensed with. The British navy, for example, though its principal force would always be employed for battle against the enemy's fleet, cannot neglect the protection, for which ships of war are necessary, of a number of points in far distant seas. The necessary ships must be at those points during peace, or they cannot be there in time when war begins. Thus the minor points in the distribution of the navy must necessarily be settled far in advance. It follows that the whole programme, at least in its fundamental outlines, must also be settled long beforehand.

A wrong distribution of force made during peace may be impossible of correction on the outbreak of war. Take, for example, the hypothesis of a war between England and France. On the principle of the concentration of force, the first effort of France must be to unite her fleets of the Channel and of the Mediterranean; and on the principle that the point of junction of two forces should be out of reach of the enemy, I should expect this union to be sought in the Mediterranean. For this reason I am very much puzzled by the fact that there has for a long time past been in the Mediterranean a British squadron certainly not more than the equal in fighting power of the French Mediterranean squadron, and, as far as I can ascertain,

considerably inferior to the force which that squadron would certainly attain the moment that hostilities were contemplated. It cannot be part of a plan of campaign to bring about a battle in which one's own force is inferior to that of the enemy. I presume, therefore, that the British squadron is intended to leave the Mediterranean as soon as there is a prospect of war. But if it should at that moment be in the Levant, the French squadron from Toulon would surely dispute its passage, even without waiting for reinforcements from the Atlantic. I could understand perfectly the presence in the Mediterranean at any time of a British fleet superior to the French forces in the Mediterranean together with the possible reinforcements which the latter might receive from the Atlantic.

I refer to this hypothetical state of things merely to illustrate what I believe to be the truth,—that fleets, at any rate fleets more than a few hours' sail from home, must always be ready for action, and, therefore, that their composition and distribution must at all times, even in peace, be regulated by the same considerations of strategy as must govern them during war. To my mind, this proper regulation of the movements of fleets is an important part of that readiness for naval war which constitutes what I have called the latent or potential command of the sea.

There is one condition of victory, whether by sea or land, of which the importance cannot possibly be

exaggerated. It is the proper selection of the naval or military commander. The business of a government is to appreciate truly the causes and effects of war, to avoid a policy that would lead to conflicts, either unnecessary or productive of no good result, and to ensure that for any war rendered inevitable, either by the perverse action of a foreign government, or by the general course of historical development, the resources of the nation shall be available fully and in good time. But the conduct of these forces in actual use is a professional matter. The highest function to which a soldier or a sailor can aspire is the strategical direction of an army or a navy in war. To entrust this function to any but the most competent person is madness. The name of the office matters nothing, but it is certain that an army or a navy must be directed by a single mind. Every improvement in the mechanism of war and every increase of the forces employed in it adds to the superiority conferred by better direction.

The greatest responsibility which rests upon a government, after that for its general policy and the general state of its preparations for war, is concerned in the choice of its military or naval adviser, or, to employ the more usual term, its naval or military commander-in-chief. It will be obvious from what I have said about the distribution of fleets in peace, that the naval commander-in-chief is indispensable not merely in war, but at all times. It is equally certain that the selection of

a military commander and his endowment with authority cannot safely be delayed until the outbreak of war. On this subject too much attention cannot be given to the weighty warning of Mahan: "While a government is responsible for its choice of the chief naval commander, it must depend upon him for the enforcement of discipline and for the choice of measures at once practicable and adequate to compass the ends of the war. Upon him more than upon any other must fall the responsibility of failure; for he knows or should know better than the government, what the fleet can be made to do, what the state of discipline really is, and what his own capacity to carry out the one and support the other. Only through him can the government act. When it disregards or over-rides without displacing him mischief ensues; but the correlative of the generous, confident, and hearty support it owes him are on his part unceasing intense effort, or resignation."

The Franco-German War of 1870 revealed the enormous power of a carefully prepared and skilfully directed army against an army imperfectly trained and commanded by amateurs. I can imagine the results of a similar inequality in preparatory training and in strategical direction manifesting themselves in a naval war. Such a war might begin with the capture of one fleet and the destruction of another, to the utter discomfiture of the government which had forgotten the

most elementary fact of national life—the existence of conflict—and had neglected its most elementary duty of naval and military preparation.

The first consequence of the oneness of the sea is to give to the victor in naval warfare a power of universal extent without territorial limits. In other words, there is only one command of the sea. This power Great Britain by her insular nature and her proximity to Europe has been compelled to acquire. Without it she would always be liable to invasion by the army of whichever of her neighbours possessed it. She is so much smaller in area and population than the neighbouring European powers that she would, in the absence of the command of the sea, be unable to secure her independence; for her army is limited in numbers, and a small country without great physical obstacles offers comparatively little help by which an inferior force can resist or delay its conquest.

The sea makes England the near neighbour of every European country except Switzerland, and her interests are thus closely intertwined with those of every other power. No other nation has such general relations with the whole of Europe. Even at the present day, in spite of the enormous growth of the trade of European colonies and dependencies, the commercial dealings of Great Britain with Europe are equal in volume

to her commercial dealings with all the rest of the world together.

But the connection of England with Europe is much more vital than any inquiry into the courses of trade can exhibit. It was as an active member of the European community that England acquired and maintained the command of the sea. The conditions which obliged her to seek in the exertion of maritime power the foundations of her own independence compelled her, at the same time, to associate her efforts with those of continental nations which, equally with herself, were seeking to ensure themselves against some dangerous preponderance.

Thus, in the sixteenth century England in self-defence became a champion of Protestantism against the then predominant power of Spain. In the seventeenth century there was a period of hesitation, when England was divided against herself; but she finally threw herself into the resistance to the supremacy which France sought to establish over Europe; and the expulsion of the Stuarts was the expression of the national decision to side with Holland and the Empire against Louis XIV. In the struggle against his aggressions, England then took the principal part. During the eighteenth century she sided with Austria when there was a continental combination against Maria Theresa, and with Prussia when Austria, France, and Russia were in league against Frederick the Great. At

a later date France and Spain took part in the quarrel between England and her American Colonies, France in order to assert an influence that had been weakened in its effect upon Europe, and both countries in order to shake the British power at sea. The result was the break-down of the French Government. The French Revolution, which began in this collapse, soon exchanged the character of an effort to organise freedom for that of a renewal of the old national design of dominion in Europe. England in self-defence again stood forth as the champion of the independence of nations.

England's command of the sea, then, is not the result of her own unaided exertions nor of victories won by her in opposition to Europe. It is the outcome of a partnership between England on the one side and a combination of continental powers, in which the membership has changed from time to time, but of which the objects have always been the same,—the maintenance of the independence of states against some attempt at dominion. This seems to me the true interpretation of the balance of power, which in this sense is the most European of all European causes.

There must be a command of the sea; and it is a prize that every nation covets. But every nation in Europe prefers that it should be held by England, rather than by any other power except herself. For England is hardly a great military power; she is unlikely alone to.

possess armies that would endanger the existence of her neighbours; whilst if any continental power acquired the command of the sea the others would be obliged to combine to wrest it from hands in which it could not but be a danger to each one of them.

Thus in a general view England's command of the sea serves two purposes which are inseparable from and complementary to one another: it means at once the independence of England, and that independence among continental nations which has been called the balance of power.

It remains to consider how the oneness of the sea serves the general purpose of history and contributes to that perfection of the race which, under the name of civilisation, humanity, or progress, is the chief end of all human effort. This process has two forms or aspects: we see on the one hand a number of communities, each evolving its own type of manhood, its own ideal of life; and we see also each community acting as the apostle of its own type or ideal. A great nation is one that has obtained the recognition of its own life as one of the best types; many such communities have done their work and passed away, leaving only their memory and their example. In the present world the only types that have any prospect of acceptance are those of the European nations, represented by them and by their colonies. There are no other ideals in serious competition with them; and the general character of the present

stage of history is the effort of the European nations to impose their ideals upon the world. Statesmen, writers, soldiers, merchants, manufacturers, missionaries, travellers are all at work, furthering, in every corner of the globe, the cause of Western or European civilisation. In peace or war a thousand agencies are ever spreading the European types, before which all others decline and shrink and perish. It is impossible to see how this movement can cease. There may be pauses, reactions, delays; but to the eye of any spectator at the present day the destiny of Europe to permeate the whole world with the influence of its civilisation and to impress its character upon all mankind seems manifest and inevitable. The movement began in the fifteenth century with the discovery of the oceans; it has gone on continuously ever since. In our time it has multiplied its forces a hundred-fold. The figures already given show how the power of navigation has increased during the last fifty years. But no statistics will suffice to reveal the manner in which during that period Europe has tightened her grip of the whole world. The conditions of to-day contain in themselves the beginnings of a state of things in which there will be no authority in the world except that of the European nations and the nations which, like the United States and the states of Australia, are portions of Europe transplanted across the sea. The result is that the fate of the world is settled, if not in Europe, at least in transactions between the

powers of Europe and their associates, the independent colonies of European origin.

The peculiar privilege of the command of the sea is that it carries with it the leadership of Europe in this civilising process, and thus confers upon the nation that holds it the primacy of the world.

VI.

EGYPT.

THE continents that make up the Old World are cut in two by a broad belt of desert, that stretches from Thibet across Persia, Arabia and Africa, to the Atlantic shore. In Asia it is broken by many a mountain chain, whose snow-fed streams spread belts of verdure, along which the traveller can pick his way. The Persian Gulf penetrates it; the Red Sea all but traverses it. In Africa it is one unbroken solitude, where no highway is possible, and where the bones of fallen camels mark the tracks of a precarious intercourse.

The desert is the true frontier of Europe. The Mediterranean is the connecting link between its own shores, and brings Marseilles, Naples, and Athens nearer to Algiers, Tunis, and Alexandria, than they are to Lille, Munich, and Vienna. South of the great African desert, the furnace of the world, lies the vast forest that feeds with its moisture the great rivers of Africa. The Nile penetrates the desert without opening a road, for its middle course is broken by cataracts that absolutely forbid regular navigation. After the last cataract the stream flows for 500 miles
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along a valley a few miles wide, between walls made by the hills of the desert. At Cairo these walls recede, and leave a triangular bay, which has been filled up by the delta of the Nile.

The long valley and the delta are Egypt. It is a country where the soil is entirely the deposit of the Nile, renewed every year in the flood which submerges both the valley and the delta, and which, left to itself, would every year remove the boundaries that indicate ownership in the soil which it creates. There is nothing in the world like the fertility of Egypt. But its usefulness depends upon the regulation of the Nile, and to regulate the Nile the whole population of the country must co-operate. The value of every field and the title of every landowner require for their maintenance an efficient management of the river. Thus Egypt depends, as perhaps no other country does, upon government, that is upon an authority endued with knowledge, constraining all for the good of all. A weak government and an ignorant government are alike fatal; for science is needed to control the Nile, and power is indispensable where every one must be compelled to do his share of the common task. The Pyramids, standing between Cairo and the setting sun, bear witness that government began in Egypt, and that from the first it was knowledge in power.

Shut in by the desert and self-contained, Egypt was the home of science and of order during long centuries when all the world outside was barbarous.

The Pharaohs solved, perhaps perfectly, in the area of Upper and Lower Egypt, the problem of political economy. They regulated the Nile with a mastery that is even to-day not fully understood. A great reservoir in the Fayoum received the surplus waters of its flood, and stored them for times of deficiency. The ruins of Thebes attest that they secured a rich culture not only in the delta but in the whole valley of the Lower Nile. The canal which they made towards Ismailia, and perhaps to Suez, may have served not only for irrigation but for navigation and commerce. The population of the country was more numerous by a third than it is to-day, though Egypt is one of the most thickly peopled countries of the modern world.

The conditions which produced government in Egypt could not produce freedom, which requires a sturdy breed of men, accustomed to stand up each for himself. Freedom springs up among the clans whom a mountainous country hardens and divides, or among a race inured to the adventures of the sea. There was no occasion for it in Egypt, where wealth depended not upon individual energy, but upon obedience to the common ruler, and where government was of necessity the partner of nature in dispensing the very elements of production. Egyptian life resembled in one respect that of a modern factory; for the Nile, like the factory engine, determined by its periodic action the doings of a whole population. A nation thus habituated to a

master is unprepared to resent a change in its rulers. Moreover, so long as the nation is indifferent, the land of Egypt is peculiarly easy of conquest. A victorious army astride of the Nile between the Pyramids, where it emerges from the desert, and the point twenty miles lower down where the stream divides, is master of all the communications of the country. To reach that point, the invader has only a few days' march from the coast, along the outer bank of either arm of the Nile, or along the canal which takes the water of the river to the Red Sea. The distance—a hundred miles—is too short to give the defender time to raise a second army. Thus a single victory takes the invader to the foot of the Pyramids, where he has the key of the whole country, and can be expelled only by a general rising, of which, however, the population of Egypt, unaided, has never been capable.

The great period of Egyptian history, the age of Egypt for the Egyptians, ends where the history of the rest of the world begins. At the close of the sixth century before Christ, the country was conquered by the Persians, perhaps the best hated masters Egypt ever had. The conquest by Alexander, two centuries later, was a welcome change. The Ptolemies, the successors of Alexander, were intelligent oppressors. They governed by means of a Greek bureaucracy, making the Greek settlers the privileged class, and exacting an enormous revenue devoted to dynastic ends. This

involved attention to the material prosperity of the country, but prevented the natives from reaping its benefits. Egypt was sucked dry in the interest of Greeks. The half-Hellenised Egypt of that time was the richest country of the world, the granary of Italy, the centre of trade. It was also a manufacturing country ; and from Alexandria, then the second city of the world, linen, papyrus, and glass were exported both to the East and the West.

Egypt passed into the position of a Roman province without more struggle than was implied in a violent and prolonged Alexandrine riot. The Roman Government was the continuation of that of the Ptolemies. There was no sudden or sweeping change, but the Greek bureaucracy took their orders from Rome through a few Roman officials at their head. The privileged condition of the Greek inhabitants remained. They could become Roman citizens and Roman soldiers. The Egyptians could become neither. They could but till their lands or row in the galleys. The Romans taxed the country even more heavily than their predecessors, so that it was gradually exhausted, for its corn as well as its revenue went for nearly four centuries to Rome.

With the partition of the Empire and the establishment of Christianity the population of Egypt continued to be of hostile races and creeds. The Greek minority, prevalent in Alexandria and the cities of Greek origin,

was orthodox, and looked down upon the indigenous Egyptians who clung to their own particular heresy.

The rise of Islam, which has been aptly called the executioner of Hellenism, found the Byzantine Empire weak in its extremities. The Arab invasion of Egypt came at a time when there were rival claimants to the imperial purple, and when the Byzantine world was divided upon a point of religious doctrine. One emperor, favouring one doctrine, sent orders to negotiate with the Arab leader for the evacuation of Egypt by the imperial troops; and a convention to this effect was agreed upon and carried into effect, the Arabs undertaking to protect the natives and respect their worship, as for many years they did. The rival emperor meanwhile succeeded to power, and declined to ratify the convention; so that the Arabs, being already in possession, became unconditional masters of the country.

The Arabs began by governing well, accepting the administrative order which they found. Their first work was to clear out the old canal from the Nile to Suez, and to divert the corn of Egypt from Byzantium to the ports of Arabia. Egypt was thus for centuries estranged from Europe, and turned as it were towards the East. The greater part of the population became Mahommedan, a minority preserving their Christian faith. The distinction between Arab and Egyptian was soon lost in the common religion, and for nine

hundred years Egypt was again for the Egyptians. The cities of Upper Egypt indeed disappeared as the old irrigation works vanished; and even in the delta there was but a shadow of the ancient wealth. But, as the Moslem world fell asunder, and Egypt became the seat of its own caliph, it was perhaps the least unfortunate region of Islam. In the tenth century the first of the Fatimite caliphs founded the city of Cairo, of which in the twelfth century Saladin built the citadel and the walls. The remains of its mosques and the tombs of the caliphs attest the prosperity of Cairo in the middle ages, when the trade, not merely of the East, but of the West, once more flowed through the country, which the Crusades had again made known to Europe.

In the thirteenth century, a sultan of the house of Saladin bought 12,000 Mingrelian and Circassian slaves, prisoners taken by Ghengis Khan, and formed them into a body-guard known as Mamelukes, that is "slaves". It was not long before the body-guard were the masters. In 1251, they deposed a sultan, and set up a Mameluke in his place. Mameluke dynasties governed Egypt and Mameluke Beys its provinces from that time to the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Turkish Sultan Selim won the necessary battle near Cairo, and appointed a Turkish pasha to rule the country.

The Turks destroy, but never create. A mosque was built in Cairo by the sultan who fell fighting against

Selim. The next mosque was built three centuries later by Mehemet Ali, a Turk under European patronage, whose ambition was to supplant the sultan and found a dynasty of his own. During those three centuries, from 1517 to 1798, Egypt was blotted out of history. Trade, driven out of the Levant by the Turks, sought new paths; and Egypt, left to itself, without a civilised government, relapsed into barbarism and poverty. With the decline of the Turkish power, the Mameluke Beys again asserted themselves, and were in the eighteenth century the masters, or at least the local misgovernors, of the country. They raised the tribute which the Turkish sultans required, and exacted as much more as they could for themselves. Egypt was thus brought to the last stage of decay. The control of the Nile was a thing undreamed of. Cairo was little more than a city of ruins, inhabited by paupers. The fellaheen, or native Egyptians, lived in poverty and misery, plundered by the Mamelukes, as well as by the Bedouins, whose settlements were scattered about the country.

At the close of the eighteenth century, Egypt once more comes under European influence. Two nations are concerned with its affairs; and its history henceforth becomes a part of the history of the relations of France and England with each other, and of the Eastern question in which all the powers are more or less interested. The European intervention began with the

action of France. For this reason the French consider that they have a historic interest in the country. It is desirable, therefore, to have a perfect understanding of the nature of this French interest.

On the 16th of August, 1797, Bonaparte, then in Italy, engaged in negotiating a peace with the defeated Austrians, wrote to the Directory: "The time is not distant when we shall feel that we must seize Egypt in order thoroughly to destroy England". In November, Bonaparte, still at Milan, was appointed "General-in-Chief of the Army of England," and sent off 30,000 men from Italy towards the Channel. Early in December he reached Paris. The Directory had received reports from the French consul at Cairo, Magallon, urging the despatch of an expedition to Egypt; and they favoured Bonaparte's project, if only because it would remove to a distance a popular and dangerous aspirant to power. During the winter Bonaparte said to Bourrienne: "I shall make a tour of inspection on the north coast, to convince myself as to what we can risk. If, as I fear, the success of a landing in England seems to me doubtful, the army of England will become the army of the East, and I shall go to Egypt." The tour of inspection was made, and on the 23rd of February Bonaparte reported to the Directory that a landing in England, without the command of the sea having first been secured, would be a bold and difficult venture, impossible except in the long nights of autumn or winter. In April he further

reported that before the next autumn the expedition to Egypt might be carried out, which would compel the English to send portions of their fleet to India and to the Red Sea. By that time the French preparations in the Channel would be further advanced, and in November or December 40,000 men could be landed in England. On the 12th of April, Bonaparte received his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East, with instructions to seize Malta and Egypt, to drive the English out of their settlements in the East, so far as he should be able to reach them, especially out of the Red Sea, to cut a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, and to secure the Red Sea for France. A *locum tenens* was to be appointed for the Army of England until Bonaparte's return. In his own orders to his troops he still called himself Commander of the Army of England.

This is the origin of the French interest in Egypt. No doubt, Frenchmen and others had thought of Egypt before. Leibnitz had suggested to Louis XIV. that he should conquer the country. D'Argenson had considered a similar project in 1738. But these projects are no more a basis of French interest in Egypt, except in the sentimental sense of the word, than the fact that Saint Louis landed there and was taken prisoner.

Bonaparte sailed from Toulon the 19th of May, 1798. On the 22nd of June, while still at sea, he published an army order. "Soldiers!" he wrote, "you are about to make a conquest of incalculable consequences for human

culture and the trade of the world. You will strike the most certain and telling blow at England, until at last you give her her death-blow." On the 1st of July he reached Alexandria, with 24,000 men. The Mamelukes had a force of about 8000 horsemen, and no other troops. On the 21st of July the greater part of these horsemen were defeated at the battle called after the Pyramids; and next day the French entered Cairo. On the 1st of August the French fleet was destroyed by Nelson, and the fate of Bonaparte's army was thus settled, for it could not return to France and could not be reinforced. It was, however, strong enough to overcome any possible opposition that Egypt could offer, and Bonaparte set to work to organise the country as a French colony. His arrangements aimed at draining its resources into his own hands. But they were so oppressive as to drive even the long-suffering fellaheen to open risings, which were put down with cruel severity.

The invasion was resented by the sultan as suzerain of Egypt, and a Turkish army collected in Syria. Bonaparte, in 1799, invaded Syria and defeated the Turks, but was foiled in his plans by the appearance of Sidney Smith at Acre. He returned to Egypt, to find that the Turks had sent thither by sea a second army. This he attacked and defeated at Aboukir in July; and in August he left his own army to its fate, and set sail with the pick of his staff for France. In January, 1800, a convention was concluded between Sir Sidney Smith and Kléber, the

French commander, by which the French army was to evacuate Egypt, but its safe return to France was guaranteed. This, however, the English Government refused to ratify, demanding the surrender of the French troops. Kléber then, in March, attacked and defeated the Turkish army at Heliopolis. Thereupon, General Abercromby was sent to Egypt with a British force, and General Baird sailed from India with a smaller force, which landed at Kosseir in the Red Sea, crossed the desert to Keneh on the Nile, and eventually marched down the river to Cairo. Abercromby landed at Aboukir, defeating the French; defeated them again at Alexandria; and finally, reinforced by Baird, forced the French to capitulate on the 27th of August. The French troops were allowed to return home, and the English forces then left the country in possession of the Turks. The net result of Bonaparte's expedition was the knowledge of Egypt acquired by the scientific men whom he took with him, and the collections of antiquities which they made there, and which the English commanders allowed the French on their capitulation to retain.

Bonaparte, become First Consul, did not forget Egypt nor the purpose with which he had gone there. In July, 1802, he made his peace with Turkey. In 1803 his consul at Cairo, Matthieu de Lesseps, was instructed to look out for a man suitable to counteract the influence of England and the power of the Mamelukes. The man whom De Lesseps recommended was Mehemet

Ali, a Macedonian Turk, who had come to Egypt in the army sent by the Porte against the French in 1799. In 1803 he was bimbashi (colonel) of an Albanian regiment. His French patrons seem to have been useful to him, for in 1805 he became Turkish Governor of Egypt.

Mehemet Ali soon fulfilled the desire of his benefactors. In 1807 an incapable English Ministry, being at war with the Sultan, who after Austerlitz had allied himself with France, sent to Egypt an expedition of 5000 men, under a scarcely capable commander. Alexandria capitulated; but the force sent against Rosetta, only 1500 men, was defeated with heavy loss, and the British commander then agreed to evacuate Egypt upon his prisoners being restored to him. Napoleon and De Lesseps were probably satisfied. In 1811 Mehemet Ali contrived to have all the Mameluke chiefs and all their important retainers massacred. He was thus unencumbered in his governorship, and rapidly developed the ability and the ambition of a first-rate oriental despot. In 1815 he attacked the Wahabites of Arabia, and restored the freedom of pilgrimage to Mecca. With the help of French advisers, he greatly improved the administration of Egypt, attending to irrigation, to the introduction of new crops, such as cotton and sugar cane, to the construction of canals, and to the preservation of order. But he gathered the additional wealth thus created into his own

treasury by an exhaustive system of taxes and monopolies. Thus enriched he raised an army on the European model and created a fleet. No one knew better than he the decayed condition of Turkey; and he aimed at making himself the independent king or sultan of Egypt, and perhaps of the greater part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1820-21 he sent an expedition up the Nile, which conquered Nubia, Dongola, Kordofan and Sennaar, that is, the greater part of what has since been known as the Soudan. During the war of Greek independence he assisted the Sultan by sending his stepson Ibrahim Pasha, with an army of 20,000 men, to suppress the Greeks in the Morea, an enterprise which was ended by the destruction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino in 1827. The story of Mehemet Ali's conquest of Syria, and of his attempt, under French protection, to found an Empire of Egypt and Syria, has been already told.¹ It is the second act of French intervention in Egypt, and ended not indeed in a military but in a diplomatic defeat of the French policy. Mehemet Ali was confirmed as hereditary Turkish Pasha of Egypt, but his project for the conquest of Syria was finally disposed of.

Mehemet Ali died in 1849.² He had not entirely

¹ See pp. 44-47.

² Ibrahim Pasha took the government in 1848, upon Mehemet Ali becoming imbecile. He died the same year, and was succeeded by Mehemet Ali's grandson Abbas. In 1854, Said,

realised the programme of Napoleon Bonaparte, but he had at least succeeded in establishing in Egypt a dynasty subservient to France.

The successive pashas governed, as Mehemet Ali had done, as "enlightened" oriental despots. The enlightenment consisted in the adoption of European modes of increasing the revenue, while spending it in oriental fashion, for the monarch's personal ends. The French engineers and speculators with whom Egypt teemed had a thousand plans of increasing the resources of the country. New canals were constructed; railways were built; palaces and theatres grew up. Alexandria was fortified; the pashas acquired vast estates. But the fellaheen were more heavily taxed than ever, and driven with the lash to forced labour for the benefit of their rulers. It was an oriental oppression under the veneer of French culture. The attempted conquest in Syria had been thwarted. But officials sent from Cairo collected the taxes of the Soudan, where they had opportunities of enriching themselves by connivance or partnership with the local slave traders. In the Soudan, moreover, there was a geographical interest, by which Englishmen were specially attracted,—the question of

Mehemet Ali's third son, succeeded; and on his death in 1863, Ismail, son of Ibrahim Pasha, became Pasha of Egypt. Ismail in 1866 received the title of Khedive or Viceroy of Egypt. He was deposed in 1879, and succeeded by his son Tewfik, who died in January, 1892, and was succeeded by his son, Abbas.

the source of the Nile. Baker, in a journey begun in 1861, tracked the river to the Albert Nyanza. The journey revealed to him the horrors of the slave hunting of which the further Soudan was the field. In 1869 he obtained from the Khedive Ismail a firman which, under the pretext of suppressing the slave trade, Baker's object, authorised him to conquer and govern in the name of the Khedive the provinces to the south of Gondokoro. Baker a few years later was succeeded by Gordon, who conquered Darfour for the Khedive, and pushed his border southward almost to the Great Lakes. In 1873 the Khedive obtained from the Porte the recognition of his authority over the districts of Suakim and Massowah, the Red Sea gates of the Soudan.

The growth of the British Empire in India brought Egypt once more into the main current of the world's life. The shortest and easiest way from England to India is by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The use of this route was facilitated by the construction, in the period between 1850 and 1860, of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo and thence to Suez. An English officer, Waghorn, had devoted himself to the advocacy of the Egyptian route to India; and his views had been communicated in 1838 to Ferdinand de Lesseps, who, many years later, was enabled by the formation of an international company, by the assistance of the Pashas Said and Ismail, who were lavish both of the forced labour of their subjects and of money,

and also by the diplomatic assistance of Napoleon III., to complete the canal from Port Said to Suez, which was opened in 1869. The difficulty was to feed and maintain a great number of workmen in the desert. It was overcome by bringing the Nile to the spot. The old channel from the river to the Red Sea was restored, M. de Lesseps starting his "fresh-water canal" from the Nile near Cairo and carrying it to Ismailia and Suez. The water from the canal is conveyed in pipes from Ismailia to Port Said. Thus, the Nile became the instrument for the creation of the maritime canal, and the link by which the canal is inseparably bound up with Egypt.

The canal once made became a great highway of the world's trade. During the twelve years between its opening and the end of the year 1882 there passed through it forty million tons of shipping, of which four-fifths were British. In 1875 the Khedive's shares in the canal, being for sale, were bought by the British Government for four millions sterling.

The year 1875 marks the turning-point of Egyptian history, the beginning of that direct absorption of Egypt into the system of European civilisation, which became inevitable from the day when the short cut to British India was first used. The process can hardly be attributed to the initiative of England.

The first step arose out of the capitulations, the old treaties in virtue of which the subjects of any European

Power resident in the Turkish Empire are exempt from Turkish jurisdiction and subject only to that of the consuls of their own Government. In 1867 Nubar Pasha had called the attention of the Powers to the embarrassments arising, both to their subjects and to the Egyptian Government, from the impracticability of satisfactorily settling disputes between foreigners resident in Egypt. The Powers, especially France, were reluctant to part with any of their rights. But the influence of England, and her readiness to forego for the good of Egypt a harmful prerogative, eventually led to a settlement; all the European Powers agreed to a law establishing in Egypt mixed tribunals, that is, courts in which the majority of the judges are Europeans, to replace the consular courts, in disputes between persons of different nationality. These courts were opened in January, 1876. The regulations by which they are guided have the force of a treaty between the Powers, and one of the clauses lays down that the Egyptian Government, its various departments, and the estates of the Khedive, are to be subject to the judgments of the mixed courts.

This clause was the lever by which England was compelled to lend a hand to the settlement of Egypt. The fulcrum was the debt contracted by the Khedive.

Between 1863 and 1875 Ismail had borrowed and squandered nearly eighty millions sterling, which was secured partly on the revenues of Egypt, partly on the

vast estates which had been acquired by Mehemet Ali and his successors. It was to mitigate his financial embarrassments that the Khedive sold his shares in the canal. At the same time he asked the British Government to name a skilled financier who might help to go over his accounts. The Government suggested Mr. Cave, who went to Egypt as a temporary servant of the Khedive, and gave him good advice, that was not followed.

Early in the year 1876 the French Government proposed, in the interest of the French and English creditors, that the two Governments should take the finances of Egypt "resolutely in hand". The English Government declined to be a party to measures for the international control thus proposed. They were "not disposed to take any step which could lead to an interference with the independence of Egypt, and could not view with indifference any attempt to gain administrative control over Egypt by another Power".

The Khedive, then acting under French advice, created a Treasury of the Debt, to be under the management of foreign commissioners, named by their Governments, for the purpose of receiving the funds needed for the interest upon the debt, and for its redemption, and of applying them exclusively to those objects. The English Government refused to nominate a commissioner; and Major Baring, who received the post in November, 1876, was appointed by the Khedive on his own responsibility.

In the autumn of the same year Messrs. Goschen and Joubert went to Egypt as representatives of the bondholders, and upon their advice the Khedive instituted two controllers-general,—one of receipts, to collect the whole of the revenues and pay them to the proper treasuries, the other of audit, to check the whole of the Government account-keeping, though he was to have no power to consider the expediency of any item of expenditure. One of the controllers was to be an Englishman, and the other a Frenchman. The English Government, still anxious not to become involved in responsibilities in Egypt, refused to nominate a controller; and the Khedive on his own authority appointed Mr. Romaine.

The Khedive, however, was not really in earnest with reform; and as the controllers had no authority to control expenditure it soon became evident that the whole administration of the country was being thrown out of gear by financial mismanagement. Early in 1878, the members of the bar practising in the mixed courts protested against the non-execution of the judgments of these courts against the Government and against the estates of the Khedive. The other Powers, in the first instance Austria, took up the matter, and a joint protest of the consuls was delivered to the Khedive. This was the first of a series of acts by the Powers not deeply interested in Egypt, which showed that England could not look on inactive unless she was prepared to see

the control of the country and of the canal pass into the hands of some other European Power or Powers.

Meanwhile under pressure from several Governments the Khedive had appointed a commission to inquire into the debt. Upon the report of this commission he handed over to the state the whole of the landed property belonging to himself and his family, agreed to limit his absolute power by a council of ministers, and appointed Mr. Rivers Wilson Minister of Finance, and M. de Blignières Minister of Public Works. The Treasury of the Debt was not touched, but the functions of the two controllers were suspended, on the understanding that, in case the two foreign ministers should be dismissed, the control would *ipso facto* be revived. At the same time the Daira lands (that is, the lands hitherto the private estates of the Khedive) were placed under an Egyptian, an English, and a French director, of whom the two last were not to be removed without the consent of their respective Governments. At the suggestion of France, England agreed to nominate a director of the Daira. Thereupon the English and French Governments urged the Khedive loyally to support the ministry now formed, of which Nubar Pasha was the head, and hinted that failure in this respect might endanger his throne.

A few months later there was a military demonstration, thought to have been arranged by the Khedive, directed against Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson.

The Khedive dismissed Nubar, and appointed his son, the heir-apparent, Tewfik Pasha, President of the Council. A financial scheme, the outcome of the commission of inquiry, was laid before the Khedive by the foreign ministers ; but he issued a decree propounding a totally different scheme. This was regarded as a *coup d'état*, by which the Khedive sought to emancipate himself from his obligations to his creditors. The immediate result was a strong protest from the German Government, in which all the great Powers joined ; and the Sultan, at the request of the Powers, deposed Ismail Pasha, and appointed his son Tewfik Khedive in his stead (26th June, 1879). Thereupon the French and English Governments agreed to the revival of the control, as instituted in 1876, and appointed Messrs. Baring and de Blignières controllers-general (4th September, 1879). The two Governments also proposed to establish in Egypt a Commission of Liquidation, with full power to deal with all the financial engagements of the country. It was determined to apply to the Powers to recognise the decisions of this commission as binding, and without appeal, by an agreement similar to that which recognised the mixed courts. It was also understood that the commission should begin by ascertaining and laying down the sum necessary for efficiently carrying on the government of the country, and that the right of the creditors should be held to apply only to the residue of revenue which should

remain after the satisfaction of this necessary obligation.

During the negotiations it appeared that the Austrian Government, supported by that of Germany, was contending for the establishment of an international control, an idea which the English Government declined under any circumstances to entertain. Lord Salisbury pointed out to Count Károlyi (Nov. 18, 1879), that "international commissions as instruments of government are ineffective, slow, inert, and liable to constant interruptions in any policy upon which, for a moment, they may agree, by changes which may supervene in the relations of the Governments which their individual members represent"; and (Nov. 8), that Egypt had politically "an importance for England which it had for no other country in the world". In September, 1879, Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington formulated the points of an agreement between France and England, embodying the English view of the proposed Commission of Liquidation, the rejection of the Austrian proposals, the determination of both Governments earnestly to support the native Government, and "that the two Governments should make it clearly understood to the Khedive that they would not tolerate the establishment in Egypt of political influence, on the part of any other European Power, in competition with that of England and France; and that they were prepared to take action to any extent that might be

found necessary to give effect to their views in this respect”.

In March, 1880, the five Powers agreed to accept the decisions of the proposed commission, which was thereupon appointed, and consisted of two Englishmen, two Frenchmen, one German, one Austrian, and one Italian. The result of its labours was the Law of Liquidation of July, 1880, to which all the Powers interested in the mixed courts gave their assent. This law specified a sum which the commissioners thought sufficient for the administrative needs of Egypt, and laid down that the whole of the revenue in excess of that amount should be handed to the Treasury of the Debt, for the purpose of liquidation. At the same time the Treasury of the Debt, consisting of four members, nominated respectively by France, Austria, Italy, and England, received by the Law of Liquidation the status of an international institution. It was empowered to sue the Government, and the law enacted that no new loan should be contracted without its assent.

In February, 1881, the French and English Governments agreed to send identic instructions to their representatives in Egypt, to the effect that they should unite in sustaining the authority of the Khedive, and should give their support to the present or any future minister appointed by his Highness and also to the British and French controllers. In September, 1881, there was a military demonstration at Cairo, headed by

Colonel Arabi Bey. The mutineers demanded the dismissal of the ministry, the convocation of a Parliament, and the increase of the army. The movement was, in fact, a rebellion against the authority of the European Powers, exercised through the Law of Liquidation, which imposed necessary restrictions upon military expenditure, to the detriment, as the Egyptian officers thought, of their personal interests and prospects.

Immediately upon the news of this outbreak the French Government suggested the establishment of a joint Anglo-French military control in Egypt, and at the same time expressed a strong opinion adverse to permitting the Sultan to send troops to the country. In December M. Gambetta suggested that a joint Note should be sent to Tewfik Pasha, conveying the assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England. M. Gambetta's draft expressed the resolve of the two Governments to maintain the Khedive on the throne, and to avert by their common efforts all complications internal and external which might menace the established *régime*. Lord Granville accepted this draft, with the reservation that the British Government should not be considered committed to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary,—a reservation in which the French Government participated. The joint Note was delivered to the Khedive on the 8th of January, 1882.

The mutinous movement rapidly developed, and early in May serious disorders were anticipated, and the safety of the European residents in Cairo and Alexandria became the subject of anxiety. On the 11th of May the French Government proposed that the two Powers should send ironclads to Alexandria. The English Government agreed, and the ironclads were sent. On the 30th of May the French Government suggested that France and England should propose to the other Powers and to the Porte a conference on Egyptian affairs. The English Government agreed. On the 16th of June the French Government suggested that the two Powers should propose to the Governments about to take part in the conference a self-denying protocol, worded as follows: "The Government represented by the undersigned undertake (in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the settlement of the affairs of Egypt) not to seek any territorial advantage, nor the concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of any other nation shall not be equally able to obtain". The British Government immediately assented. Meanwhile the insurgents at Alexandria were strengthening the fortifications and mounting additional guns, and it was understood that the object of these preparations was either to drive the ships of the two Powers from their stations or to endanger their egress from the harbour.

On the 3rd of July the British admiral was instructed to prevent any attempt to bar the channel into the port. He was to inform the military commander that he had orders to prevent work being resumed on the earthworks or fresh guns mounted, and that if such work was not immediately discontinued he was to destroy the earthworks and silence the batteries, if they should open fire, after sufficient notice to the population, shipping, and foreign men-of-war. On the 5th the French Government informed the British Government that they could not send similar instructions to the French admiral because it would involve an act of offensive hostility against Egypt, in which they could not take part without violating the constitution, which prohibited their making war without the consent of the Chambers.

On the 11th of July the forts at Alexandria were destroyed by the British fleet. Meanwhile the conference was sitting at Constantinople. The Porte in the first instance declined to take part in it. The French and English Governments induced the Powers to present identic notes to the Porte urging the Sultan to send troops to Egypt for the suppression of the revolt, making it, however, a condition of their assent that the Sultan should first of all proclaim Arabi a rebel. The Sultan hesitated to comply with this condition. The conference was unable to come to any other agreement regarding the mode in which order was

to be restored in Egypt, and was unwilling to give a mandate for this purpose to any Power or Powers. On the 20th of July, upon the news that the rebels had blocked the Mahmoudieh Canal, and that Arabi had issued a proclamation against the Khedive, the British and French Governments decided to send an expedition to Egypt for the restoration of order and of the Khedive's authority. This was the necessary consequence of the policy embodied in the Salisbury-Waddington Agreement, and in the Granville-Gambetta Note. The Italian Government was invited to co-operate, but declined; and the prospect of French assistance came to an end when, on the 29th of July, the French Chamber by a large majority threw out the Suez Canal Credit Bill. Until that date the French Government had participated in the naval measures taken for the protection of the Suez Canal; but after the vote of the Chamber even this co-operation was withdrawn. On the 13th of September the Egyptian insurgents were defeated at Tel-el-kebir, and on the 14th the citadel of Cairo was occupied by British troops.

We can now see that the events of 1882 were the necessary outcome of conditions which had been prepared by the whole history of Egypt and of Europe. Twelve centuries of Islam had left the Egyptian population without any of the elements of character out of which a stable and progressive Government could shape itself. The Turkish pashas and the Turkish officials

who were superimposed upon the working population were absolutely incapable of beneficent creation. The rule of the Sultan was a thing of the past, represented now only by the annual tribute. There could be no question of restoring Egypt to the Sultan, for its quasi-independent position had been established by the repeated intervention of the European Powers.

The first step of intervention, the establishment of the mixed courts, was an international act. The earlier measures by which it was sought to avoid the bankruptcy of Egypt were taken by the Khedive Ismail either of his own accord or at the suggestion of France, and the British Government was no party to them. The French Government, indeed, retained at this period all its former anxiety for a position of peculiar influence over Egypt; but France was isolated in Europe, and it would have been impossible for her to strengthen her influence in Egypt to the disadvantage of England. The French Government, therefore, invited at every stage the co-operation of England, and it was by consenting to this course that England was gradually drawn into active interference. The English Government seems to have had no other view than to maintain if possible the independence of Egypt, and to allow no other Power to acquire an exclusive position in regard to Egyptian affairs.

The English abstention lasted until the deposition of Ismail, in which Austria² was the prime mover. Eng-

land then agreed to nominate one of the controllers, and joined with France in the creation of the International Commission, which resulted in the Law of Liquidation, the second international act to which all the Powers were parties. The dual control meant no more than that France and England each of them nominated one of two officers, whose business was to check the execution of the financial arrangements made under the authority of all the Powers.

The disturbances which eventually led to the military occupation were in reality a revolt against the economies necessitated by the international European control of the finances. It was France that proposed the military intervention, that resisted the plan of an intervention by the Sultan, and that suggested the despatch of ironclads to Alexandria. To all these measures the British Government agreed from a desire to meet as far as might be the wishes of France. At the critical moment the French suddenly withdrew, and England was obliged to act alone.

In July, 1882, when the French Government, in deference to the unmistakable wish of the French nation at the time, decided to abstain from all intervention, the situation in Egypt was such that nothing but a prompt and effective military occupation could have saved the country from utter ruin. The action into which England was thus led received at the time the tacit assent of all the Powers. The necessity of inter-

vention was patent, and the right and the duty of Great Britain to make herself responsible for the restoration of order in Egypt were recognised by Europe.¹ England had a free hand to carry out a

¹The substantial nature of the British interest in Egypt in contrast with the imaginary nature of the French interest could hardly be better expressed than in the despatch of the 17th October, 1881, from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French agent at Cairo. "France," says this despatch, "has in Egypt, as in all that part of the East, secular traditions which have created for her a prestige and an authority which she cannot allow to be diminished. At the close of the last century our expedition, half scientific, half military, resuscitated Egypt, which, since then, has not ceased to be the object of our solicitude and of that of Europe. It was a French officer who organised the Egyptian army under Mehemet Ali. In 1840 France risked European war to support the rights of the viceroy. Fifteen years afterwards she undertook and completed in a few years the Suez Canal, which has opened a new route for the trade of the world ; and the prodigious development of the traffic which passes through it already proves the utility of this work. Lastly, France has in all parts of the country a very numerous colony which has the right to count upon the most effectual protection from her.

"England on her side has a position which, without being the same, is not less considerable. If her colony is far from being so numerous, if her share in the construction of the Suez Canal was not so important, she furnishes almost the whole of its clients ; for her vessels of all sorts which traverse the canal form nearly four-fifths of the whole traffic. Moreover, the canal which joins the Mediterranean to the Red Sea is henceforth for Great Britain the indispensable route which brings her into relation with that incomparable colony of 250,000,000 subjects which she possesses in India."

policy that was marked in advance with the approval of the French Government.

What was the nature of this policy? It was necessary to the world, and above all to India and England, that there should be permanent, unshakable order in the country upon which the Suez Canal depends. There were too many European interests in Egypt to permit its being the scene of the cataclysms through which even civilised nations pass in the process of evolving a government out of the ruins of a system that has collapsed. The cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians" raised by Arabi was not without justification; yet a country exists not for itself only, but for the world; and the success of Arabi meant the temporary relapse of Egypt into barbarism, the prevalence of anarchy at a vital point in the great machine of civilisation. The world could not allow its mechanism to be thus clogged. The purpose of the British intervention was to supply government at a point where anarchy was intolerable. Thus the first duty of England was to create in Egypt that strong and stable government which is required by Europe in a region closely connected with it by traffic and travel. This was an obligation to Europe, and it carried with it the duty to secure the fulfilment of Egypt's obligations, the punctual payment of the tribute and of the debt, and the assured administration of justice to the foreign residents. But there was another requirement, founded in the English character,

which is peculiarly sensitive to the duties imposed by power. For five and twenty centuries the Egyptians had toiled for foreign masters. Had not the time come when they too might learn the lesson of civilisation, and might be given a government that should uplift rather than depress them? From the first Ptolemy to Ismail, the taxgatherer's hand had been heavy. A just government might stay this grasping hand and infuse the hope that incites to spontaneous work, the fountain of character. Thus might be laid the foundations of a new Egypt, in which the government of ancient days should be reproduced in the modern spirit of freedom. Egypt would then be for the Egyptians and for the world.

This last requirement was in one sense the most important, for it was evident that until Egypt could walk alone she must be kept in leading strings; in other words, the superintendence of Egypt by England was bound to continue until the establishment of an Egyptian Government able of itself to fulfil the needs of Egypt and of Europe.

Self-government, however, cannot be imposed upon a community from without. Wherever it exists it is the outcome of a national character, formed by centuries of discipline and effort. It is unknown to the Mahomedan world; even in those parts of India where Mahomedans have longest been subject to British administration, it is not thought by the most sanguine that the time has yet come when the controlling hand

of England could with advantage be withdrawn. In the education of a nation, time is measured not by years but by centuries.

It would seem incredible if it were not true that the British ministry, at the moment of the despatch of its expedition to Egypt, announced to the Powers that the occupation was to be temporary, and that the British troops would be withdrawn so soon as order was restored. This promise was afterwards repeated, and the meaning of the word "temporary" was explained by a statement of the number of months which it was thought under favourable circumstances might suffice for the fulfilment of the task. The Cabinet upon which was imposed, by the force of circumstances, by the consent of the world, by every obligation of interest and duty, the task of restoring the government of the Pharaohs, and at the same time of infusing into it the modern ideals of humanity, progress, and freedom, met this unprecedented responsibility with the perfectly gratuitous assurance of its intention to escape from it at the earliest possible opportunity.¹

The explanation of this strange aberration is to be found in the habit by which English Cabinets invariably shrink from any large view of policy. Every decision is postponed as long as it can possibly be postponed, and when action is inevitable nothing is considered but

¹ "Che fece per viltate il gran rifiuto." *Inferno*, iii. 56.

the situation of the moment. To look before and after, to consider the history of half a century that is over, or the possibilities of half a century to come, is regarded as unpractical. Cabinets will tolerate anything but a policy shaped in accordance with an intelligible design. Thus the Egyptian question in 1882 had never been thought out by the Government.

The idea that prevailed in the Cabinet was that a British occupation of Egypt would, so long as it lasted, be incompatible with the good relations that had for some time prevailed between England and France. In this view there was an element of truth; but a more superficial view of the truth never influenced a ministry. The object of French policy was to make Egypt French. This had been twice frustrated without rendering more difficult, except for a time, the good relations of England with France. The French by their inaction acquiesced in the British occupation, and the whole world expected that it would be permanent. It would have been impossible for the French Government to demand other assurances in regard to the future of Egypt than those which they had themselves given in 1881 with regard to the future of Tunis. It was, of course, conceivable that at some future time France might demand the evacuation of Egypt under threat of war; and it appears that the possibility of such a threat was the real cause of the British declaration. But if the policy of Great Britain is to be guided not

by her own interests or duties but with a view to the avoidance, without regard to their justice or injustice, of acts at which France may take offence, the ultimate consequence must be, not merely the evacuation of Egypt, but the acquiescence in the French annexation of that country and of any other country, British or foreign, which it may please the French Government to demand.

The British Cabinet may have thought that Great Britain would be unable successfully to conduct a war in resistance to a French demand for the evacuation of Egypt. If this were the case, the right policy was, not to interfere in Egypt, under a promise to withdraw from the country, but to abstain from intervention and to devote the whole of the resources of the empire to such preparations as would ensure that no future measure of policy, considered to be right in itself, and to be called for by British interests, should be abandoned for fear of France.

It may be said the promises of evacuation were involved in the self-denying protocol, but this is not the case. The protocol referred only to arrangements which might be made in consequence of the concerted action of the Powers. The British intervention resulted from no such arrangement, and the Government therefore was not bound by the protocol.¹

¹ That the British Government in 1882 had a free hand in Egypt is admitted by the very able and well-informed French critic who discussed the Egyptian question in two elaborate essays published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in November, 1891.

The promised withdrawal has proved to be impossible. To-day, after the occupation has lasted twelve years, there is not a public man in Europe who supposes that if the controlling hand of Great Britain were withdrawn, the order which exists in Egypt would be preserved for a fortnight. There is not a Power in Europe that would not be embarrassed by a British evacuation of Egypt; and even the French Government would be the first to urge that the British regiments should remain in the citadel of Cairo, if it were perfectly certain that French troops could by no possibility take their place.

The result of the short-sighted policy which gave these promises has been to embarrass at every turn the hands of the British Government. The fiction that Egypt is a part of the Turkish Empire has been maintained, with the result that the Egyptian taxpayers, already burdened with the payment of interest upon debt of which but a tithe was contracted in their behalf, and which is equal in amount to the whole cost of governing the country, must continue to pay a heavy tribute to the Sultan. Another fiction is that the Khedive is the ruler of the country. The consequence of this is that the Powers, who cannot be expected to trust a Turkish pasha, maintain the Capitulations, the Mixed Courts, and the Law of Liquidation. Thus the hands of the Englishmen, who in spite of these fictions do in fact superintend the administration of Egypt, are tied. In

1884 it was necessary to contract a new loan to the amount of some nine millions sterling. This could not be done without the consent of the Treasury of the Debt. But the Treasury is managed by a number of foreign representatives, whose instructions are drawn up not in the interest of Egypt but with a view to promote the policies of their several Governments. Some of these Governments had quarrels with Great Britain. Germany, for example, desired the acquiescence of Great Britain in transactions detrimental to English interests, and of which the equity was more than doubtful, concerning various colonies. The simplest mode of bringing pressure to bear on Great Britain was to cause a dead-lock in the administration of Egypt; and this could be effected at any time by a refusal to admit any modification of the Law of Liquidation. In this way, in 1884, the proposed loan was prevented, and a conference called by Great Britain with a view to obtaining the consent of the Powers was also rendered abortive. In 1885, however, England had so far surrendered to Germany and France in the various colonial disputes that she was allowed to negotiate a treaty permitting the necessary loan and securing for it the guarantee of the Powers.

At every stage the administration of Egypt is rendered difficult by the facilities afforded to the representatives of all the Powers to interfere, to protest, or even to exercise a veto.

In spite of these obstacles very much has been accomplished. The country is solvent, the interest on the debt is paid with perfect regularity, and the residue of revenue has been so carefully managed that it has been possible to regulate and to improve irrigation with more success than has been known since the age of the Ptolemies. At the present time a number of schemes are under consideration for the construction of a great reservoir in Upper Egypt, similar in purpose to that which the Pharaohs created in the Fayoum. The area of land under cultivation has been enormously increased. Forced labour has been abolished. Taxation has been rendered less burdensome, more equitable, and more productive. The first steps have been taken towards purifying and strengthening the administration of justice. But the chief work, the moral education of the people, can hardly be said to have begun.

Everything that is possible in the conditions has been done to encourage the Egyptians to those habits of local administration which may be the germs of a political life. But the first element of discipline is wanting, because there is no confidence in the permanence of any of the institutions of the country. All those classes that under normal conditions would be on the side of government are against it. They look to the future, and they are told that in the future the British occupation will have ceased. They are thus of necessity in the position of the malcontents under a

despotic monarch, who usually centre their hopes in the heir-apparent. In Egypt each class thinks itself the heir-apparent: there is the party of the Khedive; the party of the Turkish caste which monopolised the offices in the days of Ismail; and last, but not least, there is the French party.

The only remedy for this uncertainty lies in the recognition of the plain truth, that England cannot, consistently with the responsibilities which she has undertaken, abandon Egypt.

By the battle of Tel-el-kebir Great Britain stepped into a position analogous to that of a trustee, responsible morally both to Egypt and to Europe. A trustee in private life, however, can be called to account before the courts. England has no such legal responsibility. She has no mandate from Europe, and the European interest she represents is chiefly her own. The Egyptians did not invite her, and to them as to Europe she is accountable only at the bar of history. The Cabinet of 1882 took a strange view of this responsibility. A native body-guard was to be organised to keep the Khedive in his place; but it was not made clear how the men of this force, gendarmerie or native troops, were to have implanted in them, after the argument furnished by the presence of British bayonets had been removed, the patriotic duty of maintaining the subjection of their countrymen to a Turkish pasha. Self-government was to be created by a draft constitu-

tion. This seems to have been thought an evidence of the liberal character of the British ministry. But to my mind it is impossible to conceive a more profound contempt for constitutional government than is implied in the proposal to establish it by charter in a few months among a people who have for centuries been clay in the hands of oriental despots. The British constitution derives its value not from its forms, but from the character of the people among whom it has arisen. To introduce free institutions into Egypt means, if it is not a mere empty phrase, to recreate the character of the Egyptians, a task which, if it is possible at all, must be carried on persistently through many generations. Lastly, there was the question of the Soudan, where, shortly after the British occupation of Egypt, the movement of the Mahdi was becoming dangerous to the Egyptian dominion. The Cabinet having settled that its chief purpose in Egypt was to withdraw, and seeing that to resettle the Soudan would make withdrawal from Egypt more difficult, shrank from any enterprise in that region. A series of wonderful syllogisms was invented which half convinced the Cabinet and satisfied its partisans that the Egyptian Government alone was responsible for the Soudan, but that the British Government, though responsible for the Egyptian Government, was not responsible for its responsibility in the Soudan. The British public saw more clearly; and the Cabinet was compelled reluctantly

to embark upon a course of the necessity and justice of which it was not convinced, with the result that its enterprises were too late and ended in disaster. The Soudan has relapsed into barbarism, and the first consequence has been a general recrudescence of savagery throughout the interior of Africa.

Each of these questions is still open. Sooner or later Great Britain will be compelled, unless she is to renounce her calling and commit suicide, to recognise and to assert her responsibility for the future of Egypt and for the civilisation of the Soudan. The protectorate of Egypt, with its accompaniments of the guarantee or purchase of the debt, the abolition of the capitulations, and the opening of the Soudan under British authority, has been put off. But all these measures are as urgently required to-day as they were ten years ago, and the problems shirked by the Cabinet of 1882 will yet have to be solved in far more difficult conditions.

The failures of 1882 and of 1885 are due to a false doctrine, to a false interpretation of history, and to a false view of national duty. The tradition of that day was that it is right to shrink from the responsibilities of empire, and that the British Empire was already too extensive.

I venture to denounce this tradition. What is the meaning of the British Empire in the sense in which it was thought too extensive? No one suggests that the colonies inhabited by British settlers are an evil, or that

they can be too large or too numerous. The Empire in this sense means the government which England supplies to countries which before her advent were a prey to anarchy,—primarily the government that has been set up in India. Empire in this sense is a part of the purpose for which Great Britain exists. The greatness of England lies, first of all, in the character of the best Englishmen, by which they are pre-eminent for truth, honesty, and duty; and secondly, in the spirit which this character infuses into the administration in British hands of such countries as India. In this spirit government is regarded as a sacred trust, to be exercised for the good of the governed. No doubt there are failings and imperfections. But this character of British administration in the Empire is universally recognised. Empire in the sense of dominion with a merely selfish purpose is impossible for England, without a perversion of the national character; and undoubtedly it is necessary jealously to watch over enterprises of conquest which are sometimes undertaken in her name. But the chief title of England to moral greatness is, not that her people have made themselves new homes in America and Australia, but that to hundreds of millions in the East the British Government generation after generation has meant peace, order, and justice. The most perfect type of British Empire is in Egypt, where England has taken nothing for herself, so that the country is not even counted among British

possessions. Without annexation, without even a protectorate, without one single advantage for Englishmen that is not open to men of any other nation, Great Britain is silently doing in Egypt a work of which the achievement will be her greatest glory.

I have spoken strongly, perhaps bitterly, of the blunders, as they seem to me, of the past. But even these strange fallings off from duty will have been useful if they result in a clearer conception for the future. It may in the long run be better that the attempt was made to evade the inevitable in Egypt. To have annexed the country would have been to stimulate the more ignoble motives of public life and policy, to have declared a protectorate would have lent colour to the suspicion of a selfish end. The work that has been done by the English in Egypt has had time to speak for itself; and to-day all that is necessary is, not to wave the British flag, but to remove all doubt as to the national determination to go on with the work, and to settle those claims which are mere hindrances to its progress, whether they are set up by the bondholders, the consuls, or the Khedive. No European and no British purpose would now be served by withdrawal from Egypt. To my mind a voluntary withdrawal would be the abandonment of the highest trust which the nation possesses, and be equivalent to its moral collapse. It is likely enough that some other Power may challenge our position in Egypt, and

offer to compel us to withdraw. In that case resistance would, I conceive, be an inexorable duty ; and it seems to me the condemnation of the present generation of our statesmen, that there is a doubt as to this duty or as to the adequacy of England's power to fulfil it.

The critic like the historian should be impartial,—not indeed in the sense that he should be unable to make up his mind and should have no opinion of his own, but that he should endeavour to put himself in the place of those whose conduct he censures and to appreciate from their point of view the motives by which it was inspired. The view which I have given of British policy in Egypt requires to be supplemented by an examination of the ideas by which it was sought to justify the pledges that seem to me to have been unnecessary. In the debate on the first vote of credit, Mr. Gladstone expressed the intention of his Government to submit the definite settlement of the Egyptian question to the concert of Europe. This was the fundamental pledge, and I do not think that the spirit which dictated it is open to criticism. The British intervention was undoubtedly undertaken in behalf of Europe. It was an assertion of European interests, of which, however, the British interest was by far the greatest component. The concert of Europe is unsuited for such a purpose, for it implies the absolute unanimity of the six great Powers. Mr. Gladstone in 1880, in a eulogy of the concert of Europe, had said :

"Common action means common objects ; and the only objects for which you can unite together the Powers of Europe are objects connected with the common good of them all". This is perfectly true ; the Powers will not agree except for a purpose in the promotion of which each one of them is interested ; but it does not follow that where such a purpose exists they will agree. So far from being the instrument by which European ends are promoted, the concert of Europe is the most convenient instrument by which any one Power can prevent the attainment of an object desired by all the others, but disagreeable to itself. There is a crucial instance in the case of Bulgaria. The Russian Government at the Congress of Berlin proposed that the Prince of Bulgaria should be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Porte with the assent of the Powers. Lord Salisbury objected to allowing the legality of the appointment of a Prince of Bulgaria to depend on the concert of Europe, because such an arrangement would enable Russia to make it impossible for Bulgaria to have a legally constituted Government. The objection was waived, apparently because the other Powers attached no importance to the legality of a Bulgarian Government ; but Lord Salisbury's prediction has been verified, and Russia has made precisely that use of the European concert which Lord Salisbury predicted.

In the case of Egypt there was a long-standing opposition between English and French aims. To make

the fate of Egypt depend upon the concert of Europe was to give France a handle, by which, though at the critical moment she was unable to fulfil the duty which she had imposed upon herself, and though she thereby threw upon England the responsibilities and the sacrifices which it involved, she could in future paralyse the efforts of England to carry out a purpose, the European nature of which France herself most fully admitted.

Thus it seems to me that the pledges given by England in regard to Egypt were based upon a profound misapprehension of the true nature of Europe and upon a mistaken interpretation of history. It is, perhaps, due to the Government that gave them to explain its motives and to record its good intentions; but good intentions do not constitute statesmanship, and the noblest sentiments will never supply the want of a true policy—that is, a policy founded upon a knowledge of the world as it really is.

VII.

A WARNING FROM GERMANY.

THE Cabinet that came into office in April, 1880, was convinced that the British Empire was already so extensive as to be excessively hard of management, and it shrank from anything that could increase it. No doubt the Empire cannot be well governed without a plan, without a clear conception of its nature and purpose, and of the conditions of its security and prosperity. Yet a proper classification shows that it is neither so unmanageable nor so disproportionate to the strength of Great Britain as some descriptions would convey. Canada and Australia govern themselves. India is well able, with moderate assistance from England, to defend its own frontiers, provided only that a consistent deliberate policy in regard to them is maintained by the supreme government. The group of colonies at the Cape certainly at that time required attention; but their prosperity demanded, above all, a policy based upon thorough knowledge of their conditions. The rest of the Empire consisted of strips of coast and of islands, all of which were secure against attack, so long as the British navy was equal to all combinations. In

none of them could more than a slight and temporary exertion of force ever be needed to maintain the British authority. A very considerable increase of such coast districts and islands would be possible without any additional effort for their protection ; for British authority in such places stands or falls with the command of the sea. If the navy is what it must be to secure British independence, not another man or ship is needed to secure as many coasts and islands as the uncivilised world contains. The expense of their local administration is not a serious burden upon the national finance.

Perhaps the Cabinet of 1880 was needlessly alarmed at the extent of the Empire. It hardly seemed to have appreciated its purpose to bring government to regions where there is no government, and to be the intermediary between Europe, that is civilisation, and barbarism, or, what is next to barbarism, the decayed Mahommedan world. Still less did it realise that so far from exhausting England, the enterprises beyond the sea are her real work, and that the source of strength lies not so much in wealth, as in energy, that is in action. Accordingly, in the period beginning in 1880 the British Empire appears in a condition of paralysis. Its spontaneous growth is checked, and it acts only under the stimulus of a prick from without.

The Cabinet of 1880 had another fixed belief. The prime object of policy to their mind was peace. Quarrels with other nations were to be avoided. If

they were forced upon us, they were to be made up by concessions. The idea of friendship between nation and nation was deeply rooted in their minds, and they were ready to make considerable sacrifices to it. It so happens, however, that there is no such thing on the particular globe which we inhabit. Here, each nation has its own ends to pursue, and does pursue them uninterruptedly by all available means: by trade, by negotiation, by force, sometimes by fraud. Gratitude between nation and nation does not exist, though there are movements of feeling, of sympathy, and of antipathy often most erratic. The Cabinet paid heavy prices for this chimera of friendship without ever obtaining a return. It was to the friendship of France that in 1882 the opportunity was sacrificed of establishing upon a sound footing the government of Egypt, necessarily then, and thereafter, under British supervision. But the friendship of France has not been obtained, and, instead, a most inconvenient handle has been given to her hostility.

The counterpart to the shortsightedness and indecision of this policy in relation to France is to be found in the attitude which the same Cabinet maintained towards Germany, in regard to the strange diplomacy with which that Power accompanied her first attempts at colonial enterprise.

The real nature of these transactions is to this day absolutely unknown, both in Germany and in England,

except to the very few persons who have the opportunity and the inclination to study State Papers. The German White books were prepared with a view to a German parliamentary controversy, and omit essential facts. The English Blue books, which do contain the facts, have never received proper attention in this country, and can hardly be expected to be studied abroad, except by historians.

The action of the German Government in 1884 and in the early part of 1885 reveals a conception of moral obligation quite dissimilar to that which prevailed in England, and to that which has usually been believed to prevail in Germany also. But this action seems to have met with widespread, almost universal approval in Germany. Thus, at first sight, it would appear as though Germany and England were absolutely sundered, and that there is not between them that community of moral judgment which is the only possible basis of relation. I cannot for a moment believe this to be the case, and I am driven to infer that the German approval of Bismarck's action was given, not to the transactions I am about to describe, but to an imaginary series of transactions submitted for their judgment, and different in character to those which really took place.

The German colonial movement had two distinct sources.

After the foundation of the Empire it was observed with great regret that the outflow of German emigrants, going principally to the United States, was

not diminished, and there was a very natural feeling that this drain upon the population might be regarded with greater equanimity if the stream of emigrants could be directed to some country where a new Germany, a new state of German nationality, could grow up under German auspices. It is evident that as no territory suitable for this purpose was vacant this idea could not be more than a pious wish. The desire was, however, deeply felt and widely spread, especially in South Germany.

At the same time a number of Hamburg traders had quite different views. They were anxious to secure for their own houses in the competition against foreign traders in certain parts of the world the great advantage of Government interference. The regions in question were almost without exception absolutely unsuited for the settlement of Europeans. But a skilful agitation encouraged by the Government enabled these traders to represent their purpose as identical with that which had taken so strong a hold upon the popular imagination; so that in the summer of 1884 Germany was ablaze with enthusiasm for German colonies, where the German race was to spread, to be founded in those tropical regions of Africa where the only colonies possible are plantations worked by negroes, under the supervision of the few Europeans who are willing for a few years to sacrifice health and home in return for a good salary.

In the beginnings of the colonial movement Prince Bismarck had explained his own view of the subject. He disapproved of territorial acquisitions made by a Government with a view to the possible future creation of colonies; but he thought that where German traders were established in regions not under the authority of any civilised Power it was the duty of the German Government to extend to them its protection and support. This duty he did not think the Government ought to undertake except with full assurance of the sympathy of the nation, a sympathy of which at that time he saw no evidence. This view had been made known to the British Government; and even in 1884, though at that time the German people was deeply agitated on the subject of colonial acquisitions, Lord Granville continued until the middle of June to receive through the proper official channels assurances that the attitude and the intention of the German Government were unchanged.

The attention of the advocates of German colonial policy was directed to three regions.

The Pacific had been reconnoitred by the pioneers of German trade with remarkable sagacity. In some of the island groups, such as the Carolines, an almost unoccupied field had been found. Here was developed a lucrative business, chiefly in cocoanut husks, in which there was no noteworthy competition. In the Samoa and Fiji groups, Germans, along with other Europeans,

took part in those doubtful transactions by which the natives sold, or professed to sell, portions of their land. New Guinea, outside the Dutch territory in the western half of the island, was untouched by settlers either German or English, but there were one or two German establishments on the small islands lying off the north coast. In one portion of the north coast of New Guinea a Russian traveller, Baron Miklouho-Maclay, had spent several years, had learned the native language, and become so intimate with the natives that they looked upon him as their helper and protector. He was especially anxious to preserve them from the unhappy fate that has so often befallen aboriginal races under the influence of the sudden inrush of Europeans.

On the east coast of Africa the extensive empire of the Sultan of Zanzibar was the seat of a considerable trade in the hands chiefly of British subjects, many of them Indian. The influence of the British consul, Sir John Kirk, had for many years been so great that, although there seems to have been no idea of a British acquisition of the country, he was regarded as practically the Prime Minister of the Sultan.

On the west coast of Africa whatever trade there was had for several generations been almost exclusively in British hands. There were small English settlements on the Gambia and on the Gold Coast dating from the reign of Queen Elizabeth. From 1805, when the final establishment of the English command of the

sea placed all the coasts of Africa at the mercy of Great Britain, until 1884, the idea of territorial acquisition on these coasts had not been entertained in this country. The colonies at the Cape had naturally enlarged and extended themselves; but the principal use made by England of her sea power in regard to Africa had been the destruction of the slave trade, a process which had led to the founding of a third small colony at Sierra Leone, as a refuge for freed slaves, and to the acquisition of Lagos, as a convenient station for the suppression of the traffic. In more recent times a few German houses had sprung up under the shelter of British influence; and the energy and ability of their managers had made some of them formidable competitors at particular points.

When, in 1883, the German Government asked the Senates of Bremen and Hamburg to lay before it any complaints or desires in regard to the trade of these towns with West Africa, the Hamburg Senate reported that England in all the treaties which she had made with the native chiefs for the suppression of the slave trade had stipulated for free and unhindered trade; that this stipulation had never been framed for the exclusive benefit of Englishmen, and that most of the treaties expressly bargained that the privileges granted should be given to the "subjects of the Queen of England and all European Powers friendly to her". "The German firms," the report goes on to say, "especially those estab-

lished at Cameroons, gratefully recognise the ready goodwill with which the English consuls and English ships of war have often protected their interests with the same energy that they would have employed in the case of English firms. This was especially the case quite recently in regard to conflicts with the chiefs at Cameroons."

In the coast region north of the Cape Colony, extending as far as the southern limit of Portuguese territory, there was little trade. In 1796 possession had been taken of the whole of this coast in the name of King George; but this action had never been followed up. In 1867 the Governor of the Cape Colony had suggested the annexation of this territory, but the home government had refused to entertain the proposal. In 1869 German missionaries stationed in Namaqua and Damara Land had asked for British protection and for the British annexation of Walfisch Bay, and still better of the whole country. A British commissioner was sent from the Cape, and succeeded in pacifying the natives. Walfisch Bay was eventually annexed in 1878; but the British Government at that time, in view of the many difficulties pending in South Africa, refused to countenance any further extension in these parts. In 1880 there was again a war between Damaras and Namaquas; and the German Government asked that, as there could be no independent proceedings on the part of Germany for the protection of the life and property of its subjects in these regions, any measures intended

for the protection of life and property of English subjects might be extended to the German missionaries and traders. The reply was given that this would be done; but it was pointed out that her Majesty's Government could not be responsible for what might take place outside British territory, which included only Walfisch Bay, and a very small portion of country immediately surrounding it. Between 1860 and 1880, various British traders had bought from native chiefs concessions, either in the shape of lands or mining rights, and the islands off the coast had most of them been formally annexed by Great Britain.

Bismarck's purpose from the beginning can hardly be described as friendly to England. Not that he meant to bring about a war, for with the first shot his chance of obtaining a colony would have vanished. But he intended to appropriate districts in which, as no one knew better than he, Great Britain had substantial interests. He had a perfect legal right to annex, without consulting England, any districts where the Queen's authority had not been proclaimed. The English might have been annoyed, they might have considered such a proceeding unfriendly, as no doubt it would have been. But they would not have resented it, and would probably merely have inferred that it was time to annex whatever remaining coasts had a sufficient claim upon them.

The alternative open to Bismarck was frankly to

explain his purpose and to obtain by amicable negotiation the assent of Great Britain to those acquisitions which he desired to make. In this case a certain amount of mutual accommodation would have been necessary; and as Germany had no possessions beyond sea, the equivalent for English concessions would have been found in German support to English policy in general European affairs. That this was the proper course to have pursued is shown by the elaborate attempts made by Bismarck to prove to his German supporters that he had attempted it, but that his offers had been refused by England.

The course which he actually adopted was at every point and at every stage to deceive the English ministry, to profess to open friendly negotiations, and under cover of this proceeding, by which the suspicions they might have had were disarmed, to effect the annexations, and then, while they, being themselves friendly, had accepted Bismarck's assurances in good faith, and were trying to clear up what they supposed were misunderstandings, to denounce them to Germany as jealous intriguers against German colonial enterprise. When the German public had been roused to a profound resentment against England, Bismarck left the crop of hatred to grow, and settled the disputes he had created between Germany and England by negotiations in which he conceded every point to which England attached serious importance.

The net result was that Germany obtained some colonies of no very great value; that at least half of the population of Germany conceived a feeling of profound animosity to England, of which the English public was and is unconscious, and that all those Englishmen (outside the Cabinet) who were aware of the nature of these transactions—unfortunately, this knowledge reached only a few—perceived the danger attending any political compact or treaty with a state in which Bismarck's influence prevailed.

The first case was Angra Pequena. In February, 1883, Bismarck informed the Foreign Office that a German trader, named Lüderitz, had bought 150 square miles of land at Angra Pequena, from a Hottentot chief, and asked whether England was in a position to protect him. Bismarck's object in putting this question was not to obtain English protection for Herr Lüderitz, but to extract from the Foreign Office an admission that the district of Angra Pequena did not belong to England. This plan was deranged by Lord Granville's reply that the Queen's sovereignty had been proclaimed only at certain points on the coast; but that any claim to sovereignty by a foreign Power, between the Orange River and Cape Frio, would infringe the legitimate rights of England.

This answer puzzled Bismarck. He knew that it was true; and he himself soon afterwards pressed to the uttermost the doctrine of a right to exclude other Powers from

unannexed territory in the neighbourhood of an existing colony. But the German public was easily misled on this point. In a despatch addressed to Count Herbert Bismarck (then in charge of the German Embassy at London), which was subsequently published in Germany,¹ the Prince wrote that England was not treating Germany on equal terms; and quoted as proof the declaration that England has a right to exclude foreign Powers from a region in which the Queen's sovereignty was not established.

Lord Granville meanwhile, having taken the original question to mean what it said, was in communication with the Cape Colony for the annexation to the Cape, which he believed was what Bismarck desired, of the district in question. Thereupon Bismarck protested, declared that Germany had a right to protect Herr Lüderitz—which no one had ever denied—and complained of the unfriendliness of the British Government. Lord Granville, to whom Bismarck's purpose was not yet clear, and who considered himself bound by the declaration that the Queen's sovereignty had not been proclaimed, replied that there could be no doubt of Germany's right to protect the German factories.

Bismarck then sent a man-of-war to annex the whole

¹ Dated June 10, 1884, and written, not for Lord Granville, to whom its contents were not communicated, but for the German public. From this despatch I take the explanation just given of the purpose of Prince Bismarck's questions.

coast, from the Orange River to Cape Frio; and Lord Granville, on hearing of this, instructed the Colonial Government to abandon its proposed annexations in the same region, and wrote to say that England would welcome Germany as a neighbour to the Cape Colony. Bismarck then sent word that this was the first step in the direction which he had hoped that British policy would take.

It is to be regretted that the English Cabinet tolerated this chicanery. The English claims, by exploration, previous annexation, and occupation, fully justified the claim to exclusive influence, which Germany by her requests for protection to missionaries and others had herself repeatedly recognised. There was, indeed, no reason to object to a German acquisition of the country, except the manner in which it was effected; but it is hard to believe that the dignity of England would not have been better maintained by a refusal to recognise the high-handed procedure by which an English claim, whether well founded or not, was brushed on one side.

Angra Pequena was the first and the least objectionable of the series of German proceedings. In April, 1884, the Foreign Office received a note from the German Embassy, saying that Dr. Nachtigal, a German consul, was about to visit the West Coast of Africa "in order to complete the information of the German Foreign Office on the state of German commerce on

that coast"; and Lord Granville was asked to cause the British authorities on the coast to be furnished with suitable recommendations. This request was at once complied with. On the 19th of July the English Consul Hewett reached Cameroons for the purpose of accepting on behalf of Great Britain the cession of the district, which had been repeatedly offered by the native chiefs. He found the German flag flying, and learned that the district had been annexed by Dr. Nachtigal five days previously. He thereupon appointed a vice-consul, Mr. Buchan, whom he instructed to support the German authorities, and to discountenance resistance to them by the native party opposed to the Germans. At the same time, in accordance with his instructions, he annexed the English missionary settlement of Victoria in Ambas Bay, which the German consul had not visited nor annexed.

There were established at Cameroons six English firms, some of whom had been there for very many years, and two German firms, of which the oldest had been there only twenty-five years. The native population spoke English; and the German treaty with the chiefs was written in English. In 1879 and in 1881 the chiefs had petitioned the English Government to annex their territory; and in 1883 the Government had decided to accept their petition, of which the consequence was the mission of Consul Hewett. The German traders, whose obligations to the British have been already

described in their own words, were of course aware that these negotiations were in progress, and Dr. Nachtigal had been sent by Bismarck in great haste expressly to forestall the English. The instructions given him were written for Bismarck by Herr Woermann, one of the German merchants at Cameroons. These merchants, no doubt, were acting in their own interests, and in accordance with their own character, which it is for their own countrymen to judge. Bismarck was quite entitled, if he wished, to organise this cutting-out expedition to a point in which he knew the precise nature of the British interest. His request for English recommendations to Dr. Nachtigal was made, as he subsequently officially explained, to throw dust in the eyes of Lord Granville. This conduct, too, it is for Germany to judge. But Germany has perhaps not been aware that Bismarck afterwards stated, what was not true, that the real nature of Dr. Nachtigal's mission had been disclosed to the British Government. When this untruth was pointed out to him Bismarck defended himself, but at the same time admitted the untruth, by saying, that if he had told the English Government they would have been too quick for him. To run up the German flag over a group of English traders for the benefit of their German competitors, in a district where the Germans were under an obligation to the English, where the German negotiators had to use the English language,

and where the German gunboat had to use the English Admiralty chart, was hardly the act of a friendly state.

The request for help to Dr. Nachtigal, coupled with the suppression of the truth concerning his mission, was not in keeping with the German character, which is loyal and frank. But there were other strange acts. At Hickory Town, on the right bank of the Cameroons river, was a chief called Lock Preso who refused to sign the German treaty, or to allow the German flag to be hoisted in his territory. Dr. Nachtigal, having been told by his traders that Lock Preso was a subordinate chief, "thought I might without more ado consider Hickory Town as part of the district dealt with by the treaty, and left instructions for suitable means of obtaining Lock Preso's acquiescence". The treaty was obtained from those chiefs who did sign it, by means not usual in civilised countries. It was unpopular with the natives, who wished to be under England. The English merchants and the vice-consul told them to accept the position of German subjects, and to keep the peace. But there were disturbances, and in December Rear-Admiral Knorr, after a meeting of the Germans on the spot, at which they agreed that the faction hostile to Germany had the upper hand among the natives (these natives had, in fact, attacked one of the towns), and further that the natives of Hickory Town did not believe themselves subject to Germany, decided to attack and burn Hickory Town,

and to take its chief Lock Preso alive or dead. At the same time the admiral issued a proclamation (in English) beginning: "In the Imperial German Protectorate of Cameroon the public peace has been disturbed, apparently by foreign instigation". He sent various complaints against the English merchants to Germany; and these in a speech in the Reichstag Bismarck enumerated, without having investigated them, as so many evidences of British hostility to Germany. They were afterwards promptly refuted. But even if, after the sharp practice of Herr Woermann and his friends, the English traders had made difficulties for the Germans, the Germans could scarcely reproach them without a hypocritical assumption of self-righteousness, nor Bismarck fairly hasten, without the slightest attempt to investigate the matter, to use these charges as a means of exciting hatred against a nation with which he professed to be on friendly terms. But he went further. He protested against the British annexation of Amba Bay (which he well knew had been ordered before the German purpose of annexing Cameroons was known) on the very ground, which he had just denounced as untenable in regard to the Cape Colony, that it was near a German colony, and that Germany had a right to forbid other Powers to place their colonies beside her own. And Amba Bay was the actual property of British missionaries, who had bought it, and been settled there for many years.

Of New Guinea the western part has for many years been a Dutch possession. The coasts were surveyed by British naval officers in 1845-48 and in 1873. Since 1874 British missionaries had been continuously engaged there. In 1883 the eastern part of the island was annexed by the Government of Queensland; but the act was disavowed by Lord Derby, who, however, announced in the House of Lords that it would be regarded "as an unfriendly act if any country attempted to make a settlement on the coast of New Guinea". Early in 1884 Baron de Miklouho-Maclay addressed the British Government on the subject of the natives of the Maclay coast, and received assurances that the value of his influence there should be remembered.

In August, 1884, the German ambassador called on Lord Granville and informed him that "his Government wished to take steps to protect more efficiently those islands, and those parts of islands, in the South Sea Archipelago, where German trade was largely developed and was daily increasing. They desired therefore to come to a friendly understanding with her Majesty's Government as to the general principles to be observed for the protection of subjects of the two countries respectively, and also as to the limits of the islands and territories in which either country is most interested." Count Münster added, "that the wish of the Australian Colonies to settle on the side of New Guinea opposite to Australia and to exclude from that

part of the island settlements or establishments of other countries was regarded by the German Government as perfectly natural. But the German Government were of opinion that there are parts of the wild country on the north side of New Guinea which might be available as a field for German enterprise."

Lord Granville said: "That we had no jealousy of German colonisation unless in any particular case it should clash with the acquired rights of this country. . . . I believed that the Colonial Office would approve of a more precise definition of the places in which the two countries respectively held a predominant position. With regard to New Guinea, on which island Germany had as yet founded no establishment, the German Government knew that communications had been taking place between the Home and Colonial Governments; and I might mention, but at present in confidence, that those communications are nearer a conclusion than is as yet known to the public." After consultation with his colleagues, Lord Granville further informed Count Münster that "the extension of some form of British authority in New Guinea, which will be shortly announced, will only embrace that part of the island which specially interests the Australian Colonies, without prejudice to any territorial questions beyond those limits".

About a month later the German Government proposed that the precise definition of British and German territorial interests in the South Seas should be treated

by a commission, which they suggested should meet at a given spot in the South Sea Archipelago. Lord Granville agreed to the commission, but proposed that it should meet in Europe.

On the 19th of September the British *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berlin delivered to the German Foreign Office a note of which the important passage is: "The result of the communications which have lately been going on between the Home and Colonial Governments is that her Majesty's Government now propose to proclaim and establish the Queen's prerogative over all the coasts of New Guinea, not occupied by the Netherlands Government, except that portion of the north coast comprised between the 145th degree of east longitude and the eastern Dutch boundary. The British Protectorate will also include the small islands immediately adjacent to those portions of the coast over which it is established. The 145th degree of east longitude has been fixed as the western British limit on the northern coast, in order that it should embrace the territory owned by the natives on the Maclay coast, whose claim for British protection has long been under the consideration of her Majesty's Government, and was one of the principal reasons which determined the Cabinet to advise the Queen to assume the responsibility of establishing the Protectorate in New Guinea. The Maclay coast extends to the southward as far as Cape King William, where commences that part of the coast,

extending to the Dutch southern boundary, which for obvious reasons it is indispensable to bring under British control. In making to your Excellency this communication, I am instructed by Earl Granville to add that her Majesty's Government have been actuated by their earnest desire to promote the friendly understanding which the Government of the Emperor have proposed to establish with reference to these territorial questions."

On the 27th of September the German Government replied: "That the projected extension of the British Protectorate in north and north-eastern New Guinea, after the previous declaration of your Excellency" (Lord Granville), "comes unexpectedly to the Imperial Government, and they wish temporarily to reserve to themselves the adoption of any attitude on the subject. According to the conception of the Imperial Government, the delimitation of the areas which interest both sides on that stretch of coast should be the subject of a friendly understanding by means of a commission."

On the 9th of October was delivered the British reply: "That her Majesty's Government have carefully considered the communication on the proposed limit of the Protectorate, and have decided that the declaration to be made shall limit the British Protectorate to the whole of the south coast, including the islands contiguous to it, instead of that which they had at first proposed. This will be done without prejudice to any

territorial question beyond these limits. It is with great satisfaction that her Majesty's Government have come to an arrangement in which they find themselves in perfect accord with Germany. In case any question should arise as to those districts which lie beyond the limits described, her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be better to deal with them diplomatically, than to refer them to the commission which it is proposed to appoint with regard to the islands of the Pacific."

On the 15th of October the German Government made a verbal communication to the following effect: "The Imperial Government take note with satisfaction of the declaration contained in Mr. Scott's Note of the 19th ult." (9th inst. must be meant), "respecting the limits of the British Protectorate in New Guinea, and are glad that her Britannic Majesty's Government are in accord with the Imperial Government on this question. They are willing that the meetings of the commission, to consider certain other points connected with the South Sea, should take place in Europe."

On the 17th of December a telegram from Commodore Erskine at Sydney informed the British Government that the German flag had been hoisted on the north coast of New Guinea from the 141st meridian as far as Huon Gulf, including the Admiralty, Hermit, Anchorite, New Britain and New Ireland groups of islands. The portion of coast thus annexed by Ger-

many extended for three degrees of longitude into the area which Great Britain on the 19th of September had notified an intention to annex, and it embraced the Maclay coast, which had been specially mentioned in the English Note of that date. Lord Granville and Lord Derby both considered that after the previous correspondence, recited above, this annexation constituted a breach of faith on the part of the German Government; and on the 21st of December a telegram was sent to Commodore Erskine: "Send ship to proclaim Protectorate New Guinea between East Cape and Huon Gulf up to German boundary. Hoist flag at various places. Despatch is necessary." Of this step the German Government was, of course, not informed until a later date; but a protest against the German annexation was immediately delivered in Berlin. Thereupon, Bismarck attempted to justify his action. His argument was, that in the English Note of the 9th of October the words "without prejudice to any territorial questions beyond these limits" implied that Germany was to be free to annex whatever she liked beyond these limits. About the meaning of the words there cannot be a particle of doubt. Bismarck soon afterwards informed the German Parliament that Lord Granville had been made acquainted with the purpose of annexing the north coast as early as the 8th of August, the day on which the English project was disclosed to the German Government. This statement

was not true. It appears in the German White book as part of the text of an *Aide Memoire* delivered to Lord Granville on the 14th of January, 1885. The sentence, however, does not occur in the text of the *Aide Memoire* actually delivered; and Lord Granville, on the appearance of the White book, protested against the statement as contrary to fact, and calculated to mislead public opinion. Its publication appears to show that Bismarck did not expect the approval of Germany for the course which he had actually adopted.

Meanwhile, peculiar transactions took place with regard to another point in the South Sea. Early in December, 1884, Prince Bismarck heard by telegram from his consul at Samoa that the king was endeavouring to obtain for that island a British Protectorate; and he asked the English Government for assurances that the independence of Samoa should be respected. The British Government immediately agreed to exchange assurances with Germany on the subject. Almost the next piece of news which they received from the South Sea was that the German consul had brought pressure to bear upon the king to sign a treaty by which Germany was to secure a predominant if not an exclusive influence in the island. Against the ratification of this treaty they immediately protested.

The tameness with which the British Cabinet received these various samples of Bismarck's anxiety to preserve the good-will of England is hardly sufficiently

explained by their devoted adherence to peace and good-will as prime objects of policy. They were, in fact, embarrassed by the situation which they had created for themselves in Egypt. It was in the spring of 1884 that they found it necessary to advise the Khedive to negotiate a fresh loan. France was at this time in the first flush of annoyance at her own abandonment of Egypt, and was very ready to interfere with the English proposal. Prince Bismarck saw in this proposal the handle by which to force England to acquiesce in his colonial projects. That this was his view of the Egyptian question he had explained to a committee of the Reichstag in June, 1884.

In February, 1884, England had negotiated with Portugal a treaty by which Portuguese claims, till then never admitted, to certain coast regions of Africa in the neighbourhood of the mouth of the Congo, were to be recognised as valid, in return for the settlement of a very low tariff upon British goods entering the Portuguese territories on either coast of Africa. The French Government disliked this treaty because its ratification would have interfered with French designs upon territory near the mouth of the Congo. The German Government saw in the opposition to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and to the projected Egyptian loan an opportunity to co-operate with France. It would serve to accentuate the opposition between France and England, and consequently to mitigate the French hostility to

Germany. M. Ferry, the French Prime Minister, was the chief promoter of the policy which had led to the French acquisitions in Tunis and Tonquin, and to the attempted Protectorate of Madagascar. He represented, not the idea of revenge against Germany, but that of maritime and colonial expansion. He was, therefore, quite ready to co-operate with Germany.

The two Governments protested against the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, which the British Government, finding it by no means popular in England, readily let drop. Germany and France then issued invitations to a conference at Berlin, for the settlement of a number of African questions; and this invitation was accepted by the English Cabinet, after a sufficiently precise statement of the purposes of the conference had been laid before them.

The conference met on the 15th of November, 1884; and at its last sitting on the 26th of February, 1885, the representatives of all the Powers signed a General Act, of which two parts especially concern Great Britain. The first is the navigation of the Niger. This river was declared free for the ships of all nations equally, without restriction, and no dues were to be charged for transit upon any goods or vessels in any part of the river. Great Britain undertook to apply these principles upon such portions of the Niger as might be under her sovereignty or protection; and France gave a similar undertaking. It should be observed that the Niger

from beginning to end was discovered and explored by British subjects, and at their expense. At the time of the Berlin Conference the whole trade of the Niger was in British hands, and the whole country through which it flows in its lower course was under British jurisdiction.

The result of the Niger clauses of the Berlin Act was, as the German Government intended, to obtain for German and other traders for nothing the whole of the advantages due to a century of British effort; and it is an interesting comment upon the Berlin Act that since 1885 German traders have repeatedly attempted to make use of it to push their trade against that of the British Company, which is saddled with the costly administration of the river navigation.

Another clause of the Berlin Act lays down that any Power which in future takes possession of, or assumes a protectorate over, land on the coast of Africa, shall accompany its act of occupation or protection by a notification to the other Powers, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own. This apparently harmless clause was also directed against England. Until 1885 England, being in command of the sea, could annex on the coast of Africa whatever territory she pleased not in the occupation of another civilised Power. At every point British interests were incomparably greater than any others. The Act gave all other Powers a status for protesting

against such annexation, even though their own interests in the territory in question might be insignificant.

These two portions of the Berlin Act operated to the detriment of Great Britain in much the same way as the clauses on the subject of privateering in the Treaty of Paris. Both sets of enactments appear on a superficial view to affect all Powers equally; but a close examination shows that each of them alike is to the detriment of the Power which has the command of the sea. Until 1885 the paramount force at every point on the African coast was the British navy. For eighty years this force had been exercised for the general benefit of civilisation, with hardly a thought of exclusive British interests. It was this force which had made possible all those commercial and geographical enterprises in which Germans had taken part. The Berlin Act put it into diplomatic fetters, not, indeed, of a very stringent nature, but which had the tendency to restrain what had hitherto been the natural and legitimate exercise of British power.

In Germany there has never been a doubt that the policy pursued between 1884 and March, 1885, was hostile to England. The spirit of this policy, as it was understood in Germany, is well conveyed in the following passage from a German review: "France had for some time been continually embarrassed by England in the execution of her colonial policy, especially in her

war with China. In Africa, France, like Germany, and still more than Germany, had to contend against England's jealousy. The Egyptian question had not yet been settled in a manner satisfactory to France; the London Conference had shown that the claims of England were irreconcilable with French interests. In all these questions Germany was on the French side, as her colonial interests also were prejudiced by England. England was the opponent of all the maritime Powers of Europe. She had for decades assumed at sea the same dictatorial attitude as France had maintained upon land under Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. The years 1870 and 1871 broke the French spell; the year 1884 has shown England that the times of her maritime imperialism also are over, and that if she does not renounce it of her own free will, an 1870 will come for the English spell, too. It is true, England need not fear any single maritime Power, but only a coalition of them all; and hitherto she has done all she can to call up such a coalition."¹

At an interview which took place on the 24th of January, 1885, between Prince Bismarck and the British ambassador, Sir Edward Malet, the prince read the text of a despatch, which he said that he had addressed to Count Münster, the German ambassador in London, on

¹ *Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart*, von Wilhelm Müller. Das Jahr 1884, p. 117.

the 5th of May, 1884. This despatch stated the great importance which the prince attached to the colonial question, and also to the friendship of Germany and England. It pointed out that, in the commencement of German colonial enterprise, England might render signal service to Germany; and said that for such service Germany would use her best endeavours in England's behalf in questions affecting her interests nearer home. It pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual advantage which such an understanding would produce; and it then proceeded to instruct Count Münster to say that, if it could not be effected, the result would be that Germany would seek from France the assistance which she had failed to obtain from England, and would draw closer to her on the same lines on which she now endeavoured to meet England.

This despatch, though it was sent to Count Münster, was never communicated to Lord Granville, nor to the British Government. It must be inferred, either, that Prince Bismarck wrote it merely with a view to its subsequent publication as a justification of his policy, or that, immediately after sending it, and in time to instruct Count Münster by telegraph to suppress it, the German Chancellor changed his mind, and decided to co-operate with France against England, without offering England the alternative which it describes.

Was not Prince Bismarck's purpose to arouse Eng-

land to a sense of her European position, and suggest to English statesmen the possibility of a European combination against the British naval supremacy, in case they should refuse to recognise the national duty of preserving the balance of power?

Whatever Bismarck may have meant, the moral of the whole story is not doubtful. England cannot expect those continental states, whose European interests most nearly coincide with her own, to acquiesce in her primacy in extra-European affairs, except upon condition of her active support in regard to those European interests as well as of her readiness to meet their wishes, as far as may be, in regard to the regions where her navy is the preponderating force.

VIII.

THE EXPANSION OF FRANCE.

FRENCH statesmen from the time of Henry IV. until the fall of the First Empire were engaged at the same time in an effort to acquire or to maintain the ascendancy of France on the continent of Europe and in a contest with England for maritime supremacy. There can be little doubt that the ultimate failure to realise either of these aims was due to the combination between them. The inference, however, which has sometimes been drawn, that those who shaped French policy made the elementary mistake of trying to do two things at once, is not necessarily correct; for it assumes such a separation between England and the rest of Europe as would have admitted that French supremacy over either was indifferent to the other. The fundamental lesson of the whole history seems to me to be that the interests of England and of Europe are indissolubly united; and I think this is the explanation both of the nature of the policy of France and of its failure.

Napoleon III. endeavoured to restore French ascendancy on the continent. The events of 1866, by bringing about the union of Germany, frustrated this

design, and the war of 1870 was the despairing attempt of France to reassert her primacy on the continent. It resulted in the destruction of her army and the collapse of her government.

The first object of France after the conclusion of peace was the reconstruction of her government. This was a work of enormous difficulty. The republican constitution was adopted because it was that which divided Frenchmen least, but it had to contend with many forms of opposition. There were three pretenders, all of whose followers professed aims which in any other country would have been treason. The pretenders had the sympathy of a Church which could pose with some show of reason as persecuted. Among the nominal adherents of the Republic there has always been a section which understands Republicanism as identical with revolution, that is with anarchy or the annihilation of government. That the Republic has maintained itself until its stability has ceased to be doubted is possibly a proof of the good sense of the French nation. It certainly affords very strong evidence in favour of the view that the first requirement of any nation is an executive authority which cannot be shaken.

The new government had to begin its work by creating afresh the national defences. It is difficult to estimate the sacrifices which have been made for this purpose, or to grasp the meaning of the prodigious results which have been obtained. At the present day

the outbreak of a war would find France in possession of an army consisting of more than two million thoroughly trained soldiers, with a third million of whom all have received some training, and the greater part, composed of men of the better classes, have at one time or another served a year in the ranks. For this enormous force arms and equipment of the best modern patterns have been provided. An elaborate system of fortifications has been carried along all the assailable land frontiers. At the same time a formidable navy of the first order has been created. The ships are believed to be at least as well constructed and as well armed as those of any other Power, though they are not in any category quite so numerous as those of Great Britain. The number of sailors available for manning the ships immediately on the outbreak of war is considerably larger than that at the disposal of the British Admiralty. These defensive preparations render the independence of France secure. No nation will lightly go to war with her, and nothing but a very strong combination of Powers could in any way endanger her.

During the first period of recovery, when France was fully occupied by the reconstruction of her institutions, she could hardly look abroad without anxiety. The one idea of Frenchmen at this time was revenge, or the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. The common conception was, that the one purpose for which the new army was being created was to attack Germany at the first

opportunity. The French were therefore naturally afraid that Germany might anticipate this attack; and in 1875 the report was bruited about in the French press that a German design of this sort had been frustrated by the intervention of the Tsar. This story has been sifted by a distinguished French writer, M. Edouard Simon,¹ according to whose account the French Government, being alarmed, addressed itself to the Tsar, whose intervention consisted in informing them that he believed their alarm to be groundless. The French Cabinet thanked the Tsar for having preserved the peace; and he replied that he had done nothing, for he had found Prince Bismarck as peaceably disposed as he was himself. The legend of a Russian diplomatic intervention on behalf of France seems to have originated with Prince Gortschakoff.

For some years France continued to maintain an attitude of cautious reserve in regard to foreign affairs, joining, however, in diplomatic measures which received the general assent of her neighbours, such as the Andrassy Note, and the Berlin Memorandum. At the Congress of Berlin, the French representative took an honourable part by supporting the proposal for the admission of Greece to the deliberations, and afterwards by advocating her claims to an extension of territory, which she ultimately obtained.

The period which followed the Congress of Berlin

¹ *L'Allemagne et la Russie au dix-neuvième Siècle*, pp. 262 to 271.

was one of close understanding with England. The British Government acquiesced in the French occupation of Tunis, and the two countries embarked upon a common policy in regard to the affairs of Egypt. The action of France in Tunis led Italy into the Triple Alliance, which presented in Europe a barrier that France could hardly hope to assail. It was necessary to seek outside the bounds of Europe the field for any new French enterprises. Here the only serious rival was England. The refusal of France in 1882 to carry out in Egypt the policy which she had herself initiated was followed by a revival of the traditional feeling of hostility to England, so that no French Government has thought it necessary to consider English susceptibilities except in so far as it has appeared dangerous to offend them. This exception, however, has been rendered almost nugatory by the theory and the practice of British Governments, which, believing that the greatest of British interests is peace, have conceded every demand made by France and backed by the suggestion of possible complications.

Since 1882, therefore, France has gradually embarked upon a policy which is described by French writers under the term "colonial expansion"; but of which the true character is imperial, rather than colonial, for it consists in the establishment of French rule in uncivilised countries, most, if not all, of which are unsuited for European settlement.

The new activity of France manifested itself first of all in Tonquin. It is not a little remarkable that the popular feeling was for a long time bitterly opposed to an enterprise recommended by precisely the considerations which are usually supposed to appeal most strongly to the French spirit. The inference is the majority of Frenchmen still regarded revenge against Germany as the first object of national policy.

As early as 1870 a French trader named Dupuis, who was settled at Hanoi in Tonquin, drew the attention of the French Governor of Cochin China to the commercial importance of the Red River, which he believed offered a valuable waterway into the interior of China. In consequence, in 1873 a French officer named Garnier was sent to the Red River. He surprised and seized the citadel of Hanoi. But the Government of Annam, of which country Tonquin was a part, took into its pay the "Black Flags," or local pirates, by whom Garnier was besieged and eventually killed. In 1874 the Government of Annam signed a treaty permitting the French to navigate the Red River, and to have consuls at Hanoi and Haipong. The Annamite Government, however, tolerated piracy on a large scale in the Tonquin delta; and under the pretext of suppressing the pirates, the Governor of Cochin China in 1882 sent a small expedition under Major Rivière, which seized Hanoi, and attempted the conquest of Tonquin. The Annamites appealed to their suzerain, the Emperor

of China, who interfered in their behalf. Negotiations were opened between France and China, which after much misunderstanding and recrimination on both sides ended in war. Meanwhile in May, 1883, Rivière was killed. The French sent constant reinforcements to Tonquin. Their forces also bombarded the defences of Hué, the capital of Annam, and in August, 1883, dictated a treaty by which Annam and Tonquin became French Protectorates. The war, however, continued. Long efforts were required before Tonquin was subdued. The Annamites were far from pacified, and the Chinese Government would not abandon its suzerainty until the French had defeated the Chinese troops in Tonquin, attacked the island of Formosa, and carried on a naval war upon the Chinese coasts. At length in May, 1885, China agreed to accept the French terms. By the summer of 1886 the French had asserted their power over the whole of Tonquin and Annam.

The Red River disappointed the hopes that had been formed, for it proved not to afford a navigable way into China. French writers began to suggest that the Mekong would supply the want which the Red River had failed to meet. The Mekong passes through territory which was then under the jurisdiction of Burmah. The Lower Province of Burmah had long been part of the Indian Empire, and Indian statesmen were quick to perceive the embarrassment that would arise from the establishment of any European influence other


than British in the country of which Lower Burmah is the outlet. There was no doubt that some French diplomatists contemplated the acquisition of rights at Mandalay. As far back as 1873 a Franco-Burmese Treaty had been signed at that place, which, however, was not accepted by the French Government. More positive evidence of a French purpose was given by the conclusion, in January, 1885, of a convention between France and Burmah, which was to establish peace and perpetual friendship between the two countries, and to secure for each party in the dominions of the other entire liberty of commerce and the treatment due to the most favoured nation. King Thebaw, an oriental monarch of a more than usually brutal type, had completed a long score of offences against the Indian Government; and there were not merely pretexts, but substantial reasons, for making an end of his misrule whenever it should be convenient. The French Treaty of 1885 made it convenient; and in the following winter Burmah was invaded, its king deposed, and its territory annexed to the Indian Empire on the 1st of January, 1886, before the ratifications of the French Treaty had been exchanged. A strip of territory on the Upper Mekong, forming a borderland between China and Siam, was ceded to Siam, upon condition that it should not be ceded to any other Power.

The foresight and decision revealed in the dealings of the British Government with Burmah serve to place

in the clearest light the want of those qualities which more recent events have exhibited in regard to Siam.

The establishment of the French in Annam and Tonquin, following upon their much earlier establishment in Cambodia, necessarily raised the question of the future of Siam, which, to use the mildest expression, became liable to absorption by its powerful neighbour. The French had established themselves in Tonquin with a decided purpose of expansion, and their energies were bound to move in the direction of least resistance, that is, towards Siam. Even if this had not been self-evident, French exponents of colonial policy, and English writers who had watched the far East, had not failed to indicate by the expression of their hopes or fears the probable course of French action. In my judgment, then, the successive British Cabinets of the last few years had ample notice of the necessity to decide what should be the course of Great Britain in regard to Siam. It was incumbent on them to make up their minds what Great Britain wanted, and what were the means to be adopted, to realise the state of things thus conceived of as desirable.

What, then, did Great Britain want? Evidently we were satisfied with things as they were. The trade of Siam was in British hands, and the extensive territories of the Siamese interposed between our border and the French. Nothing could have been more satisfactory. But the presence of the French in the



neighbourhood was an indication of a wish on their part for a change, and made it certain that things could not remain as they were.

A new force had come upon the scene; and in case it should, as was probable, move in the direction of Siam, what force existed which could operate to resist it, and so bring about equilibrium? There was the "independence" of Siam. That is merely a name for the fact that Siam had not been attacked by a Power stronger than itself. It might imply a right to be unmolested. But I do not know that the rights of states maintain themselves. As far as I can gather, they exist in imagination always, but in reality only when the state has and uses the power to assert them, which in this case the Siamese Government has not. The resisting force then was to be found only outside of Siam; and, as no Power but France and Great Britain was interested, could come only from Great Britain. The amount of resistance to be offered would depend upon the strength of will to be overcome. In case of a French determination at all costs to enter Siam, nothing but a corresponding determination on the part of Great Britain would suffice, and in this extreme hypothesis a conflict would arise to be settled by a war, of which the issue would depend primarily upon the preponderance of naval force in the Mediterranean.

As there was no sign that the French sought a direct conflict with us, it was probable that they would abstain

from any action sure to bring about such a conflict. It is important, however, to distinguish between the substance and the form. The fundamental fact was, and is, that the only possible protection for Siam is the British arms, that is, primarily the British navy, and ultimately the whole resources of the Empire. The duty of the Government, if it were decided that Siam ought to be protected, was to effect the operation if possible without calling these forces into active exercise. This would be accomplished by an intimation to the French Government, showing clearly at what stage British resistance might be expected, and the intimation would arouse less annoyance in proportion as it should anticipate any action by which French feeling or French honour might be committed. At any time during the seven years prior to the summer of 1893, a treaty guaranteeing the whole or a part of her territories might have been offered by the British Government to Siam. The only diplomacy needed was a clear explanation of the situation, that the choice for Siam lay between a British guarantee and dismemberment. This argument would probably have secured the assent of the Siamese Government to the treaty required. Such a treaty, though it might not have been liked in France, would have offered no pretext for a quarrel, and would have settled the question.

I venture to think that no other course so well fulfilled all British requirements. It would have pre-

vented the recent troubles, and have secured Siam without war, and without too much irritation. Such action as that actually taken at the last moment by Great Britain appears to the French as arising from a desire to thwart them, from a sort of dog-in-the-manger policy; for they think "if the English wanted Siam, why have they not taken it before? They do not want it, but they will not let us take it."

A treaty guaranteeing the territory of Siam would, however, not have preserved things as they were. It would have ended the "independence" of Siam, for we could not promise to defend Siam without taking security against an uncalled-for Siamese initiative against France. It would, for instance, have been incumbent upon the British Government, as soon as the treaty was signed, to insist upon the Siamese doing justice to any claims (either for money compensation, for injuries, or for territory on the left bank of the Lower Mekong alleged to belong to Cambodia) which the French could substantiate by proper evidence. Such claims might have been a fit subject for arbitration. In other words, the treaty would have created a Protectorate. This was inevitable.

The approach of France placed us in a dilemma from which there was no escape. We must either abandon Siam and our interests there to France or undertake a Protectorate; and in all probability ministries have shrunk from extending the area for which we are in

this way responsible. But in such a case no standstill is possible. British enterprise had found a field in Siam, and when challenged it must either go on or draw back.

In 1883 the French Government revived a long-forgotten project for the establishment of French power in Madagascar. So long ago as 1643, Frenchmen had landed in Madagascar, and set up stations at one or two points on the coast. In 1672 they were driven out of the island. In 1750 the island of St. Marie was ceded to France, and has since remained in French possession. In 1855 a Frenchman, named Lambert, obtained from the son of the then reigning Queen concessions so extensive as to amount almost to the sovereignty over the island. In 1862 the prince who had given these concessions succeeded to the throne, and confirmed them; but afterwards bought them back from Napoleon III., for the sum of 1,200,000 francs. In 1841 a French naval officer had made a treaty with a vassal prince in the north of the island, by which one or two islets on the north-west coast were ceded to France, together with a slip of territory on the adjoining part of the mainland of Madagascar. The islands were occupied by the French, but the mainland was not disturbed, and the sovereignty of the Hova Government was not questioned.

In 1878 a Frenchman named Laborde, who had long lived in Madagascar, died; and his heirs, Frenchmen,

claimed lands which he had held in the island. Malagasy law did not allow of a foreigner acquiring a transmissible title to land; and the Hova Government, therefore, did not recognise the Frenchmen's claim. But this claim was taken up and asserted by the French Government. There was no visible question of right, but the French Government had decided that Madagascar offered a suitable field for a French protectorate, that being, as M. Ferry says, the "preferred form of French colonial acquisitions". In April, 1883, a French squadron appeared at Nosibe, and proceeded to bombard every town or village that could be discovered for two hundred miles along the coast. This operation was the first of a long series in which the French failed to induce the Hovas to admit their protectorate. The Hovas had already sent an embassy to Europe, which tried to obtain British help. In February the British Government recognised the sovereignty of the Queen of the Hovas over the whole of Madagascar; but Great Britain remained neutral in the conflict between the Hovas and the French. In December, 1885, the Hova Government agreed to a treaty with France, by which a French control over the foreign relations of Madagascar was to be recognised, but which stipulated for the full independence of Madagascar, except as regards her relations with foreign Powers. The French Government professes to base upon this treaty a claim to a protectorate involving the power to interfere in the

affairs of the country, including the management of its finances and customs. This the Hovas have never for a moment admitted.

Madagascar in 1883, before the arrival of the French squadron, was in a peculiar sense a sphere of British influence. British missionaries had been at work there for many years, and had effected the conversion to Christianity of the Malagasy people. This is a success without parallel in the annals of modern missionary enterprise, and recalls the achievements of Augustine and of Boniface. It would have been unworthy of the British name to have sought in the work of the missionaries an excuse for the conquest of the island, or a pretext for political interference in the affairs of the Queen of Madagascar. But if England refrained from conquest in her own behalf she was certainly entitled to forbid any other Power to interfere there. The treaties which permitted Englishmen to trade and settle in the country conferred the same privileges upon the subjects of other European states. There was a free field for the private enterprises of Frenchmen.

Amid all the weaknesses of recent years it seems to me that none has been so discreditable to England as that which has been exhibited in regard to Madagascar. The British neutrality of 1883 contained in it the germ of further abstention; it would have been easy to protest then before the French were deeply committed, and the French at an early period gave a handle for

intervention by arresting a British consul. To interfere at a later stage would necessarily be invidious. The French, however, almost invited such a course by the forced construction which, even according to French evidence, they undoubtedly placed upon the treaty admitting a protectorate. In August, 1890, however, the British Cabinet threw overboard the Malagasy by agreeing to a treaty with France in which Great Britain recognised the protectorate according to the French interpretation. The explanation of this, as it seems to me, cruel surrender is, that the Government had just negotiated with Germany an agreement in regard to Zanzibar, for the validity of which the assent of the French Government was necessary. To obtain this assent the unfortunate Hovas were sacrificed.

In north-western Africa France has revealed during the last few years the design of an empire of enormous extent.

Between the frontier of Morocco and the mouth of the Niger, France possesses three strips of coast.

The first, Senegambia, runs from Cape Blanco to Sierra Leone, interrupted only by the small British colony of the Gambia, and the Portuguese settlements opposite the Bissagos Islands. This French territory includes the whole course of the Senegal River, and the upper waters of the Gambia; and from here the French have pushed inland to the Upper Niger, to which, also, their influence has been extended southwards from

Algeria. The sphere of influence thus claimed is almost as large as British India. It extends from the eastern frontier of Tunis southward to Lake Chad, from Lake Chad westward to Say on the Niger, a point about half-way between Timbuctoo and the mouth of the river. From Say it follows the Niger towards its source, and continues in the same direction to the northern frontier of Sierra Leone. In short, it includes all north-western Africa north of the Niger except Morocco, and the area claimed by Spain on the Atlantic coast to the south of that kingdom.

The other two strips of French territory are Bassam on the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey on the Slave Coast, which has been attacked and annexed during the last three years. From the maps issued by the French geographers it is evident that the French propose to use Bassam and Dahomey as bases for the acquisition of the region lying to the south of the Niger, and forming the back land of the English and German colonies on the Gold Coast.

The French colony of Gaboon, or, as it is now called, the French Congo, fills up the area between the German sphere of influence at Cameroons, the Lower Congo (except a small strip at its mouth) and its great tributary the Oubangi; and the French cartographers assume that this territory, too, is to spread inland behind the German and English spheres of influence as far northwards as Lake Chad.

It is impossible not to admire the breadth of design revealed by this great African empire, and the tenacity of purpose by which its realisation has been accomplished; and it cannot be denied that the region lying to the south of Algeria and to the east of Senegambia is a legitimate sphere of French activity; it is for the other Governments concerned to prevent French encroachments upon territories in this portion of Africa where they or their subjects have established themselves and acquired rights. It may be noted, for example, that the claim suggested in French maps for the extension of Dahomey northward to the Niger is inconsistent with the rights of the Royal Niger Company, whose sphere of influence included the back land of Dahomey before the French Treaty of 1890, which afforded the pretext for the French conquest of that country.

It is usual at the present day to speak of the partition of Africa between the European nations; but the expression should be taken with some reserve: the map of Africa has been partitioned, and presents the appearance of a series of vast empires, each of which is larger than any European state except Russia. But these empires exist only on the map; they represent agreements made in Europe between the Powers on a sort of mutual dog-in-the-manger principle, each Power agreeing not to meddle in the area which another Power has coloured red or blue on the paper, on condition that

its own blue or red area shall be untouched by the other Power. But, so far as effective government or civilisation is concerned, the actual countries have hardly been affected by the application of the paint brush in Paris or Berlin. In most of the regions concerned, not one out of a thousand of the natives has ever seen a white man. With the exception of the British colonies at the Cape, and a few of the more prosperous colonies on the West Coast, Africa is as yet substantially untouched by Europe. Between the delimitation of spheres, and the actual assertion of European influence over the continent, lies a century of effort which has yet to be made.

It remains to touch briefly upon one or two questions which illustrate the weakness of British diplomacy in its relation with France in recent years. They turn upon matters in themselves of no appreciable weight in the scale of national or international interests, which for that reason may serve as straws to show the direction in which the current of national policy is flowing. The first of them concerns the New Hebrides and the Society Islands in the Pacific. In 1847 the Governments of Great Britain and of France by a joint declaration agreed to acknowledge the independence of the Islands of the Raiatea group to the leeward of Tahiti, and never to take possession of any of them in any shape or form. In 1880 the French Government took possession of the Raiatea group. The British Govern-

ment remonstrated, but eventually agreed that the abrogation of the declaration of 1847 should form a concession on the part of Great Britain, in consideration of the general settlement of the Newfoundland fishery question then in course of negotiation. Pending this settlement a French protectorate over the Raiatea group was agreed to, from six months to six months. The settlement with regard to Newfoundland was, however, never reached. In 1878 the two Governments by an exchange of notes had agreed not to interfere with the independence of the New Hebrides, and they confirmed this agreement by a further exchange of notes in 1883. In 1886 French troops landed in the New Hebrides, whereupon in 1887 the British Government actually proposed that they would recognise the French protectorate over the Raiatea group in return for the signature of a convention by which France should engage to evacuate the New Hebrides, where the duty of maintaining order and of protecting British subjects and French citizens was to be entrusted to a joint commission of French and British naval officers. In November, 1887, this convention was signed, and in May, 1888, the declaration of 1847 concerning the Raiatea group was abrogated.

I know of no proceedings better calculated than these to instruct a French statesman how to deal with a British Government. The maxim they inculcate is: If you wish to violate an agreement not to lay hands

upon territory in which Great Britain has at least as much interest as France, do so whenever it is convenient. Upon receiving a British protest immediately violate a second similar agreement. You may then offer to undo the second wrong as a gracious concession, in return for which you may expect to be confirmed in the possession of what you have obtained by the first.

Another question of no great substantial importance has derived immense significance from the manner in which it has been treated. It is that of the Newfoundland fisheries.

The Island of Newfoundland was formally annexed by England in 1583. In the seventeenth century its possession was disputed between England and France, to be settled in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht, by which it was agreed that Newfoundland with the adjacent islands should "belong of right wholly to Britain," and France renounced all claims to any rights in it or them. It was to be unlawful "for the subjects of France to erect any buildings there, besides stages made of boards, and huts necessary and usual for the drying of fish, or to resort to the island beyond the time necessary for fishing and drying of fish". But it was to be allowed to them "to catch fish and to dry them on land, in that part only and in no other" which extended from Cape Bonavista round the northern point of the island to Point Riche.

By the Treaty of Versailles of 1783 these limits

were altered, and the fishery assigned to the French was to begin at Cape St. John and pass round the north of the island and down the west coast to Cape Ray. By the same treaty the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to France as a shelter to French fishermen, on condition that France should not fortify them nor erect buildings upon them except for the convenience of the fishery. At the same time the English king declared that he would "take the most positive measures for preventing his subjects from interrupting in any manner, by their competition, the fishery of the French during the temporary exercise of it, which is granted to them upon the coasts of the Island of Newfoundland; and would for this purpose cause the fixed settlements which shall be formed there to be removed". He further declared that "the thirteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, and the method of carrying on the fishery which has at all times been acknowledged, shall be the plan upon which the fishery shall be carried on there. It shall not be deviated from by either party; the French fishermen building only their scaffolds, confining themselves to the repair of their fishing vessels, and not wintering there; the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, on their part, not molesting in any manner the French fishermen during their fishing nor injuring their scaffolds during their absence." The French Government proposed to insert in their counter declaration the words "the exclusive right of fishing"; but the English

Government refused to accept this, and explained that the King of England did not mean to grant exclusive fishery, but only to order his subjects not to molest the French by competition. The French Government thereupon agreed to withdraw the word "exclusive".

Upon these treaties and the British declaration, the French Government claim the exclusive right of fishing on the treaty shore, as defined in 1783, and the right of prohibiting any fixed British establishments there.

England has always denied the French claim to exclusive fishery, and the concurrent right of the British fishermen has always in practice been respected. The British Government has also always maintained that the declaration of 1783 referred only to fixed fishing settlements, and that fixed British settlements which are not for the purpose of fishery, and which do not interfere with it, are admissible. There is not, and has never been, any doubt on the part of any British Government as to the interpretation of the treaties, nor as to the nature of British rights. The French claims just recited are held to be entirely without foundation.

It is not surprising that there should be chronic disputes arising out of the French claims; and disturbances among the fishermen have been avoided only through the presence in Newfoundland waters during the fishing season of a British and French squadron. But there is ever present the danger of a collision between these forces employed in the protection of antagonistic in-

terests. To remove this danger attempts have been made more than once to negotiate a settlement of the disputed points.

In 1885 an agreement was signed between France and England by which the concurrent rights of British fishermen were recognised, and the formation of establishments necessary for the development of every industry other than that of the fisheries was to be permitted over the greater part of the treaty shore, in return for an undertaking that no British settlements, except wharves and railway sheds for the working of mines, should be allowed on certain specified limited portions of the coast. The French fishermen were to have the right to purchase bait on the shores of Newfoundland free from all duty or restriction.

This agreement did not satisfy the colonists, and it was therefore never ratified. They objected principally to the free purchase of bait which it granted to the French. It should be explained that the bait cannot be caught in sufficient quantity on the treaty shore, and the colonists wished to have it in their power to restrict the sale of bait, by way of retort to the bounties paid at St. Pierre and Miquelon to the French fishermen, which in the opinion of the Newfoundlanders gave them an undue advantage. In 1886 the Colonial Legislature passed a Bill for preventing the sale of bait to the French, which, after remonstrance from the Home Government, received the Royal assent at the close of

the fishing season of 1887. The French fishermen, thus hampered in their cod-fishing occupations, took to catching and tinning lobsters, an industry which had been previously started by the colonists. The colonists raised the famous objection that lobsters were not fish within the meaning of the treaties. The French retorted by a vigorous revival of their claim to exclusive right, and of their objection to fixed British lobster factories.

Great Britain next proposed to submit the whole question of the interpretation of the treaties to arbitration. The French declined arbitration, except upon the single issue of their right to take lobsters; and even for that, demanded as a preliminary the conclusion of a *modus vivendi*, by which existing lobster factories, French and British, were to be undisturbed, and no new ones to be erected except by mutual consent. In March, 1890, a *modus vivendi* upon this basis was concluded for one year. In May, 1891, an agreement for arbitration upon the lobster question, which left open the possibility of arbitration upon the larger question, was concluded between the two Governments, and at the same time the *modus vivendi* was prolonged for the fishing season of that year. The colonists protested against any reference to arbitration, except on the understanding that the French Treaty rights should be altogether extinguished, and they vehemently protested against the renewal of the *modus vivendi*. The agreement for arbitration has not been ratified.

In order to comply with the terms of the *modus vivendi*, certain British lobster factories erected in contravention of them were closed by the British naval officers, who were thereupon sued for damages in the colonial courts, where judgment was given against them. It appeared that the Act of Parliament, passed in 1788, to enforce the provisions of the treaty with France, had lapsed in 1834, the intention having evidently been, that the Newfoundland Legislature, then recently created, should pass an Act of its own for the same purpose. In 1891, after the decision of the colonial courts, a new Bill to give legal validity to the action of the naval officers was introduced into the House of Lords. Thereupon, after negotiation with the Home Government, the Colonial Legislature passed a provisional Act for enforcing the *modus vivendi* for three years.

The agreement of 1885 appears to have been a fair compromise. The British Cabinet, before entering into the negotiations with France on the subject, obtained the assurance that the contemplated arrangements would be acceptable to the colonists. But when the agreement had been concluded with France, the colonists, in consequence of a change of government, refused to acquiesce in the settlement.

A true view of the right policy was well expressed in a letter written on the 31st of May, 1890, by Sir J. S. Winter and others, on behalf of the colonists, to the

Colonial Office. These writers said: "That where the Government of Britain is clearly of opinion that a claim set up by France is without a shadow of foundation, it is the duty of Britain to refuse to permit the exercise of the French claim, and for France to seek, and for Britain to refuse or grant, as she may deem wise, a settlement by arbitration, Britain refusing to allow the exercise of the French claim over her soil, until by the award of an arbitration the right of the French has been established. In the present case the law officers of the Crown have given their opinion against the claims of the French, and the Government of Britain professes to be convinced of the baselessness of those claims; and therefore the people of Newfoundland say that for Britain to propose to submit those French claims to arbitration would be a disastrous confession of weakness, and that they should be resisted until France of her own motion has unmistakably and conclusively established them."

The negotiations which have been recited in this chapter appear to me to show that for many years past British Cabinets have been afraid of France, or, what is the same thing, have been afraid of war with France. I know of no attitude so likely to bring about such a war, for every concession only encourages the French to further demands. It is not a question of personal sympathy between Englishmen and Frenchmen; the fundamental fact is that France has entered upon the

pursuit of aims the realisation of which is inconsistent with the maintenance of the British Empire, and that the apathy and timidity of British Governments has encouraged these aims, of which the beginnings should have been resisted, until they have become dangerous. Some Englishmen may not be satisfied with the evidence afforded by the examples I have given of French action. As more direct proof of the nature of the ideas which are cherished in France, I may translate one or two passages from the first French school text-book of geography¹ that comes into my hands.

I begin with a point of detail: "The future of New Caledonia will not be completely assured until the day when the neighbouring archipelago of the New Hebrides is joined to it. Already our colonists have made extensive purchases of land in the New Hebrides; but a convention signed in 1878 between France and England forbids either nation to take possession of the islands. Its abrogation will doubtless be negotiated sooner or later, in spite of the jealousy of a few Australians who fancy themselves the sole masters of the Pacific."²

The work from which I am quoting is an admirably

¹ *Géographie de la France*, par Marcel Dubois, avec la collaboration de F. Benoit. Paris, 1894.

² Compare Léon Deschamps, *Histoire Sommaire de la Colonisation Française* (1894), p. 97: "Nos droits sur les Nouvelles-Hébrides . . . partagés à tort avec les Anglais dans la Convention du 24 Octobre 1887".

lucid scientific text-book of the geography of France, concluding with five short chapters on the French Colonial Empire. It is with the general ideas on this subject that are inculcated in French schools that I am concerned. "Our position assigns to us the two-fold part of a continental Power, and of a colonial and maritime state. During the last century we yielded too much to one of these two attractions upon our interest, and we too much neglected the other. And thus we committed faults which still weigh upon our destinies. It is an equal error either to declare that France is without the genius for colonisation and ought to reserve all her attention for the affairs of the continent, or to proclaim that the essential condition of prosperous colonial development is to renounce our rôle of influence and of action in Europe." Again: "In Africa, Algeria and Tunis are at our doors. Their relations with the mother country are assured. But the routes of our ships to all the other trading stations are compromised and cut by a series of English posts. No strait is free. In the East, in order to proceed to the Indian Ocean, a French fleet a few years ago had only to clear the passage of Aden; the station of Obok would have provided for that. But a moment of weakness has placed us in the most precarious situation by allowing the English to occupy Egypt, that is to say, to keep the keys of the Suez Canal in their hands. Since then it matters little that the union of Tunis to France

counterbalances the menace of Malta, that Obok faces Aden; after having toiled to free ourselves from two embarrassing sentinels, we have, in spite of the lessons of tradition and history, allowed our rivals to take and to keep a post far more dangerous to our maritime security. Much more precarious are our communications with Indo-China and our trading stations in Oceania. Here the strait commanded by Singapore cannot be passed; there the neighbourhood of Australia, jealous of the little we possess in Oceania, is a standing menace to our establishments in the Pacific. The other gate of the Mediterranean is watched by Gibraltar. . . ."

Any one who doubts, after these quotations, whether the point of French colonial ambition is directed against England may consult the admirable historical atlas in course of publication by the well-known firm of Hachette, in which there appear side by side two maps showing the colonial expansion of France and of England, by a comparison of the extent of the possessions of each of the two countries in 1815 and in 1893.

The purpose of French policy has gradually in recent years turned against England. The minor matters of dispute have been handled by France in a spirit which with almost every succeeding year has become more hostile, while English Governments by habitual concession have encouraged the French to larger and more pressing demands. There is a whole

group of questions between the two countries, each of which consists in a French encroachment upon some legitimate form of British enterprise. In the foreground stands the French belief that the English occupation of Egypt is a humiliation to France, to be terminated if possible by the substitution of French for British influence at Cairo. Behind all these several differences loom the outlines of an international conflict for the command of the sea. French writers have long discussed the causes of former failures in this contest. They hardly now raise the question directly, though the purpose of making the Mediterranean a French lake is avowed. But if the French can command the Mediterranean the spell is broken, the command of the sea is at an end, and must be won or lost in a new naval war. Four or five years ago French naval writers hardly thought that France alone could hope to carry to a successful end a maritime conflict with England. Since then the understanding with Russia has altered the balance. It is not easy to see how the English Admiralty could assert the command of the Mediterranean in a war in which France should have Russian assistance. Yet how is a war with France to be averted if the French continue to press claims such as those which they have raised so often of late years, except by concessions on the part of England, which have already been carried too far? A war with France implies a naval conflict; that is

to say, the command of the sea would be in suspense. But while the sea is disputed it cannot safely be used for purposes of military transport, and therefore our power of giving help to India must be limited if not suspended until the naval issue has been fought out. Great, then, would be the temptation to Russia to experiment upon Afghanistan, that is to challenge England at a time when she would be embarrassed, and in a region when to decline the challenge would be to abdicate her Empire.

France is entitled to seek the development of her energies and the expansion of her colonial Empire; and I for one cannot read without sympathy the history of French colonial enterprise. But it is the duty of Great Britain to take care of herself, and my sole purpose is to arouse my countrymen to a sense of this duty. I am not anxious for a war with France or with any other Power; on the contrary, I am eager to avert such a calamity. But peace cannot come from a policy of fear. It can be secured only by an exhibition of strength, of which the beginning must be a full recognition by the nation of its own purpose.

It cannot be our national object to interfere with the legitimate extension of other Powers. England claims no monopoly of empire. But she is entitled to resent and to resist the attempt of any Power to seek extension by supplanting her. What is required is a definition of her Empire. A British Government should determine

which are the regions in which British energies are so far involved that they cannot fairly be sacrificed to the claims of competitors, and distinguish them from those areas where Englishmen have no prior claim or no sufficiently established position to justify the exclusion of foreign political influence. This operation has of late years been forced upon British Governments. But it has been entered into with the usual hesitation, and without that comprehensive view which should have been the basis of the work. In a general delimitation of spheres of influence, once it became inevitable, England should have taken the lead. A due appreciation of the strength of her position would have prevented the clumsy diplomacy which threw away for nothing such fields as were offered by Zanzibar and Madagascar. In Asia the line drawn on the north of Afghanistan, much too near as it appears to me to Herat, should be prolonged eastward and westward so as to extend from the confines of China to the border of Armenia. For a satisfactory delimitation a firm diplomacy is required.

Diplomacy is a sort of brokerage between nations. It is a process resembling the negotiation between a buyer and a seller. The skilful dealer knows what he wants, and appreciates the values of the objects of exchange. But it is not necessary to use strong language that means nothing. The protests by English Foreign Ministers, of late years readily made

and as readily let drop, remind me of the Oriental tradesman, who invariably asks for his goods four or five times the price he means to accept. The only result of the practice is that the customers, as a matter of course, beat down his price. A more dignified diplomacy consists in stating at the outset claims that are really meant, and in abiding by them.

When Lord Granville informed the German Government that England could not regard as legitimate the settlement of another Power between the Orange River and Cape Frio, he took the kind of ill-considered step that I deprecate. He should have made up his mind what the German question meant; and before expressing a claim to exclude a foreign Power, the Government which he represented should have settled whether such a claim was or was not to be maintained. The answer once deliberately given should have been made good, and in that case the raising of the German flag on the coast would have been answered by an ultimatum.

It is these declarations, made without full consideration of the consequences, that lead foreign Powers to doubt the seriousness of Great Britain. I know of no colonial claim made against England in recent times which was ever meant to be pressed to the point of war. The claims that have been pushed successfully have been carried because the Powers urging them had rightly assumed that England would not fight for the rights or interests she alleged, and they, therefore,

professed to be dealing with interests vital to themselves, which they could not sacrifice. The art of diplomacy consists in divining the nature of this game of bluff; and distinguishing between an experimental pressure, made to ascertain the amount of resistance which will be offered, and a really urgent demand which will be backed in case of need by the armed forces of a great Power. To the one class of demand a shrewd statesman will at once say no. The other class he will meet with compliance, where they touch no vital interest of his nation; but where they make collision likely, he will reserve his last word until he is prepared for the action that may in the last resort be inevitable.

A war between two great Powers is so gigantic an effort, and fraught with such momentous consequences, that I can hardly believe it worth the while of any Power to undertake it for the sake of any except the very greatest of the interests which the French usually describe as colonial, but which are perhaps better called imperial. Possibly to some continental nations though hardly to any statesman who has studied its nature, the Indian Empire might seem a prize worth a contest. But even for the greatest prize, a war would not be undertaken unless it offered a reasonable prospect of success. Scraps of empire, in short, are not worth fighting for. The inference is not that England should abandon them, but precisely the reverse. If it

is made clear that England values them, other nations will take good care not to meddle with them. They will cherish this frame of mind so long as they believe that England is well prepared for war; and the opinion of foreign statesmen upon English preparations is usually based on a knowledge of the facts.

IX.

INDIA.

THE north-west frontier of India is the heel of Achilles, the vulnerable spot in the empire. The real Achilles, indeed, was protected not by a magic spell, but by his pluck and his good right arm. The myth of his dipping in Styx was the after-thought of a degenerate race, to whose weak hearts a fearless spirit was incomprehensible. We English, like the later Greeks, have grown soft-hearted, and make myths to account for the deeds of our fathers. They trusted to hearts of oak and jolly tars ; in our day it is the "silver streak" that is relied on, as though the ocean would rise and take our part. The sea is but the battle ground, ready to bear to victory the stoutest hearts and coolest heads. So long as these are ours the sea will be British, and would-be invaders must keep on land. By land there is only one way into the empire, and it leads through Afghanistan.

The barriers raised against Russian expansion across the Danube and the *Ægean* have more than once had the effect of throwing the Russian energies into Asia. The Tsar Paul had sent off an expedition for the conquest of India. It was a small force, and appears to

have been lost in the deserts beyond the Caspian. Alexander I. discussed with Napoleon a project for the joint conquest of India. In 1828-9 and in 1854-5 the Russian arms were successful on the eastern side of the Black Sea. In 1855, when Alexander II. succeeded Nicholas, the Russian frontier in Central Asia ran from a point on the eastern shore of the Caspian, along the northern edge of the Sea of Aral and thence due east to the confines of China. Since 1855, that frontier has moved southwards by leaps and bounds, so that to-day Russia is conterminous with Persia and Afghanistan. In thirty-five years she has over-run Central Asia.

The policy to be adopted by England for the defence of the north-west frontier depends partly upon military and partly upon political considerations. Afghanistan is a country as large as Germany, and throughout almost its whole extent exceedingly rugged and mountainous. The general direction of its ranges of mountains is such that they must be crossed by an army advancing either from Central Asia to India, or from India to Central Asia. The fundamental question which must be settled first is, whether for the purpose of resisting an army advancing from Central Asia towards India, the most favourable battle-field is to be sought in the mountainous country of Afghanistan or on the Indian or on the Central Asian side of the mountains.

Mountains have a three-fold effect upon the action of armies: they retard movement, they render supply more difficult, and they facilitate resistance at particular points. From this last effect the inference has been drawn, and is usually accepted by the non-military public, that a mountainous country is favourable to defence. This is, however, not the judgment of the masters of war. They distinguish between a defence which is local and temporary, having for its object to delay the enemy, and to gain the time needed to strike a decisive blow against him in some other part of the theatre of war; and that defence of which the object is to defeat the enemy, to destroy his force, and to compel him to desist from his enterprise. A mountainous country is favourable to the former kind of defence: it lends itself conveniently to a resistance of which the purpose is delay; but, where a decisive victory is necessary, a mountainous country is advantageous not to the defence, but to the attack. The defender will choose and occupy a strong position, which his opponent, instead of attacking, will attempt to turn. To prevent this, the defender must occupy with parts of his force positions on his right and his left, commanding the communications by which a turning force could move. When his force is thus disseminated, the assailant will make a concentrated attack upon its weakest part; the defender must then abandon all his positions, or his adversary, marching

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past him, will himself occupy a position commanding his line of retreat. The defender will then be compelled to attack this position, and all the advantages of local defence will thus pass to the side of the original attacker. For this reason, the best teachers of war hold, that where considerable forces are employed, and a decisive victory is required, the defender must seek his battle-field not in the mountainous country, but in the regions before or behind the mountains.

Perhaps in theory, the position may be the best in which the defender awaits attack upon his own side of the mountains. In that case, he throws upon the assailant the difficulties of movement and of supply created by the mountain obstacle. He compels him to divide his forces, because no army can move with safety by a single road; and thus has the opportunity, when these separated columns issue from the mountains, of falling upon one of them with his whole force, before the others can come to its assistance. It should be observed, however, that this plan of defence is exceedingly difficult of execution. The military history of Europe abounds with instances of failure to carry it out, and contains only a single example of its successful application.

It is, no doubt, with a view to this mode of defence that some English writers have advocated the adoption of the Indus as the frontier of British India. But the argument of this school is based upon a confusion be-

tween two things absolutely distinct. The question which I am at present examining is the military question as to the most advantageous theatre of war for the defence of India against attack from the north-west. The question where the frontier line should be drawn is a totally different one ; for the frontier line which is important is that, not of India, but of Russia. If the Russian outposts were permitted to face the British outposts along the line of the Indus the scheme of defence upon which this school depends would be impossible. Any scheme which would permit Russia to possess herself of the mountainous country before the outbreak of hostilities would enable her before commencing her attack to overcome those difficulties of concentration and of supply which offer the principal advantages of a defence conducted on the Indian side of the passes. It is, moreover, obviously impracticable to suggest a frontier on the Indus at a time when the actual frontier is far in advance of that river, and when a district beyond the Indus as large as Great Britain has long been under British administration. If there is one thing which is inadmissible for England in Asia it is to draw back. To abandon a province which has once been declared British is as dangerous as to lose a battle.

To return to the question between the three zones as theatres of war. To await attack on the Indian side of the mountains is objectionable, partly on the ground, which has already been suggested, that it would enable

the enemy, by choosing his own time for attack, to neutralise all the military disadvantages to which in theory it would expose him, and partly for a grave political reason. If India were not merely an empire but a nationality, ready like any other nationality to fight for its independence, this course might be the best to adopt. But India is no such thing; it is a great group of nations under foreign rule, and is therefore full of possibilities of insurrection. To permit an invading army to reach the valley of the Indus would be to put a premium upon every form of sedition; and there is no one acquainted with India who can regard such an event with equanimity. The scheme of defence which consists in concentrating an army on the Indian side of the mountains may therefore be dismissed. It is an ultimate resource, which in case of need a skilful commander would no doubt turn to account, but it is not an acceptable basis upon which to found the national policy.

The alternative plan is that which would meet the attack upon the side of the mountains remote from India. There is no doubt whatever, that, if it were practicable, this would be the best form of defence, but it involves certain indispensable preliminary conditions. A British army could not safely be assembled in Afghan-Turkestan unless its communications with India were secure. It would require good roads, or, still better, railways through the mountains, and these communications.

would need to be made sure either by forts and garrisons, stationed at commanding points in their course, or by the certainty of the active friendship of the population. For, after all, in a mountainous country possession is nine points of the law; and where there is a numerous warlike population the support or resistance which they offer must go far to turn the scale. It follows that the necessary policy of Great Britain for the defence of India is to secure the co-operation in resistance to Russia of the population of Afghanistan.

This preliminary purpose might be accomplished in either of two ways: the country might be conquered and converted into a British province, the inhabitants being disarmed, and the endeavour made by just administration to obtain their loyalty; or, the attempt might be made to secure such an alliance with the rulers of the country as would ensure not only their resistance to Russia, but their readiness to receive, and faithfully to support, a British army, temporarily sent into their country to assist in its defence. It is, perhaps, the most striking proof of the want of design, which has long been characteristic of British policy, that for fifty years Governments have vacillated between these two alternatives, and that the final adoption of the second has been the result of hesitation rather than of deliberate choice, and that the consequences which it necessarily involves are even now imperfectly understood.

Lord Auckland in 1837-38 seems to have drifted by degrees from a policy of alliance to one of conquest. It is difficult to believe that he was well informed about the country, or that he had properly thought out the nature of the enterprise upon which he was embarking. Dost Mahomed refused an alliance in which no advantage of any kind was offered to him. At this Lord Auckland took umbrage, and determined to restore Shah Shoojah, under the impression that a monarch set upon his throne by British influence would be a trustworthy ally. Afghanistan was conquered with little difficulty by a comparatively small force—21,000 men, of whom only one-seventh were British. After the entry into Kabul in 1839, this force was considerably reduced, and maintained itself for two years, in spite of considerable opposition. But the English were placed by Lord Auckland's policy in an ambiguous position. Having come to restore Shah Shoojah, who was without a following among his countrymen, they were obliged to remain in order to maintain him. But for the same reason they were obliged to support his corrupt, incapable, and oppressive government. As they had from the beginning declared their occupation of the country to be temporary, it was impossible for them to gain adherents; and their position as invaders, the ambiguity of their policy, and the many doubtful measures into which this ambiguity led them, aroused the bitterest animosity of the whole nation. At this

time, moreover, the British border was not upon the Indus, but between the Ganges and the Sutlej. The small force in Afghanistan was as far from its base in India as Napoleon's army when it entered Russia was from the Rhine. Even then the national rising was helpless against a determined leader; General Nott at Kandahar had no difficulty in maintaining his position. But at Kabul political intrigue and military incompetence paralysed an army which should have been unassailable; and the conquest, which had justified itself neither by a good cause at the beginning nor by producing good government in the sequel, ended in the retreat and disaster of January, 1842. That in the following autumn Nott from Kandahar, and Pollock from Peshawar, marched to Kabul and destroyed the bazaar may have asserted the honour of the British arms, but could hardly be expected to bring about that "union of hearts" which, after all, was the original purpose of the British policy.

The indirect consequences of the first Afghan war were the annexation of Sind and the Sikh wars, which resulted in the annexation of the Punjab. The high character and brilliant success of the group of men who established the British administration in the Punjab, their magnificent services at the period of the Mutiny, and the fact that their province was conterminous with the Afghan tribes, gave them for many years the decisive voice in the conduct of frontier affairs. The

policy of John Lawrence as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and afterwards as Viceroy of India, has received the perhaps appropriate nickname of "masterly inactivity"; but it is evident from the exposition of his views written by Wyllie, who enjoyed his confidence, that his determination to keep clear of Afghanistan had relation to the circumstances of the time, and was very far from being an absolute unchangeable doctrine.¹ Its practical result was in great measure to heal the sores left by the first war; and Lawrence himself, under the influence of Edwardes, concluded the first treaty by which an Ameer received those conditional promises of help which might, with advantage, have been given to Dost Mahomed in 1837.

The second Afghan war was conceived as the counter-stroke to the Russian mission to Kabul, itself a repartee to the policy which had led to the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano. This time, however, the conquest of the country was not intended. The purpose was only to annex certain border districts hardly amenable to the authority of the ruler of Kabul, which would give the English assured communication up to the edge of the Ameer's territory.

The Ameer, Shere Ali, after the first British success,

¹ Lord Lawrence believed that any attempt on the part of Russia to advance into Transcaspia would either fail or be a most difficult, most costly, and most tedious operation.—See Lord Roberts, "India Past and Present," in *Scottish Geographical Magazine* for December, 1893.

retired to Afghan-Turkestan, where he died. His successor, Yakoub Khan, at once agreed to the English terms and made peace, but the terms imposed upon him contained the old ambiguity. The cession of Kuram and other districts was no real dismemberment or diminution of Afghanistan, and was unlikely to cause permanent soreness. But to accept a British resident at Kabul was for the Ameer to admit the subordination of the country to British influence. It seems to me to have been a mistake to require it; for the demand implied, what was not the case, that the country had been conquered. The instinct of the Afghans resented this expression of a supremacy which had not been asserted by arms. The result was the murder of Cavagnari, and, as a consequence, the British invasion. Lord Roberts defeated the Afghans and occupied Kabul, from which the utmost exertions of the natives and their tribesmen failed to dislodge him. Then was the moment when Afghanistan might have been declared a British province, and might without disproportionate effort have been transformed into such a bulwark for India as the Punjab has been since the second Sikh war.

But meanwhile there had been a change of Government at home, and the new Cabinet was deeply committed against any extension of the Empire. The policy of alliance as distinct from that of conquest was revived; and Abdurrahman Khan was invited to become Ameer, upon condition that he should have no relations

of his own with Russia. Kandahar was eventually restored to him.

The policy of alliance as distinct from that of conquest has, since 1880, been maintained by both parties. In 1885 the Russians advanced up to the edge of Afghanistan, and the diplomatic interference of the British Government led to the delimitation of a frontier from the Hari Rud to the Oxus. More recently the advance of Russia in the region of the Pamirs has led to communications between the two Governments, of which the result may be a further delimitation of the frontier. The approach of Russia has occasioned a number of changes on the British frontier, partly by way of military preparation, and partly by way of the assertion of British authority among tribes who were previously neither under Great Britain nor the Ameer, and through whose territory pass communications of much importance for an efficient defence.

The recent operations near Gilgit had the effect of bringing under British authority the country which, on the south side of the great mountain chain, intervenes between the territory of Kashmir and that of the Ameer of Kabul. Gilgit and Hunza have been annexed, Chitral has received a British resident, and relations have been opened with Kaffristan. It remains in this part of the country to establish such communications as may be necessary through the districts intervening between these frontier tribes and Peshawar.

In order to understand what has been done in the south of Peshawar, it is necessary in a rough general way to dissect the map of Afghanistan. The country consists of two great mountain chains or belts, of which the principal one, a prolongation of the Himalayas, runs from Hunza or Gilgit to Herat; the other, which may be conveniently called the Suliman range, runs from Kabul and Peshawar southward by Quetta and Khelat to the sea.

To the south of Kandahar the country lying beyond the Suliman range is open and level, though for the most part desert. As regards this range, therefore, an Indian army assembled near Kandahar would be in the position which I have described as the most advantageous—in the plain on the enemy's side of the mountains. The military arrangements of recent years aim at rendering practicable the concentration of an Indian army in that plain, and at the fulfilment of the conditions which we have seen are imposed by this strategy. Railways and roads from the Indus have been constructed through the mountains, and the security of these communications has been ensured by the extension of British jurisdiction over the tribes that inhabit the districts which they traverse. It may be observed that in the opinion of Clausewitz, whose chapters on mountain warfare are considered the most authoritative exposition of the subject, there is one exception to the rule that a general on the defensive ought not to risk a decisive

battle in a mountainous region. "The disadvantages of a hill country," he writes, "would disappear, and all its advantages would remain if the defence of the chain consisted in the concentration of the army upon an extensive mountain plateau. Here we could imagine a very strong front, flanks exceedingly difficult of access, and yet the most perfect freedom of movement in the interior and in the rear of the position. Such a position would be one of the strongest that exists, but it is hardly more than a dream."

The position which has been selected and prepared at Quetta realises this dream. A position or a fortress does not defend itself, but the situation of Quetta is such that a skilful general with a disciplined army at that point ought to frustrate any attempt to invade India by marching through Herat, that is, round the end of the great northern mountain range.

The possession of the passes through the Sulimans between Quetta and Peshawar makes it possible to move forces into Afghanistan whenever they may be required; and the influence which the Indian Government has now asserted among the tribes of these mountains must, if wisely used, bring into the British service a great number of the best fighting men of these border clans.

All these preparations are excellent, and there is reason to believe that, supposing adequate reinforcements from England are sent to India in good time, any Russian army that might at present throw itself against

the British frontier would meet with crushing defeat and disaster.

This, however, is not the eventuality that has to be faced. A Russian advance, the possibility of which in a discussion of British policy may be assumed without discourtesy, would bring the Russian troops not across the Indian but across the Afghan frontier. Fourteen years of relation with the Ameer, and promises and treaties that have now for the third time been renewed, pledge Great Britain to repel a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The policy of alliance,—or, to use the stereotyped official phrase, of a strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan,—has no meaning unless it is to lead to military action of this kind. But the military preparations that have been made do not cover such action. Without a larger army, in particular a larger British force than India possesses or England has ready to lend her, and without the extension of the railways to Kabul and Kandahar, it would be difficult to eject the Russians from Afghan-Turkestan or from Herat, if at any time they should advance to the one or the other, and should defeat, as they probably would, the Afghan forces opposed to them.

Thus in regard to the north-west frontier, as in regard to the rest of the Empire, the nation has been without a plan. There have been two rival projects, neither of them arising from a full consideration of the ultimate needs of India and of the Empire. Twice Afghanistan

has been invaded without a mature design of conquest, and on each occasion the war, having had to be conducted at a distance of hundreds of miles from the nearest Indian base, has been difficult and costly beyond all proportion to its results, while the influence that has been gained over the Afghans by fighting has not been sufficient. After each war the policy has been reversed. Since the last war, the policy adopted has been to make the defence of India depend upon the help of the Afghans. Yet the means prepared are not those which will ensure the defeat of the Russians on crossing the line which separates them from Afghanistan, but arrangements for the repulse of an attack upon India, possible only after the defeat of the Afghans.

In any case, a large reinforcement of the Indian army from England will be needed for a serious war on the north-west frontier; yet it is doubtful whether, even now, the arrangements have been made to supply it in time. Pledges have thus been given to the Ameer, without the preparations to which these pledges point having been completed.

The recent mission to Kabul no doubt gives a better foundation to the hope that the Afghans will be true to the alliance that has been made. But as the net result of fifty years of vacillation, a situation has been created in which either of the courses which Russia could take in case of quarrel would greatly embarrass India. Russia might seize Afghanistan north of the

mountains, without attempting more. In that case it would be a hard task to recover the province for Afghanistan, especially if the Afghans preferred losing it to accepting British help. Yet the effect upon our political credit in Asia would be very grave. It would undermine that confidence in our power which is the mainstay of the Indian Empire. Or Russia might, in case England were engaged in a maritime war, attempt the entire conquest of Afghanistan. To prevent this would require a great effort from India, at a moment when the possibility of reinforcement would be doubtful ; and it would be a war waged in that one of the three theatres which, without the certainty of Afghan co-operation, is the most disadvantageous to us. So much from the purely Indian point of view. But from the imperial point of view, the policy has been still more objectionable, at any rate since the Russian advance to Merv.

A foreseeing Cabinet would never without a struggle have permitted the Russian frontier to touch the mountains north of Herat, nor to pass beyond the desert of Turkestan. By the acquisition of their present border, the Russians are enabled, if they wish, to oppose at the northern issues of the passes an English army debouching into Afghan-Turkestan. Thus the British Government has lost the chance of securing in Afghanistan a position from which an offensive counterstroke would have been practicable in case of need. A British force

at Herat or Balkh, or even the power of assembling one at either of those places, would have been the means of counteracting a Russian move. It would have been an excellent, perhaps the best instrument for securing the independence of Persia, or for excluding Russian influence from that country. It would have been at all times an appreciable weight in the balance of diplomacy.

There can be no doubt that one motive of the Russian advance up to the Afghan border was the desire to be able to exercise pressure upon England in regard to her policy in Europe. The true reply was to have turned the tables on Russia by acquiring to the north of the Afghan mountains a position from which England could have exerted a pressure upon Russia in Asia.

The present situation requires in England a Government with a clear purpose firmly held; in other words, a Government representing a united nation. Such a Government will use its position in Europe to prevent, if possible, the greatest danger to India,—that of a combined attack by sea and land on the British power, and will meet the first sign of Russian aggression upon the British sphere of influence in Asia by energetic action, leaving no room for misinterpretation. In that case there need be no anxiety.

On the Eastern frontier it is evident that Siam being helpless will be annexed by France up to the

line which Great Britain may trace as the limit. At that limit, however much the nominal sovereignty of Siam may be preserved, the restraining force will be the British power. Such a line is in fact, though not in name, a British frontier. Nothing is more misleading than a metaphor turned into a political catchword, such as the expression "buffer state". The phrase was coined to conceal our failures in Afghanistan where the real object of our first war against Dost Mahomed was to establish just such a protectorate as is now required in Siam. So long as the Russians could not come near Afghanistan they did not attack it. As soon as they were near enough they attacked the Afghans, and Great Britain stepped in to protect them. A buffer is something that resists compression and yields only to expand again. If Afghanistan is thought to have this capacity it is because the country is full of natural obstacles and its people are warriors. But Siam contains no such obstacles as the Afghan mountains, and its people are not warlike. As a buffer between France and England, it would be like an egg-shell between two ironclads. There is some excuse for the fiction of a buffer state between British territory and that of Russia, because Russia can move her troops towards India by land where they cannot be stopped by British action at sea. In the case of France in the far East there is no such excuse.

A French frontier touching our own in Siam, though

it might be an inconvenience, would be no danger whatever, provided we are strong enough at sea; for in that case not a Frenchman can land in Siam, Annam or Tonquin, except on sufferance. The only precaution needed in case the frontiers are to meet, as I believe that they must, is to annex or declare a protectorate over the portion of the Malay Peninsula not yet in our occupation. This step will confine the French communications with Indo-China to the sea, which is our element, and to the straits, which are in our power.

The oscillation of the British Government between two policies is not more dangerous to the external relations of India than to the management of that Empire within itself. The Indian Empire is the direct result of the British supremacy at sea and of the European conflicts in the course of which that supremacy was asserted. At the present day the all-important question turns not upon the origin of our position in India but upon the character which it has acquired. The purpose and scope of the British rule have been determined by the deliberate judgment of the British nation. With each successive step by which the administrative authority in India was transferred from the East India Company to the government of the Queen, the intention has been more and more clearly marked that India shall be governed not for the exclusive advantage of Englishmen or of the British nation, but with a view to the welfare of the inhabitants of the different countries of which the

Indian Empire is composed. India for the Indians is not the invention of Hindoo, Parsee, or Mussulman ; it is the maxim of the Indian Government. Upon this subject a great deal of misconception prevails, which it is the more difficult to remove because those who are best able to explain the truth, the Englishmen who have spent their lives in the Government of India, are too often regarded as partial witnesses, and for that reason are apt to be reticent in proportion to the authority which ought to be recognised in their utterances.

The English Government is making India. There are in the country a multitude of races, a multitude of religions. The whole vast area is honeycombed with racial and religious antipathies. The very conception of its unity and of a community between its inhabitants is the result of the English power ; and in that sense of patriotism which means action for the good of the whole community there are no Indian patriots except the English and a very few of their native pupils. The Bengali understands India for the Bengalis, though he knows it to be impossible except by hoodwinking the British public. Take away the British Government and the Bengalis would be conquered in six months by their neighbours from the north-west. Let the British public decree that India is to be governed by competition wallahs, chosen in India, and the whole administration will shortly be worked by Parsees and Bengalis because the Parsee and the Bengali are clever at

examinations. But India for the Indians means a fair field and no favour for all the inhabitants of the peninsula. That is attainable only in one way,—by the exercise of British authority in firm and impartial, that is in British hands. The newspapers, as I write, are full of the fights between Mussulmans and Hindoos at Bombay, in the North-West Provinces, and in Burmah. Can there be impartiality between these hostile creeds in a magistracy taken from either? The plain fact is, that the only strong impartial honest class to be found in India is British. The British administrators, when they are let alone and not overruled by some party cry in England, govern India for the Indians. If they are removed, either by the fall of our Empire, or by the enforced application to India of some new-found dogma dear to a party at home, the hopes of the Indians are doomed. The ultimate future of India lies no doubt in the preparation of a class of natives capable of taking their places in an honest administration. But in no part of India have native rule and the conditions of native life offered such a preparation.

There is at home a class of public men who seem to regard representative government, local and national, as panaceas universally applicable, and to think that England's duty to India involves the exportation to that country of the latest political inventions from Europe. In our own country, where most men are manly and fairly honest, representative government

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has grown up very gradually out of the determination not to be taxed without being able to prevent the money being used for purposes which the bulk of the nation disliked. It has answered its purpose moderately well, and has kept the government in touch with the temper of the people. But it requires manly men, intelligent men, and a widespread interest in national affairs. If a race has not plenty of backbone and plenty of practical good sense, these qualities cannot be manufactured with a ballot-box. They must be bred. Can any one say how long that will take, and what are the conditions? In our own case our earliest known ancestors, who came here across the North Sea, were sturdy folk to begin with: the race has had centuries of the Christian religion, and centuries of struggling within and without to make it what it is; yet with all this preparation our constitutional system dates from 1688, our extended franchise only from the first Reform Bill, and our present by no means universal suffrage is but the creation of yesterday. It seems sheer madness to think of applying in India doctrines and practices that even among ourselves are brand new.

The British government in India is based upon the utmost possible toleration to all religions. But it is one thing to tolerate idolatry, another thing to give political power to an idolatrous race. The Hindoos, or at least many of the races among whom the Hindoo religion prevails, are intelligent, industrious and docile.

A few of them after long and close contact with Europeans undergo a modification of character, and are brought nearer to the European standard. But the mass of the Hindoos are separated by a tremendous gulf from all that Europe holds sacred. It is impossible for a European to see without a shudder the filth-smeared idols which are the objects of Hindoo worship. The Indian law courts reveal the multitude of foul superstitions in which Hindoo life is enveloped. Their records seem to show that the command, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," has never reached the Hindoo world ; and it is certain that among the mass of the people no Hindoo child learns at its mother's knee the simple duty of telling the truth.

When the Civil Service was thrown open to Englishmen the test established was that of an examination. It secured that the Englishmen selected should have attained a certain educational standard. But to apply a similar standard in India—the same standard cannot be applied, for Indian examinations at the best are incomparably inferior to English ones—is a totally different thing.¹ The essential requirement in an

¹The Mahomedans, very many of whom serve in our armies, and who remember well that before our advent men of their religion had the chief power in India, bitterly resent the system of selection by literary examinations for the public service. They feel themselves superior, both as believers in one invisible God, and as men of warlike race and character, to the classes who enter at the examination door.

administrator is character; and this the Englishman has by his birth, his breeding, by the atmosphere in which he has been brought up. Even if he is deficient in backbone, the responsibility thrown upon him of representing his country among an Eastern population will nerve and strengthen him. No amount of literary training will give the Hindoo or the Parsee the honesty, the judgment, the incorruptibility, which are presumed in the Englishman; and the native in office is necessarily without the strongest stimulus to uprightness which the Englishman in the same position cannot evade—the responsibility of belonging to the ruling race. We have opened in India a multitude of schools in which we teach English and the rudiments of Western knowledge, and which are the avenues to Government employment in the lower grades. But character is not taught in lessons at a desk. It comes from living under the influence of a sense of duty, and from the tradition of centuries. To plant it in India in a few years is a sheer impossibility. The foundation of character is discipline, that is, enforced obedience under just orders. Such a discipline exists in the Indian armies, and service in our native regiments gives the best education, in the true sense of the word, that natives of India are receiving from us.

The welfare of India lies in the continuance of the British rule, because that rule alone means peace, law, toleration and fair play between class and class. But

we may distinguish between two methods. The one, which is based upon the knowledge of Indian life and conditions, tries to employ the materials which it finds, in the shape of native institutions, in the spirit of equity and of sympathy with the people among whom it operates; the other is the effort to enforce in India the doctrines of European sects and parties. This is profoundly injurious. Take for example the notion of equality. That the State should be absolutely impartial in the administration of justice and in the distribution of burdens is perhaps the fundamental principle of political equity. But the theorem that all men are naturally equal contradicts the elementary facts of life, and can be held only by persons who either shut their eyes to the condition of the world in which they live, or are at issue with society as regards the foundation upon which it rests. It is in short a revolutionary dogma. In Europe, where all classes form one community, and share so many rights, duties, beliefs, and traditions, this superficial theory can find adherents, for there is among Europeans sufficient uniformity of character to make it plausible. But in the East equality is unintelligible.

Hindoo society is founded upon caste. The Mahomedan religion teaches the absolute superiority of the Moslem over the infidel, and Moslem and Christian alike look down, and cannot but look down, upon the worshippers of idols. These are social inequalities

which no government can remove. The advent of British rule has introduced another. The Englishman is head and shoulders above all the Orientals who surround him. He may be less subtle; less quick and delicate in his perceptions; he is, perhaps, too hard to sympathise with much that Orientals feel. But compared with them he is as rock beside clay, fearless, just, inflexible. He is built up upon an adamantine framework of duty, and beside him the Easterns are as molluscs. The quick Orientals recognise this difference, and they regard the English with unlimited respect. They may hate the English for their hard unsympathetic bearing and for their cold exclusiveness; and this hate is commoner than is suspected here at home. But when an Englishman goes out there to talk the radical cant about equality and representative government, he appears to them to be either a lunatic or a traitor.

If there are Englishmen who wish to represent the cause of the Indian people, their proper course is first to undertake a voluntary exile of twenty years, and to live with the natives in Lucknow or Poona. When they have learned to speak the native language and to think as the natives think, they may be capable interpreters for the class they have learned to know. Then they may do a good work as missionaries in England of the Indian cause. But they will have uphill work, for the speeches they will then make will not excite the enthusiasm of British constituencies.

There is a Hindoo saying that an elephant has two sets of teeth—one set for show, and the other for mastication. The meaning of the parable is that language serves the Hindoo for two purposes,—to say what he thinks, and to say what he does not think. An Englishman must live many years with Hindoos before he will see their teeth as well as their tusks.

The school which assumes to represent the cause of India for the Indians advocates the more extensive employment of natives in the higher judicial and administrative posts; and quotes the words of the Queen's proclamation to the effect that no one shall be debarred from obtaining any post in the public service merely by reason of his race or religion. It may be doubted whether any native is excluded from any post merely on account of his race or religion. But the native has not within him the stays that hold an Englishman to his duty. Indian life is not a medium that can give to an Indian the necessary moral inflexibility, which no amount of Indian school and Indian university can produce. Therefore, however hard it may be upon the native aspirant to a post to find the door shut, to open the door would be a far greater hardship for the people whose affairs would be entrusted to him. The welfare of the people requires not administrators of native birth, but administrators of the highest character and the greatest strength. There is no doubt that these can be had only from England. But they

must be Englishmen of the highest character. In order to preserve this quality it is necessary to guard against that centralisation which tends to make all but the highest Indian officials merely clerks or servants, to carry out orders framed in Simla or in London. Good government in India means government by the man on the spot. It cannot be had if the man on the spot is ruled through the post office or the telegraph wire by a committee sitting a thousand miles away.

We are going too fast in India. The Romans performed for Southern Europe a task analogous to that of the Indian Empire. The Romans were nearer in race, climate, and religion to Gauls, Greeks and Africans, than we are to the Indians; but the Romans kept their world under a heavy hand for four or five centuries. Some of our public men seem to think we are to make India in a fraction of that time; and advocate a policy, within and without, calculated to bring about our ejection from the country before even that short period of education has been completed.

It is right that Englishmen at home should maintain the principle that India shall be governed for the benefit of its own population; but it is impossible for any man, or any assembly of men at home, to prescribe in detail the methods by which this principle is to be realised in a country separated from us by a quarter of the circumference of the globe, and so different in all the conditions of its life and of its history that it

takes many years for an Englishman to understand them. The true advisers to whom Englishmen should listen in regard to the government of India are the Englishmen who have lived and worked there, whose example is the best lesson that India has ever received, and who, as a class, have the proudest record that Englishmen can imagine—the record of duty faithfully performed.

X.

THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE.

A TRUE man, when he has come to know himself and the world, grasps in his mind an object, appropriate to his place and powers, to the attainment of which he gives himself. The aim inspires and moulds the man. A great aim uplifts and expands him; its pursuit through difficulties strengthens him; its realisation reveals him to the world. To abide through life by one great purpose involves conflicts without and within. There are times when the object is obscured; when its value seems doubtful and the possibility of compassing it is hidden. In such moments a wise man collects himself, reviews his past, and stands by the decisions made in brighter hours. He trusts in the singleness of his eye, and resolves to be true to himself.

A nation, too, must have a purpose. There must be a design to which it works, an aim with which it is identified. When there is hesitation or doubt, it should be removed by recalling the past and by considering the limits laid down and the opportunities given by nature. The purpose of national life, the scope of national policy, cannot be deduced merely

from the circumstances of the moment. It must flow of necessity from the nation's position in the world.

The mark of a nation is independence, the power to determine its own fate within the bounds of nature. A great nation must be able, upon occasion, if need be, to face the world in arms. This means for England that her national existence is bound up with the mastery of the sea.

What, then, are the conditions upon which England can command the sea ?

It is evident that she must maintain and cherish the elements of a great naval force, a school of great sea captains, a hardy breed of sailors, and the ships and weapons of a powerful fleet. But what is to be the measure of this force ? Must it be the equal of all other navies together, or of a combination of some of them ? Is there a limit to the naval force that may be required, or does the national policy involve the maintenance of an Invincible Armada ?

In past times it has been sufficient to keep a fleet superior to any other in the quality of its leaders and in the skill of its crews, but not so overwhelmingly strong in numbers as to exceed all other navies.

For the same conditions that compel England to assert the command of the sea make her a member of the European community, which is a combination of independencies. The self-defence of England has almost always helped the self-defence of some other

Power or Powers. The British navy has been at the same time the guardian of England's independence and the preserver of the equipoise between the States of Europe or between the groups into which they have been ranged. This dual character of England's action is founded in her geographical situation. The command of the sea exerted by England and the balance of power in Europe are two names for the same thing, two aspects of one activity, like the two faces of a coin.

Upon the command of the sea, of which the maintenance of the balance of power is the condition, rests the British Empire, the action of England in countries beyond the pale of European law and life, where an indigenous civilisation has never developed, or has fallen into decay. In all such regions, wherever they border the sea, British influence during the greater part of the nineteenth century has been supreme. To some places English settlers have gone in such numbers as to create new colonies. Where there has been the need for defence against attacks by land, as in India and at the Cape, the British Government has been forced to extend its borders. But the possession of territory has not been sought. The British sea power has been used as the servant of mankind. The slave trade has been destroyed; piracy has been cleared off the sea; order has been kept on every shore, and the traders of all nations have enjoyed the equal protection of the British flag. Englishmen have had no monopoly, no special

privilege. Where the British Government has been established, the native has been an object of as much solicitude as the European.

We may perhaps distinguish between the Colonies as the children of Great Britain, and Empire as the exercise of British rule, or of a British influence distinct from rule in countries without a Government of their own. Empire in this sense is the necessary result of England's position, the work imposed upon her by nature. By the expansion of her trade and the strengthening of her maritime energies it contributes to her prosperity. At the same time it is a trust of which the responsibility uplifts the national character.

Thus the two functions of the navy to command the sea and to maintain the equilibrium of Europe are the two pillars of an arch, of which the crown is the imperial task of bringing into the community of civilisation races that have hitherto been strangers to its laws. Each part of this threefold mission is vital, and the bond between them cannot be severed.

The record of recent years is that of a series of challenges to England's imperial work. It is a tribute to the greatness of her power that the antagonism has been manifested as yet only in regard to subordinate enterprises and spheres of influence of minor importance. But these disputes are the symptoms of a graver conflict. At every point where French and English policy meet, they are in hostile contact, and it is impossible to

review the disagreements between the two nations without perceiving that the aims of France are diametrically opposed to interests vital to Great Britain, that is to essential portions of her national purpose. Either France must abandon these aims, or there will be a war in which England at least will stake her whole existence.

The policy of Russia is ambiguous. She has of late years acquired a position in Central Asia from which any further advance must be dangerous to the Indian Empire. At the same time she has revealed the design of creating a naval power in the Mediterranean which could at any time be used in combination with that of France against the British command of the sea, of which the Mediterranean is at present the weak point. The possibility, and even the probability, of a war in which England would be opposed both to France and to Russia has long been perceived. But this does not exhaust the possible combination. France has for some time persistently endeavoured to sever Italy from the Triple Alliance, and to restore that ascendancy over the foreign relations of Spain which is a tradition both of the old French monarchy and of the first Empire. It is hardly possible for Greece to avoid becoming the subordinate ally of Russia, in case Russia acquires a foothold in the Mediterranean.

It has been by the weakness of British Governments that the French and Russian aims in opposition to-

those of England have been encouraged. A generation of British statesmen has been afraid of Empire. They hesitated to grasp the opportunities which were open to them in India, in Egypt, on the African coasts and in the Pacific. There was no failure in the energy of the people, and most of the regions for which Cabinets refused to be responsible were flooded with British enterprise. The shrinking from Empire was accompanied by a neglect of the means by which it must be asserted. When the challenges came the ministries were taken aback. Not having the firm will to resist encroachments on the legitimate sphere of England, they were without the naval force necessary to give effect to that will. The command of the sea has now to be won afresh by preparation, by wise policy, if need be by fighting.

The additions which had been made, and are still to be made, to the strength of the navy may be signs that the nation is awakening. So soon as this is believed by continental statesmen to be serious,—so soon, that is, as they can feel sure that England has abandoned her hesitation, and that she will at any cost defend herself and assert her imperial vocation and her command of the sea, the whole situation in Europe will be changed.

That situation, as it has shaped itself by degrees since 1882, is the effort of some of the continental States, whose purposes are not aggressive, to secure

themselves against the purposes of others, which involve the subversion of the existing European order and the reduction to a condition of dependence of two of the great Powers, and most of the small ones. The aggressive policies are those of France and of Russia.

To France, the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine is hardly any longer a vital aim. No French statesman would propose merely for this purpose a war in which France should be without allies and Germany without other enemies. A more serious aim is to command the Mediterranean. A French supremacy in the Mediterranean must be the end of the independence of Italy. It cannot be viewed without apprehension by Austria, and it must bring the Balkan States into a situation of dependence upon France which in itself can hardly be regarded as desirable by any other continental nation.

Russia seeks the control of the straits which unite the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and in all probability also the actual possession of Constantinople. This is an end the attainment of which must reduce the Balkan States and Asia Minor to the position of Russian protectorates, and is incompatible with the continuance of the Austrian Monarchy as a great European Power. It must be resisted in the interest of the independence of the countries most nearly concerned, and would be a danger to Europe, as is evident from the fact that those countries unaided could hardly hope to resist it with success.

Russia and France are confronted by the Triple Alliance. Any settlement whatever, whether effected peaceably or by force, involves either that one of the two sides should abandon its own purposes, and acquiesce in those of the other, or that there should be a compromise. But the purpose of the Powers forming the Triple Alliance is merely negative; they object to the execution of any part of the designs cherished by France and by Russia. A compromise, therefore, would imply at least their partial acquiescence in the purposes to which they are opposed. In other words, a compromise means a partial surrender. To this neither Italy nor Austria can ever voluntarily agree.

The efforts of the Triple Alliance to develop forces sufficient to ensure success in the preservation of the *status quo* have placed a great strain upon each of the three countries, especially upon Italy, which is the weakest, and perhaps the most exposed. The doubt whether the alliance can prolong these exertions, and whether it will be able to maintain successfully the struggle of which the prospect caused its creation, has weighed heavily upon Germany. She has most to lose in case of defeat; she is the least interested of the three in the Mediterranean and in the Bosphorus; she would, in case of war, have to bear the chief burden. Her statesmen have therefore sought an alternative policy. Their first duty is to Germany, not to Austria and Italy. Are they justified in staking Germany's existence upon

quarrels which, though their ultimate bearing upon Germany's welfare is not doubtful, are yet not directly German interests? Prince Bismarck's answer to this question was a decided No. His policy was, while by his alliances he secured Germany as well as might be, in case the conflict should begin, to postpone it as long as possible. He made every effort to avoid a breach with Russia, because he saw that it must lead to a Franco-Russian alliance. To prevent the formation of that alliance, he went so far as to co-operate with France against England in 1884-85. It is far from clear whether he would not have carried that co-operation even further than he did; and possibly the fall of M. Ferry averted from England a danger of which she was unconscious.

German policy in regard to Bulgaria was a skilful balancing between Russia and Austria. Bismarck would never commit himself to a war for the safeguarding of the Bosphorus. The German Emperor would seem to have gone further in the direction of supporting Austria than Bismarck thought wise. But their recent reconciliation, if it has any political meaning at all, implies that the Emperor's second thoughts have led him to share Bismarck's view, and that he also shrinks from a war against both France and Russia for the defence of Austria and of Italy. Thus it may become the policy of Germany to remain neutral, and to leave Austria and Italy to take care of themselves. In that

case, Austria and Italy must submit to their fate; they must accept the best terms they can make with their neighbours.

It is evident that Germany is placed in a dilemma. She is compelled to hesitate between her duty to Europe and her duty to herself. For the cause of Austria and of Italy is essentially that of the independence of nations in which Europe is most deeply interested. It is not merely these two states that are concerned. Their downfall would carry with it more or less directly that of all the small Powers: of the Balkan states, of the Scandinavian states, and of Belgium. The defence of all these Powers can be undertaken by Germany only at the risk of her existence, and without the certainty of success. It is therefore doubtful whether, under such conditions, she ought not, in self-preservation, to sacrifice them, and to endeavour to make such terms with her two great neighbours as will save her for the present, and perhaps enable her in future to secure herself by siding with one against the other.

The situation thus disclosed, of which the gravity is proved by the stress which it lays upon Germany, is the struggle of Europe to preserve its equilibrium in the absence of its natural regulator, the sea power of England. Thus, in the present day, as in the past, England's determination to assert her own purposes and to defend herself, must range her on the side of those

nations of Europe which seek to defend themselves and one another against a preponderance that would be dangerous to them all.

We are now in a position to consider the question of the quantitative standard of British naval preparation. It is evidently needless to create a navy equal to all the navies of Europe if half the European Powers are of necessity on England's side.

In November, 1891, General von Leszczynski, who had a short time previously retired from a very high command in the Prussian army, published a brief paper on the chances of a European war. In this paper I find the following passage: "It is in the present situation of great importance whether or no England remains neutral. If she joins us the balance of strength is considerably modified. Russia must then leave two army corps in Finland and Livonia, and put a strong garrison into Riga. We should require no troops to protect our coasts, and none in Schleswig, and should have the sea open as a channel of supplies. It is the same in the south. If England, with Italy and Austria, holds the Mediterranean, three Italian army corps are set free to take the field. Pleasant as all this sounds, Germany must not reckon upon this alliance, because, though England hates Russia, she is afraid of France. We may say that the Triple Alliance balances the Dual Alliance, and England's decision turns the scale. The rôle of that country is therefore

most eminently fortunate, and yet it will not be played."¹

If the difference between England's alliance and her neutrality suffices to turn the scale and is regarded by one of two sides as the decisive factor, it must be no less valuable in the eyes of the other side. Far more decisive, then, must be the difference between her alliance and her active hostility. Even Prince Bismarck, who has used all his influence to induce Germany to compromise with Russia and with France, does not appear ever to have doubted that the opposite policy ought to be and could safely be adopted if the co-operation of England were assured. A consideration, then, of the present relation of the Powers confirms the view, derived from a retrospect of their relations in the past, that the necessary design of British policy involves the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and that England's command of the sea rests not merely upon the development of naval force, but also upon her defence, in conjunction with other Powers, of European causes in which she and they are alike interested.

England for many years past has been irresolute, aimless, ungoverned and unled. She has forgotten the root from which she sprung, the purpose of her being. It may be that she cannot be aroused; that the spell of the delusions which have caused her to close her

¹ General von Leszczyński had probably been reading Colonel Maurice's *Balance of Military Power in Europe*.

eyes and ignore the world cannot be broken. In that case the end of her greatness is at hand. The other nations are watching her. If she continues the course of timidity and surrender, the encroachments on her empire and on her work will be renewed and increased until one day she will be confronted by a league of armed nations. If she persists in the belief that she is isolated by the sea from the rest of the world, that the weal and woe of Europe is no affair of hers, and that she can ignore Europe and go her own way, the day of challenge will find her alone, for those who would fain be on her side will have made their peace with the adversaries. No Armada can then save her; for the nations whose fellowship she has disclaimed will seek a share in the spoils. They may step in to save her from utter conquest and annexation. But an England living on sufferance as a convenience for Europe is not the inheritance we have received, and an England shorn of empire must be a scene of inexpressible privations and disasters.

These are not empty fears, the phantoms of imagination. They are but the translation into English policy of the questions which disturb Europe. Suppose that the Triple Alliance should collapse, or that its members should make terms with the other side. The only conceivable result would be to strengthen France and Russia for the pursuit of aims which directly clash with the conditions of England's existence. The surrender

of Italy would create a danger to England's sea power such as never arose in the worst crisis of the last century. The surrender of Austria would leave Russia free to move her vast armies from Europe to Asia. The surrender of Italy and Austria would leave Germany in dire straits, and she could avert the struggle for existence only by a promise to look on inactive, or even to assist at the spoliation of England. In that case England would have to fight an almost hopeless struggle against a world in arms, or to end her history by an inglorious capitulation.

There is one course, and one course alone, by which this unhappy prospect can be changed. It consists in a national awakening to the real state of the world, and of a return to the purposes which have made England what she is. To build a fleet, however strong, is not enough, if at the same time we persist in a policy of indifference in regard to European affairs. To declare that we shall take a side will produce little effect unless it is backed up by the convincing proof, furnished by arming in earnest, that the declaration represents the national will.

Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall in 1886 announced the intention of his Government to co-operate with Austria, if need be, in resistance to Russian aggression in the direction of the Straits. During the continuance of his ministry, assurances seem to have been given to Italy that in case of a struggle for maritime inde-

pendence, she would not be left without the help of England. But these declarations, though at the time they may have contributed to keep the peace, were not enough. They awakened no response in England, where the public mind was not prepared for them.

Lord Salisbury was in the position of a leader inadequately supported: a national policy cannot be carried out as the programme of one of two evenly balanced parties. A leader must have the nation behind him. For this reason the policy of 1886 produced little effect in Europe. The Governments of the great Powers could not be sure that Lord Salisbury spoke for England, nor that he might not in a few years cease to direct her policy. These doubts were justified by events; and the conviction was strengthened that England is too uncertain a factor to be reckoned with as an element in the policies of continental states.

Moreover, the announcement of this policy was not accompanied by any determined effort to place upon a proper footing the forces by which alone it could be carried out. The Cabinet introduced a shipbuilding programme, which every one at home and abroad regarded, not as the consequence of a great design, but as the result of a popular agitation unconscious of any definite political purpose. The experts upon whose judgment continental Powers relied pointed to the ill-considered distribution of the naval forces, and to

the incompetent management of the army, as evidence that these preparations need not be taken too seriously.

Lastly, the same Cabinet, in its negotiations regarding Newfoundland, Zanzibar and Madagascar, showed the same timidity and the same weakness as its predecessors.

A very different result would be produced by a general recognition among Englishmen of the true bases of the national greatness. That would enable an English statesman not merely to declare a policy but to carry it out. For England when roused to national, that is to united, action represents a tremendous force, which, thrown into the European balance, must turn the scale. Two-thirds of Europe in agreement are so strong that the other third can without humiliation accept conditions which otherwise would be admissible only after war and defeat. It is thus possible, to use the least sanguine form of expression, that a British statesman, with a united nation behind him and a strong navy at his command, might be the mediator of a settlement by which the peace of Europe could be placed upon lasting foundations. On minor issues all the Powers are ready to compromise. Each must refuse conditions that would touch its independence. In other words, no great change in Europe can be permitted. But once the great Powers agree to renounce territorial or other disturbing ambitions in Europe, diplomacy may proceed deliberately to settle

boundaries of the spheres of influence of the European nations throughout the Old World; and even the fate of Constantinople and Asia Minor may be decided without the sacrifice of countless lives. I can imagine no greater victory of peace than for an English statesman to take the initiative in an act by which Europe shall take Islam under her protection and divert to the spread of a better life among the countless multitudes of Asia and Africa, the energies of Western civilisation which have too often been used for destruction. But this result cannot be arrived at except by a nation firmly united, and led by a man who should be the true exponent of the national genius.

In sketching the outlines of the present situation it has not been my intention to propound a programme, but merely to illustrate the abiding aims of the British nation. Human action can never be reduced to a set of syllogisms; and political action, more than any other, requires to be guided by a judgment ever active and alert, exercised in regard to each occasion as it arises.

A policy can therefore be framed only by the statesman who controls its execution. But the statesman is nothing unless he is the incarnation of the national purpose. The ultimate responsibility rests with the nation, which must be the judge of its own aims. For the law of all human life is that we are identified with our aims, that by them we stand or fall.

A noble purpose clearly grasped and firmly held is,

for nations as for individuals, the spring of greatness. It gives breadth to the mind and force to the will, and lifts up the heart. It brings hope in times of hardship, satisfaction in success, and consolation even in failure. It creates that lofty character which by the manifestation of order in a human life recalls and reflects the order of the universe.

XI.

THE REVIVAL OF DUTY.

FOR a whole generation England seems to have been unconscious of a purpose in the world. The nation has been like a drifting ship, the sport of circumstances ; the very idea of a course marked out upon the chart and pursued in spite of wind or weather has passed out of the popular mind ; it is as though the faculty of government had been paralysed. The institutions are all there, but there is no sign of the presence of the spirit which created them. The cumbrous mechanism of parliamentary government, the cabinet system, the public offices, are exhibited to an admiring world, like the great clock in Strasburg cathedral, as the monument of the ingenuity of a past age ; but the question what the machine is for, and whether it serves its purpose, is looked upon as an audacious impertinence. Even the party system, which has long been regarded with a superstitious reverence, as though it involved the true mystery of national well-being, has degenerated into an empty form. None of the definitions by which the expounders of the constitution justify government by party apply to the parties that exist to-day.

It is impossible not to suspect that these are the symptoms of national decay,—at least, it is certain that a great nation in its decline would exhibit these phenomena. If no other explanation were open the case would be hopeless; for, however much a patriot might regret that the day of his country's greatness was over, he could not hope to galvanise into new life an exhausted nation, nor to breathe a fresh spirit into the forms of a government, if the soil in which it was rooted had lost its sustaining power.

But a different interpretation presents itself. The failure of government may be due, not to degeneracy in the race, but to the prevalence of an erroneous theory. For fifty years Englishmen have been taught that the first duty of government is to have as little to do as possible with the rest of the world. Strange as it may seem, this has been the national creed, and for many years those who have protested against it have preached to deaf ears. In this way the avoidance of a policy has become the practice of governments. This would have been impossible in any country except England, whose peculiar position as mistress of the seas long secured her from danger, while her delicate function of maintaining the balance of Europe, being in its nature intermittent, may long be suspended without the true cause of the inconvenience which ensues to the world being perceived. Thus while Europe for many years has been like a machine disordered because

its fly wheel is out of gear, the British nation has looked on in compassionate disdain at the continent in unstable equilibrium, without ever suspecting that the cause of this derangement lay in its own inaction.

According to this view, then, the nation is suffering not from the decrepitude of old age, but from the weakness of government, caused by lack of exercise for its chief functions.

Good government means knowledge in power. In our day society is so complex, and the various functions which government must superintend are so numerous, that no man can master them all.

Science has organised itself to meet this difficulty by the division of labour, and modern knowledge is based on specialisation. Each worker gives his life to acquiring the mastery of some one branch. In all the arts of life the same practice prevails, so that no one values an amateur's opinion upon any subject that is a matter of professional knowledge.

We recognise this in all our concerns except those of the whole nation; but by way of managing the nation's affairs, we put an amateur at the head of each department. The army, the navy, and the Indian empire are all in charge of men without the elementary training required from the subordinate officers in these departments. The only qualification for managing a public service, however special, is the attainment of a certain eminence as a party politician. It is supposed

that this arrangement is an essential part of the constitution. But it is only essential so long as there are two pretty equal parties contending for office.

Suppose that Lord Salisbury and Lord Rosebery were to agree upon a policy and a programme, as indeed, except upon certain minor matters, they are agreed, and to settle by lot which of them should be Prime Minister, while the other should take charge of the Foreign Office, and that they should choose for the India Office the ablest Anglo-Indian they know, and for the army and the navy the best general and the best admiral they can name,—who would be the losers by this arrangement? One or two politicians, disappointed in their hopes of office; and the party organisers, whose occupation would be gone. But would not the nation be the gainer? The Liberal clubs and the Conservative clubs would find themselves amalgamated, to the mutual benefit of both sets of members. For, in fact, on all the questions that affect the nation the difference between the two parties is scarcely perceptible. At present the issue is Home Rule. But it is not much more than a name. The independence of Ireland is impossible; for no island can be independent unless it has the command of the sea. No one in either party objects to purely Irish affairs being settled by Irishmen. One half of us would give the Irish nearly all that their leaders ask for, and call it a final settlement, as though there were final settlements in the political world. The other half of us

would grant a little less. In the case here imagined, the programme would contain just as much as the slower or less willing half would agree to, and nothing would be said about finality. The Irish leaders would have to admit that half a loaf is better than no bread, and, by making the best use of what they could obtain, would prepare themselves and the nation for a further grant if necessary. There is room for an instalment of Home Rule in Great Britain as well as in Ireland, and much need to relieve the Imperial Parliament of the local trifles that occupy half of its time.

Such an agreement between the parties would not hurt the constitution, for there will always be found extreme men and crotchet-mongers enough to form an opposition; and a strong Government can bear the independent criticism of its own supporters better than a Government that is never sure of more than a bare majority. Whatever may be the course of the two parties and their leaders, the method of laying stress upon matters upon which there is agreement, and of pushing into the background the questions that divide us, must help to give knowledge its true place of command and to relegate opinion to its proper sphere. For the questions, what are the true aims of the nation, what is its use in the world, are questions of geography and history. They are not matters of opinion, except in the sense in which the laws of nature come under that category.

To our grandfathers and even to our fathers, geography and history were little more than collections of facts. But the best minds of our own day have attained to a larger view founded in the recognition of the omnipotence of law, and of the oneness of the universe. To them the whole revolving globe is the single theatre of one great drama, the development of the human race. Geography, with the aid of a multitude of sciences, its handmaids, reveals the part which the earth with all its phenomena and all its laws has played in shaping the destinies, and moulding the character of man. To our earliest forefathers everything in nature was supernatural. To us nature appears as the training ground in which the unwearying effort of intelligence and of will has produced humanity. We can see how mountain and desert, river and sea, have helped to form mankind. At one time the hills and the deserts parted us, and the salt sea kept us asunder. In those days the world was pathless, and every stranger was a foe. But the needs of life bind men together; humanity is community.

This was the first lesson, and it was taught by the Nile, which created the first great community, and so caused the origin of government. The second lesson is free will or independence, which was given to the Greeks by the mountains that divided them. Awakened to a common life, and to the supreme quality of man, to be master of his fate, the early nations sailed the sea and interpreted the

ordered turning of the heavens. Fifty or sixty generations had hardly passed before the stars had taught us that the earth was one, and the sea had carried us round it. Thus mankind has come together, never again to be separated. Dissensions there will be and discord. Many a generation must pass before we shall all recognise one order and one law; but mankind is awakening to its oneness, and is awed even now by the presentiment of a common destiny.

History unfolds the growth of that community of which geography lays bare the conditions. The story of the nations derives its meaning from the connection between them. It is impossible to grasp the purport of the life of any people if it is regarded only from within. Such a history resembles a sentimental romance which records nothing but the feelings of an individual. The true history portrays the nation as one among many, sharing in conflict and in harmony a common life and a common fate. It is hardly possible to enter into history regarded as a single story without acquiring some view of the scope and purpose of each nation's existence and especially of the work and of the aims with which our own nation has been identified, and which in some shape must continue to inspire it.

The scope of a nation's work is not settled by blind fates. Its bounds are set by the same laws that rule the falling stone and the growing plant; its impulses are rooted in the past, as the trees of to-day in the

mould of a bygone vegetation. Like any other organism the nation must adapt itself to its environment. It must pursue its ends by means appropriate to the world about it.

The true statesman will construe the laws that limit a nation's powers, will trace its purposes to their origin, and will apply them to the conditions of his time. Such a man may lead a nation, and he will represent knowledge in power. He requires to be sustained by the general recognition of the truth of his insight. For without this he will be helpless and alone,—above his fellows, yet unknown.

English policy needs to be based upon realities, not upon creeds. If the politics of the next generation are to be better than ours have been, we must make sacrifices for our children, and have them taught a wiser geography, a broader history, than we learned in our school days.

Government implies that there shall be leaders and followers, a few to command and a multitude to obey. These are distinctions which cannot be obliterated without anarchy. Yet in the popular doctrine they are blurred and obscured. It has become a frequent practice for the so-called leader of a political party to announce that he cannot declare his course until the opinions and wishes of his followers have been ascertained. This is a renunciation of leadership. One of the commonest phrases of the day is "popular government"; and nothing is more usual than for a public speaker to inform his audience that government must be

"for the people, by the people, and of the people". Such language is either meaningless or conceals a falsehood. The system of popular representation is, no doubt, the best that can be devised for the purpose of checking a number of abuses to which the exercise of authority is liable. It is frequently supposed to offer some guarantee against the oppression of one class by another class, or a combination of classes; though this is hardly consistent with the theory of the absolute power of a numerical majority. The true function of a parliamentary assembly and of a constituency is rather that of a jury called upon to pronounce its verdict of approval or of disapproval upon the general spirit in which the affairs of the nation are conducted. More than this a constituency at any rate can hardly do; its influence upon government rests upon the character of its representative. To this extent it is true that government is of the people, and by the people; but in the actual decisions, the essential factor is insight based upon knowledge, and the management of those foreign relations upon which the future depends requires a grip of the policies of all the great states, such as can hardly be acquired by any man whose time and energies are mainly devoted to earning his own living. It is therefore impossible and absurd for a statesman to look to his followers for guidance in the conduct of affairs. But a constituency can without difficulty follow the exposition of a policy; and where two

policies are fairly laid before the nation, the verdict of the constituencies may be expected rightly to reflect the national judgment upon the aims and spirit of the respective leaders who have appealed to them.

The first requisite, then, for national action is initiative or leadership, and the mark of a leader is responsibility. A man without a policy is not a leader, and never can be ; and the leader who has a policy will be identified with it, and will stand or fall by it. A statesman not the representative of a definite purpose is a sham. The fact that a man is the accepted head of a party does not make him a statesman. We have seen too many politicians spend their time watching the constituencies, and trimming their sails accordingly. A leader of men will have thought out the questions with which he proposes to deal, and will know his own mind ; his policy may be accepted or rejected, but he will never dream of severing himself from it. Nothing exhibits more clearly the national indecision, the absence of any real policy, than the fact that the politicians of the present day never fall : they go out of office without the slightest consciousness of rejection, failure or blame, and come back to office a year or two afterwards as though it belonged to them. If responsibility has any meaning at all, it means that a man cannot be separated from his acts, and will be called to account for them. But in the present system responsibility in this sense attaches to nobody. The essence of

the cabinet is irresponsibility, concealed by a fiction. Every act of government is assumed to be the act of the cabinet as a whole. When, therefore, the House of Commons censures any act of government the whole cabinet resigns. This resignation entails no further consequence, it implies no stigma, it carries with it no penalty; the ministers who have left office appear on the front opposition bench as the honoured equals of their successors. The affairs of the nation may have been mismanaged, its vital purposes may have been abandoned, and its very existence imperilled; but no one is blamed. The same two sets of men, who have all along been managing or mismanaging affairs, continue alternately to occupy their posts as the cabinet and the leaders of the opposition. Possibly enough this may be quite right; but it seems an unfortunate use of words to apply to this system the term "responsible government".

In every one of the great departments of state supreme authority is concentrated in the hands of one man, the cabinet minister at its head. No one below him is responsible except to obey him; and he, though he is always officially described as "responsible," is in fact entirely sheltered from any kind of accountability. This irresponsible minister with absolute power, being almost invariably without the special knowledge required for the successful working of his department, is in the hands of the professional officials below him.

It is chiefly to the high character of these professional men that the excellences of the public services are due. But the practice by which authority is withheld from those who have the special knowledge required, and by which they are treated as the irresponsible advisers of an irresponsible chief, cannot but tend to take away from them whatever gifts of spontaneous action they may possess.

A healthy organisation in any community would allow each man to find his place according to his powers, not according to his birth, and would provide a training for each adapted to his faculties. No party to-day denies this view, which carries with it selection according to fitness and according to the fulfilment of duty throughout society. In ordinary careers this selection operates spontaneously. In the public services it can operate only through the men at the head of departments. Great, then, is the need to give power in the public services to men who have knowledge, and to hold them accountable. There will then be little fear of favouritism; for the man whose own career depends on the efficiency of his department will as a rule seek the best assistants, regardless of social and family ties, and will do all he can to train them for and by their work.

The meaning of initiative and responsibility may be illustrated from the position of a naval officer in command of one of the Queen's ships on some distant coast. There is a disturbance, and the officer is urged

to interfere, and to use force for the protection of some alleged British interest. He cannot seek instructions, for there is no telegraph; and his decision must be prompt. He must make up his own mind one way or another. But when he has decided and has acted or declined to act, the Admiralty will consider the case. If the officer's decision, whether it resulted in action or in abstention, is not approved, his career will suffer; it may even come to an abrupt termination. The officer is bound to act on his judgment, and to abide the consequences. It seems, in an age of weakness, a hard choice. But the discipline that enforces it makes men. Indeed, it but expresses with rigorous logic the great law of all human life, that a man and his acts are one.

Let us take a larger view of this law, and try to grasp its bearing on the fate of nations. States become great and decline not by accident and at hap-hazard, but according to their uses. There are currents in the world's affairs, and its great causes ebb and flow. Where a state is identified with a rising cause, a purpose necessary to mankind, it grows with irresistible force. When the purpose is fulfilled, and the conditions which occasioned it have changed, either the state must find a new vocation appropriate to the new order, or it must wane and decay, making place for fresh energies and the promotion of other aims. The choice of a policy may be the work of one man

or of many ; it may be the act of a despot, or may result from the deliberations of a representative assembly, but the consequences to the nation are in either case inevitable, perhaps irrevocable. France attributes the policy with which, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, she was identified to a series of statesmen, to Henry IV., to Richelieu, and to Mazarin. Prussia was made by her kings, above all by Frederick the Great. England has perhaps owed more to circumstances than most other nations. Her geographical situation and her peculiar relations with Europe count for much in the origin of her greatness. Yet once, at least, the nation asserted itself in the deliberate rejection of a policy which was inconsistent with the national purpose. For the Stuarts represented a great relapse from the cause of Protestantism and of the independence of nations ; they tried to take England into the camp of absolutism, civil and religious, and of French supremacy in Europe. Their fall was the expression of England's will to be true to herself and her calling. An issue not less weighty is now before the nation ; and upon the decision rests the fate of England and of the British Empire, and, to some extent, the future of the world. The outlines may even now be seen of a European combination, of which the purport can be nothing else than to usurp England's function of keeping the balance of Europe, to secure the peace of the continent without her, and so to take

from her and put into commission among the Powers the command of the sea, and its accompaniment of Empire. This is a situation that calls for initiative ; and action or inaction alike are fraught with tremendous consequences, which the nation can by no possibility evade. Thus the nation is responsible, first of all to itself. The Englishmen of to-day stand between their forefathers, who have left them a heritage of greatness, and their children, who are entitled to receive that inheritance undiminished. But Great Britain has also to answer to her colonies for her management of Empire. The colonies look to her. If she leads they will follow. But they cannot take her place of power, and if she abandons her own cause it will be impossible for them to help her, and they must help themselves as best they can.

The Liberal party long maintained the principle that the state exists to give scope to every man for the exercise of his best powers. The Conservative party has been regarded as the exponent of the need of a foreign policy. The truth, revealed by a search for England's purpose in the world, is that the two views are two aspects of the same thing, and that both meet and are reconciled in the national duty.

In the struggle for existence we are told that the fittest survive. Fitness means suitability to the work to be done ; and the organisation called government must adapt itself, in England as elsewhere, to the conditions of the world and of the time. It is

worse than useless to modify the national institutions without regard to the environment of the nation, without regard to Europe and to the continents that are daily coming closer to Europe. The signs of the times show plainly that for England and the British Empire the struggle for existence is to be renewed.

If the nation is divided against itself, if the spirit of sacrifice and of devotion to the country has grown weak, if the crisis finds us unready and unled, we may expect in peace the humiliation and in war the defeat we shall have deserved.

It is impossible to believe that such a fate, which has long been foretold by our enemies and even by our friends on the continent, is inevitable. Thousands of Englishmen are tired and ashamed of the factions which have absorbed our political life until "politics" has become a byword. There must be hundreds who grasp the character of the present situation and are possessed with a sense of their country's aims. The first of them who will boldly speak his mind, setting forth to the nation its true self and its great purpose in the world, will promptly be recognised. He will find himself the representative of the best of his countrymen, and strong in their support, will be lifted above himself and consecrated to a noble work. Such a man may unite and lead the nation, becoming in the effort the statesman for whom we look.

His task will be to assert England's aims in action. The result must be, either to impose upon Europe a peaceful settlement, embracing the affairs of half the world, or to lay bare the causes of a conflict that is perhaps inevitable, and for which, in that case, the nation would be prepared. Aroused and united we need not fear a challenge. It would lead to a knitting together of the British race, to a fresh expansion of British energies and to a growth of British character, under the discipline of duty, to new degrees of firmness, self-confidence and generosity. We should hand down to our children, not tarnished nor dimmed but brighter than ever, the illustrious name of England.

THE END.









